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NICOLAS BERDYAEV: A CONCi IDERA TION OF HIS 
THOUGHT AND INFLUENCE 
The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. 
No quotation from it should be published without 
his prior written consent and information derived 
from it should be acknowledged. 
The aim of this thesis is to exAmine the general development 
of' the thought of' Nicola.s Berd;{aev, and then to examine in 
a more detailed way the influence of his work on some aspects 
of theological ~iscussion in Britain up to the time of his 
death in 1947. 
The thesis therefore falls into two parts. In the first three 
chapters there is an account of Berdyaev's career. Chapter 
1 sets out Ute events of his early life in Russia and demon-
strates how this influenced his spiritual and intellectual 
development. Chapter 2 goes on to look in more detail at 
the people who greatly influenced this phase of Berdyaev 1 s 
develonmen t. I By contrast, chapter 3 outlines Berdyaev s 
career in the West, with particular reference to his contrib-
ution to personalist forms of thought, mainly in France, but 
also in Britain. 
Having completed a chronological account of Berdyaev 1 s life 
and the development and influence of his thought, the second 
part of the thesis turns to a consideration of one particular 
aspect of his thought; the doctrine of God, which introduces 
us to many of Berdyaev 1 s most important and often repeated 
ideas. The thesis proceeds to draw attention to how these 
ideas related to the discussion of the same subject among some 
British theologians of the time. 
In th~ conclusion the thesis attempts to point to those as-
pects of Berdyaev 1 s work which seem to connect with questions 
raised by modern thoelogical inquiry. Here we deal with broad 
themes rather than detBiled analysis. 1 t is the present dis-
cussion of these themes which would seem to justify our in-
terest in the work of Nicolas Berdyaev. 
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CHAPTER 1. EARLY YEARS IN RUSSIA • 
i. Family Background and Childhood Development. 
The sources of information about 
background are few. Not the least reason for this is his 
own reticence in writing about himself, about biographical 
details, that is, as opposed to expounding his intellectual 
positions. In the preface to his autobiography, Berdyaev 
asserts that 11 I do not want to write reminiscences about 
the happenings which occurred in the course of my life" (l): 
although it is a work of autobiography, he does not intend 
that it should conform to the normal sort of catalogue of 
past experiences. It will, rather, be "a philosophical 
autobiography or a history of spirit and self-knowledge. ••( 2 ) 
There can, then, be little objective reflection on the 
events which surround Berdyaev's early life. An aspect of 
his character which also contributes towards this reticence 
about biographical details is his rejection of family bonds. 
At the beginning of Dream and Reality he comments: "I was 
never conscious of 'belonging' to my parents; and the 
relations of kindred, the ties of blood, the 'generic' 
evoked a strange aversion in me.u( 3 ) Thus, he disliked 
intensely the notion of family likenesses and, indeed, 
family life in general. This feature of Berdyaev's 
personality extended also to his own marriage to Lydia 
'(udiforna Trusheff. Nowhere in this book does he ever refer 
to her as his wife, although the marriage was an intensely 
happy one; instead he prefers to speak of her as a "Life-
long friend".( 4) 
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However, Berdyaev 9 s autobiography does provide us with some 
details of his life and career. And perhaps his subjective 
manner of writing has the beneficial aspect of offering a 
personal judgement on his inner experiences, as opposed to 
leaving that to others to make. Apart from Berdyaev 9 s 
autobiography, the other primary materials which still exists 
is a collection of Berdyaev's correspondence. At least some 
part of this has been preserved intact(5)and this was left 
after Bardyaev's death in the keeping of his friends. 
Donald Lowrie acknowledges his indebtedness to the members 
of the Berdyaev Society in Paris, from whom he received much 
unpublished information about Berdyaev. In particular,Lowrie 
' mentions those sections of Berdyaev s correspondence,together 
with her own reminiscences, which Eugenie Rapp, Berdyaev's 
sister-in-law, gave him, and the historical details and 
reminiscences of Mme. Tamara Kl~pinine, a close friend of 
Berdyaev. 
, 
Mme. Klepinine has herself produced a definitive 
bibliography of Berdyaev's works, together with a chrono-
logical outline of his life.( 6 ) These two works, by Donald 
Lowrie and Tamara Kl~inine theref·ore assume, in the absence 
of other material, an authority which gives them a value not 
much less than that of Berdyaev's own autobiography. 
Nicolas Alexandrovich Berdyaev was born in March 1874.(7) 
His father was Alexander Michailovitch Berdyaev and his 
mother was born Princess Kudashev. His father's family had 
a distinguished military history, his grandfather having been 
an ataman of the Don Cossacks. His mother's family were 
half French and part of the aristocracy; his maternal grand-
mother was the Countess Choiseul. Thus, Berdyaev is able to 
remark quite casually, "I am by origin a member of the 
Russian gentry: this is not, I believe, mere chance, for 
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has left its mark on my mental make-up. My parents belonged 
Ia) 
to ;Society', not simply to gentry.u\v It is certainly true 
that throughout his life Berdyaev was aware· of the existence 
of an aristocracy? and claimed membership of it? although he 
rejected the notion that it should be based on distinctions 
of social class.(9) However, it is also clear that Berdyaev 
inherited some of the more distinctive traits of his parents. 
Berdyaev confesses to being "quick-tempered and inclined to 
outbursts of anger", a characteristic which he might well 
have inherited from his father, whom he describes as 
"extremely impetuous".(lO) This hot temperament is also 
seen in Berdyaev's brother, Serge, whom Berdyaev describes 
as "unstable, neurotic, lacking in character and very unhappy 
because he was not able to realize his gifts in life. u(ll) 
Serge Berdyaev 1 s relations with his parents seem to have been 
extremely stormy; in part this was due to the fact that he 
refused to pursue a military career. He developed an interest 
in oriental religion and the occult, and it may be that Nicolas 
was first introduced to this by his brother; certainly it 
features repeatedly in his later work~ 12 ) As a student, Serge 
got into trouble with the authorities for revd.utionary 
activity and was thereafter always under police surveillance. 
He married and died young. Lowrie quotes a letter in which 
Serge's son, Alexa mer, wri tea from Russia to a friend in 
Paris, nwe are the last of the Berdyaev's- with us the 
family dies out.u(l3 ) 
From his mother, Berdyaev inherited a refined sensitivity and 
delicateness. Descriptions of his mother and a photograph 
made in the mid- -eigh~een- n'~nebes, suggest that Berdyaev 
inherited some of her fine features, especially her eyes. 
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Berdyaev acknowledges this sensitivity in his character; 
he declares that he is "particularly sensitive to smell" 
and is "profoundly appreciative of physical beauty". (l4) 
However, this aspect of his character also revaled itself 
in poor health. 11 Illnesses have played a considerable part 
in my lirett, Berdyaev wri tea, and this seems particularly to 
have been true of the early part of his life. One ailment 
which remained with him for the rest of hie life was a tic 
douloureux. This was a nervous disorder, and something 
which Berdyaev was quite unable to control, even though 
towards the end of hie life he was occasionally able to 
avert a spasm. Lowrie records a description of this 
affliction: 
Those who- knew him well became so accustomed 
to it that they, like Berdyaev himse~f, almost 
failed to notice it, but for strangers itwas a 
painful, almost frightening, experience. Almost 
without warning the head would be thrown back, 
the fine fact distorted with a tortured grimace, 
and from the twisted, wide-open mouth the tongue 
would be thrust out. In a few seconds the 
spasm would pass, and the face return to its 
normal state •.••• For both boy and man, this 
infirmity was doubtless a significant element 
in Berdyaev's psychology. It certainly 
increased the child's feeling of peculiarity, 
a part of his earliest consciousness.(l5) 
The 11£ was to become the source of great t@rme~t to 
Berdyaev when as a boy of ten he was sent to a military 
Academy in the Kiev Cadet Corps, near where his family 
lived. Until this time he had enjoyed the security of 
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the familV. home in Kiev, or life on family estates in the 
country. The experiences of living a largely solitary and 
ungoverned life in the tempestuous atmosphernof his home was 
a formative part of Berdyaev 9 s development. Lowrie points 
out that Nicolas was fifteen years younger than his brother 
Serge, and it was therefore with relatively aged parents that 
he grew up. This, coupled with the privilege of private 
income, meant that he "grew up almost uninfluenced by the 
outside world. From his first childhood steps he never 
knew any authority and never recognized any -never 
experienced such a thing as external control •.••• 
Apparently his outbursts of anger, when he would beat his 
head on his small chair, were not considered anything for 
which he should be corrected. u(l6 )That Berdyaev was a 
difficult child whom his parents did not fully understand is 
hinted at in his autobiography, when he mentions the 
development of his father's affection for him as he grew up.(l7) 
It is also probably fair to say that the inclination of 
Berdyaev's father towards liberal views did not inspire him 
to discipline his son. It may well be that the young 
Berdyaev inherited his rejection of the establishment, which 
eventually led to participation in Marxist revolutionary 
activity, from his father. Berdyaev writes that his father's 
convictions "underwent a crisis and he made liberal ideas more 
and more his own. lie gradually broke with established 
traditions and often came into conflict with the society in 
which he lived."(lB) Another aspect of life at home which 
contrasted sharply with the Academy was Berdyaev's ability 
to read and to 1 earn. He comments that he knew French and 
German from childhood, and by the age of seven had travelled 
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to Karlsbad with his mother. (l9) Although this may or may not 
show an aptitude for leax•ning, Berdyaev claimed that "I read 
Schopenhauer's World as Will and Idea, Kant's Critique of 
~ure Reason and Hegel's Phenomenology of Mind and the first 
part of the Encyclopaedia in my father's library. 11 ( 20) 
'!'his gives a picture of Berdyaev having a lively mind and 
wilful temperament. It seems that the disciplining of the 
latter at school seriously affected the former. The 
curtailment of his freedom, together with social failure 
among his fellow cadets, combined to produce an unsatisfactory 
school career, which seems to have continued on into university 
days. Berdyaev offers his own explanation for this·, for he 
comments that: 
Fundamentally~ I, .wa13 unable L.t.o '"l~eCQ.ijCi,~e,t)lllY§.~J,f • 
with any institutional education, even that of the 
University. This is, perhaps, partly due to the 
fact that I never managed to suceed at school, even 
though, or because, I began to develop intellectually 
earlier than usual ••.••. My abilities betrayed 
themselves only when I took the initiative in my 
thinking, when my mind became consciously active 
and creative: they remained hidden and unknown to 
myself while my mind was passive, merely 
assimilating or memorizing something that was 
external to me ••••• I am incapable of retorting, 
echoing in a passive way~ I instantly want to 
develop my own line of thought. (2l) 
We have dealt in some detail with these aspects of Berdyaev's 
childhood background and development, because they do provide 
a ver.y impcrtant contribution to the way his thought was to 
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develop. It is, of course, difficult to know how much of 
the mature man the author of an autobiography is writing into 
an account of early childhood. Inevitably, some reflections 
cannot be disputed. Berdyaev undoubtedly belonged to the 
Russian gentry and enjoyed in childhood all the benefits of 
that class. lt seems likely that his parents were highly 
strung, and some aspects of this tension have been inherited 
by Berdyaev himself, the tic being an example of this. It 
also seems likely that Berdyaev's early childhood was largely 
undisciplined. One senses that in his chapter on this period 
Lowrie is making use of personal reminiscences from one source 
or another; for example, the details of the incident with the 
chair are not mentioned in Dream and Reality. Given these 
facta, it is highly probable that Berdyaev was not suC:cessful 
at the Academy. From these various aspects of his background 
there emerge some quite distinctive features of Berdyaev's 
later thought. 
The first, most obvious feature to emerge is Berdyaev's feeling 
for his native land. This, of course, could be true of any 
Russian, but it might also be fair to say that Berpyaev's 
membership of a Russian family whose distinguished military 
history went back several generations heightened this awareness. 
He records with some pride the story of how his grandfather 
11 conquered11 Napoleon (22 )and at the end of his autobiography he 
offers the following observations on the Nazi invasion of 
Russia: 11 I tel t that ~ Russia was exposed to mo rta 1 danger, 
that she might be dismembered and enslaved ••.• For my part, 
I never lost faith in the invincibility of Russia, although 
the dangers to which she was exposed were a source of 
unspeakable agony for me. My inborn patriotism •..•. raached 
an extraordinary intensity. I felt myself one with the 
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successes and failures of the Red Army ... ( 23)And this comes 
I ~• \ 
from one who had been exiled from Russia for twenty years.~~4 J 
We have already observed that Berdyaev's awareness of his 
membership of the Russian gentry gave him a feeling of 
aristocracy which he developes beyond the C8tegory of social 
class in his philosophy. 
by President Masaryk: 
The following assessment is offered 
The lack or the deJiloC):a tile ie:p4t:1$ 
q~aracterizes the apostates of Signposts ( a 
symposium to which Berdyaev contributed in 1909). 
Berdyaev, one of their spokesmen, aspires towards 
a mystical form of aristocracy. Aristocracy is 
ever mythopoeic and mystical.( 25) 
In addition to Berdyaev's social background, the period into 
which he was born must be seen as a formative in:tlue·nce. 
For the nineteenth century was a time of enormous cultural 
and philosophical development in Russia, and to this the 
revolutionary fervour of the early years of the twentieth 
century can be traced. Much of the development of 
philosophical thought took its inspiration from western 
sources. Nicholas Zernov speaks of the emergence of a new 
generation of educated Russians. Not drawn from the 
traditional land-owning class, and therefore possessing a 
different psychology, these believed that "Europe could 
provide them with ready-made weapons for combating the social 
and political evils of their own country." ( 26 ) This was the 
period of the development of the intelligentsia in Russia. 
In reaction to the state-imposed restrictions on the teaching 
of philosophy in the early part of the nineteenth century, 
the latter half saw a very rapid development. A correspond-
ing cultural and religious development seems to have been 
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slower to get going. Nicholas Lossky comments on the reign 
of Alexander II: 
In condi tidns of.. _ -f'ar·'g.rea-ter -f'r~edometha:needom tl'!.an. 
ever before the Russian philosophy developed rapidly 
and soon reached the level of Western-European thought 
o e e e In the domain of religious philosophy, Vladimir 
Solovyev\:s_ brilliant name was prominent. In this 
lifetime, however, religious problems had but little 
interest for the Russian Intelligentsia. One part 
of it was morbidly preoccupied with the problems of 
abolishing autocracy, and the other was equally one-
sidedly engrossed in social and economic ·questions 
and the problem of introducing socialism. It was 
not until the end of the nineteenth and the beginning 
of the twentieth century that a considerable section 
of the Russian Intelligentsia rreed itself from this 
morbid monoideism. Wide circles of the public began 
to show interest in religion, in metaphysical and 
ethical idealism, in aesthetics, in the idea of the 
nation and in spiritual values in genera1.( 27) 
It is exactly into this philosophical situation that 
Berdyaev's early thought is developed, and the contents of 
his father's library, Schopenhauer, Kant, Hegel, &c. reflect 
the trends of the period. Berdyaev mentioned the change in 
social outlook which he noticed in his father, a reflection 
of the influence of the liberal views prevalent in the country 
at the time. The same influence can be seen in Serge 
Berdyaev's unfortunate career. The embracing of a Marxist 
philosophy by Nicolas Berdyaev is also a part of this general 
trend, encouraged, in his case, by family considerations. 
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However 9 Berdyaev also inherits from his home background 
another interest in an aspect of Russian culture which came 
to fruition in the nineteenth century; that of literature. 
It is in the context of political stagnation that what 
Zernov terms 11 the golden classical age of' Russian 11 tera ture 11 
develops. Lossky speaks of it as "having universal 
significance .. ; he offers as evidence of this the names of 
Pushkin, Gogol, Turgenev, Tolstoy, Dostoevsky.< 28 ) lernov 
lists many more. ( 29) These names appear again and again 
throughout Berdyaev's work. Obviously he was deeply 
influenced by them, and in particular by Dostoevsky. In 
this re~ect, the fact that Berdyaev grew up in a household 
which was well supplied with the works of these men is 
another reflection of the formative influence of his early 
years. Part of the attraction of some of these works, 
Tolstoy's War and Peace for example, might be the sentimental 
regard for a first novel from father's library. Berdyaev 
himself suggests a sentimentality of this kind in his 
autobiography, and he comments on the strength of this bond: 
As I recall my childhood and adolescence and even my 
last years, I realize the tremendous significance 
which Dostoevsky and Tolstoy had for me. I always 
felt some peculiar bond with the heroes of Tolstoy's 
and Dostoevsky's novels; with Ivan Karamazov, Versilov, 
Stavrogin, Prince Andrey, and even those whom 
Dostoevsky called 'the pilgrims of the Russian land' ••• 
This feeling marked, perhaps, my deepest ties with 
Russia and her destiny.(30) 
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Rebellionp and its associate, freedom, are two motifs which 
run throughout Berdyaev 9 s life and work~ If', as we are 
suggesting here, they stem from a certain aspect of his own 
chara<f'ter 9 this is not to deny that he found encouragement 
for them in what he read and experienced. For this reason, 
Ivan Karamazov's rebellion is of particular importance to him, 
as is "The Legend of the Grand Inquisitor". In the latter, 
the problem of freedom is raised in an acute form and it was 
an interest in this which motivated so much of Berdyaev's 
thought. The concept of freedom was the basis of Berdyaev's 
interest in Jacob Boehme, the German mystical philosopher. 
Here, an attraction to a certain author can again be seen to 
stem from Berdyaev's own particular development and 
personality: 
Some h~ clilllled me the Ap:h.itb.osopher ··of· :freedom 
and a reactionary Russian bishop once said that I was 
'the captive of freedom'. I do, indeed, love freedom 
above all else •.•. Freedom is a primordial source and 
condition of existence and, characteristically, I have 
put freedom rather than Being, at the basis of my 
philosophy ••••• I might say that all my life I was 
engaged on hammering out a philosophy of freedom. 
I was moved by the conviction that God is truly present 
and operative only in freedom.(3l). 
Boehme's conception of freedom, which is based on the idea of 
a primary ungrund or "groundlessness" from which freedom 
issues was the only teaching on the subject which Berdyaev 
found "satisfactory". It could also be pointed out that 
Boehme's esoteric and gnostic style of writing probably 
appealed to Berdyaev's sense of aristocracy of spirit and 
other-worldliness. Berdyaev speaks of "the prominence in 
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II· 
myself of homo mysticus over homo religiosus. Acknowledging 
Eckhart, Boehme and Angelus Silesius as more congenial to him 
than many other doctors of the Church, he comments that this 
"has set a seal upon my whole :philosophical outlook. 0 0. 
mysticism understood as a mode of knowledge rather than a 
finished product has always exercised my imagination • .,(3 2 ) • 
' One final point about Berdyaev s home background and its 
influence upon his development is the very city in which the 
family lived, Kiev. As a large industrial town and provided 
with a University, Kiev contained two important elements for a 
revolutionary atmosphere in which Berdyaev was to develop ; 
the students were equipped with political theory which fuelled 
their revolutionary activity, while the factory workers 
provided them with a cause for which to campaign. At the time 
when Berdyaev was a student at the Universi cy, Kiev was "one 
of the chief centres of the ~ocial-Democratic movement at the 
time; there was a secret printing press, and revolutionary 
literature was produced in considerable quanti ties." (33) 
ii. UniverBity and Political Activity. 
So far we have looked at the particular influences which 
contributed to Berdyaev's development during the first twenty 
years of his life. As we move on to this section, which 
deals with his student days, it is possible to see how some 
aspects of his development reflect a wider trend in the upper 
classes of Russian Society, and in particular among the rising 
intelligentsia. 
Berdyaev entered the University in 1894 and enrolled at first 
to read Natural Science, then changed to Law. He comments in 
Dream and Reality that by this time he had already felt 
compelled to break with the gentry; he even went so far as 
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"to seek only the company o'f those (particularly o'f Jews) 
o'f whom I knew 'for certain that they were neither o'f the 
gentry nor my relatives. ,/34) It was, therefore, inevitable 
that Berdyaev should choose the most extreme and active of 
the two revolutionary parties in the University, the Social 
Democrats; the other, the Social Revolutionary Party, was 
a strongly Slavophil organization. Berdyaev comments on 
the di'f'ferences within the revolutionary movement o'f this 
period, di'f'ferences which were later reflected in the 
Menshevik and Bolshevik factions during the turmoil of 1917: 
Marxism in Russia involved a crisis among the left 
Intelligentsia and led to a breach with a certain 
number of its traditions. It arose among us in the 
second halt' of the 'eighties as a result or the 
'failure of Russian narodnik socialism, which was 
unable to 'find any support among the peasantry, and 
of the shock to the party of 'The People's Will' 
caused by the murder of Alexander II. The old forms 
of the revolutionary socialist movement seemed to be 
outlived and it was necessary to seek new forme. A 
group known as 'The Emancipation of Labour' took ita 
rise and laid the foundations of Russian Marxism. 
Among the members of thi a group were G. V. Plekhanov, 
B. Axelrod, V. Zasulich. The Marxists gave a 
di'fferent value to the narodnik idea that Russia could 
and should avoid capitalist development. They were 
in 'favour o'f the development o'f capital ism hot as in 
itself' a good thing, but because the development or 
capitalism would promote the development of the working 
class and that would be the one and only revolutionary 
14 
class in Russia •.•. A strong Marxist movement 
developed in Russia in the second half of the 'nineties 
and it secured ita hold upon ever wider circles of the 
Intelligensia. At the same time, a workers' movement 
also came into being. Within a large number of 
groups a conflict was going on between the Marxists 
and the narodniks and victory inclined more and more 
to the side of the Marxists; Marxist periodicals made 
their appearance. (35) 
Against the background of this development of political 
ideology in intellectual circles, Berdyaev himself at this 
transitional stage between school and university experienced 
an important and formative personal development. He speaks 
of this as a "first conversion", and yet not a conversion in 
the accepted sense. He does not refer to a religious 
experience. Memories of Orthodoxy as part of his early life 
seem to be few; he therefore had no occasion to fall away 
from, or to return to, a traditional faith.(36 )Berdyaev 
writes instead of a two-fold motive in man's lif'e, and it 
was the particular moment of his perception of this which 
marked what he terms "a true inner revolution". He 
understood this two-fold motive as a search for meaning and 
a search for the eternal. As the pattern of his life 
emerged, the search for meaning led him towards a Marxist 
philosophy. This was in order to make sense of the destiny 
of man and his place in society. But the other aspect of 
the motive, a search for the eternal, led him to a search 
for God. Here he found the source of Truth. It is of 
some importance to understand that Berdyaev regarded 
aspects of this motive in his life as inseparable; in his 
1 5 
search ror the eternal he wished to rind something which 
would render life meaningful. Even if' his search1ere to 
be in vain 9 Berdyaev could not but believe that the very 
search itself would give to life some significance. 
Unrortunately 9 the account or this experience which Berdyaev 
wrote at the time was taken when he was arrested by the 
police while a student. Berdyaev himselr regretted having 
lost the manuscript, and it seems almost as though some part 
or that experience, which was a determining ractor in his 
lire, was lost with it. He writes: 
I should have liked now to read what l wrote then, 
so as to re-live and recapture a rirst initiation 
into the mystery or life. This was undoubtedly a 
kind or conversion - the most powereful and perhaps 
the only one in my lire. It was the conversion to 
the search ror truth: •••.• But the change was not 
evidence of a conversion to any religious confession, 
either to Orthodoxy or even to Christianity in 
general. It was above all a re-orientation towards 
spirit and spirituality. (3~) 
It is important to understand that Bepd·yaev's basic 
orientation in this direction was established before any 
other ideology was adopted. For this is at the heart, not 
only of his adoption of Marxism, but also of his progression 
through it to Idealism and finally Christianity. Reflecting 
on his Marxist days, he observes that "I never abandoned 
this rundarnental attitude, not even throughout my Marxist 
period. I do not think that people holding such a 
basically 'spiritualist' conviction can ever be thoroughly 
going materialists, or are susceptible of any orthodnxy, 
religious or otherwise.u(3B) 
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Although before going up to the University, Berdyaev had 
already developed an inclination towards Marxism, his 
introduction into Marxist circles actually took place during 
his first year there. He became a close friend of a fellow 
student in the Faculty of Natural Science, David Logvinsky. 
This friendship, although close, was not to last long; 
Logvinsky was exiled to Siberia and died there. He seems to 
have shared Berdyaev's philosophical interests and was 
responsible for introducing him into an active Marxist group, 
among whom was Anatoli Lunacharsky, the first Commissar of 
Education under the Soviet regime. Among the revolutionary 
factions in student circles at this time, Berdyaev speaks of 
his attraction to the Marxist Social Democratic Party as 
focused in its "characteristic appreciation of the moving 
forces below the surface of history, its consciousness of 
the historic hour, its broad historical perspectives and its 
universalism. 11 (39) The westernizing influence of this group 
was also very strong. It is interesting that in ~ite of 
the p~ound effect which Tolstoy, Dostoevsky, &c. had on 
Berdyaev's early life, he can at this period find himself 
feeling "very anti-nationalistic." 
Berdyaev appears to have been an enthusiastic member of the 
Party and to have played a leading role in its affairs. He 
speaks of giving lectures, reading papers and even travel 
abroad on its behalf. Lowrie mentions that Berdyaev 
attended a meeting of European trade unions in Zurich in 
the summer of l897(40)and Berdyaev himself speaks of meeting 
the 11 founders and leaders of the whole movement, 11 and being 
in touch with the emigres, a group led by Plekhanov, ~elrod 
and Vera Zasulich~4l) It was at about this period that 
Berdyaev was arrested for the first time. Lowrie attributes 
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the cause of the demonstration to the news that a woman in 
St. Petersburg had committed suicide in protest against the 
r~gime. (42 )But the event had not been serious and no charges 
were made. The demonstration, arrest and subsequent release 
do serve, however, to illustrate the highly excitable 
atmosphere in which Berdyaev was living. He writes of this 
period of his life as one of the most exhilarating, 
enthusiastic and creative. He also had other interests 
outside the Marxist circle. Among these was Professor 
Georgi Chelpanov, a man of varied interests, whose critical 
judgement Berdyaev valued, and whose society o!'fered a 
valuable contrast to "the specific intellectual atmosphere 
of Marxist circles."(43 ) Another friendship formed at this 
time was that with Leo Shestov. He was probably one of the 
cloeest friends Berdyaev ever had; their association lasted 
until Shestov's death in Paris just before the second World 
War. They both shared an interest in Dostoevsky but also 
in Nietzsche. 
It was also in this period prior to his exile that an unease 
came over Berdyaev and his views began to change. Among 
his interests outside party matters was an appreciation of 
Russian symbolism; he speaks also of r~ading a great deal 
of Ibsen, who at this time because a favourite writer. 
These were signs of an alienation from orthodox Marxist 
circles, though that alienation did not become fully evident 
until the period of exile. Yet, in spite of these 
differences, Be rdyaev was s ti 11 able to write that "the 
period before my exile was also the time of my greatest 
p opula ri ty. " ( 44 ) 
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Early in 1898 the Social-Democratic Party suffered a major 
set-back when a hundred and firty or its leading members 
were arrested, Berdyaev among them. (45) Initially 9 the 
conditions in wnich the prisoners were kept were relaxed 
and they were able to hold meetings. The prison was 
visited by the Governor-General of Kiev, General Dragomirov, 
a friend of Berdyaev's parents, who showed some understanding 
of the students' views. Through the influence of his father, 
Berdyaev was not held long and was released on bail. However, 
as a result of the evidence that had been collected against 
him, Berdyaev was sentenced two years later to exile under 
police surveillance in the Vologda province. It was during 
this period immediately prior to exile that Berdyaev began to 
write. His first articles was entitled "F. A. Lange and 
Critical Philosophy in its Relation to Socialism," and was 
published in German in a Marxist journal entitled Neue Zeit~46) 
Berdyaev's first book was also written at this time: it was 
entitled Subjectivism and Individualism in Social Philosophy 
and was published in St. Petersburg in 1901. (47) Berdyaev 
comments on this book that it sought to define the relation 
between ·~ . .P..r!ori' and concrete man. The signs or his 
departure f'rom what was acceptable in orthodox Marxist circles 
are evident here, and f'or this reason the work is important in 
Berdyaev's development. He claims in hB autobiography that 
in this book he "repudiated the mtaphysical implications of 
materialism". (48 ) Another important reature of this book is 
that it contained a preface by Peter Struve. Berdyaev 
obtained special permission while still on bail to go to 
St. Petersburg. While there, he met Peter Struve in the 
home of his cousin, Prince Trepov, a Minister of the lnterior. 
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The formation of a connection with the intelligentsia in 
St. Petersburg was significant for Berdyaev: it gave him 
an opportunity to meet with intellectuals who were 
sympathetic with his own views but critical also of Marxist 
philosophyo Berdyaev says of Struve that he was 
the doyen of the intelligentsia at the time, and 
a central figure in its mental evolution ••. he 
said in a letter to a friend that he had ' great 
hopes~ of me. But, though we were part of the 
same movement of so-called critical Marxism, I 
occupied a much more leftish position than he. 
Struve gave out the impression of being attracted 
by the doctrine of Marx because it seemed to him 
to provide an historical justification for 
industrial capitalism. (49) 
Berdyaev also alludes to the literary connections which he 
made while he was in St. Petersbrug: these were to be of 
great importance in the years after his return from exile. 
It is not easy to assess what the period of eXile was like 
or exactly what effect it had on Berdyaev. The regime under 
which Berdyaev lived seems to have been extremely congenial. 
He had accommodation at an Inn called the 'Golden Anchor' 
and was allowed a considerable degree of freedom. This was 
due largely to the influence of distant family relations.< 5o) 
However, the company seems not to have been so pleasant, 
being made up mostly of Social Democrats. The feelings of 
aristocracy of spirit again reveal themselves during this 
episode. In reaction to his fellow exiles, Berdyaev writes 
that "I just could not feign enthusiasm for this whole mental 
atmosphere and I do not think my reaction was evidence of 
any intellectual snobber.y. The exiles, in their turn, 
looked down on me as a romantic, an 'aristocrat' and a 
'black swan'." ( 51 ) However, perhaps a considerable part 
of this t'eeling of' estrangement stemmed from the 
i publication of Berdyaev s book, not long after their arrival 
at Vologda. Berdyaev notes that the book caused some 
discussion among the Vologda exiles, among whom Lunacharsky 
and the1~~t~crlt~ci3.st Bojdanovu were especially hostile. 
It was as though Berdyaev had been exiled with the wrong 
people; he was now leaving the Social Democrats behind and 
travelling his own path. He now found himself ttalong with 
some others, at the head of the movement subsequently 
christened by Bergey Bulgakov 'From Marxism to Idealism'.u(52 ) 
But the book no longer interested Berdyaev, who had moved 
further along the road to Idealism. The use of these terms 
has a particular application in Russia at this time. 
Masaryk observed that "when we talk of From Marxism to 
Idealism, we have to understand by idealism, religion as 
the definite opposite of materialism. In Russia, 
materialism signifies irreligion or antireligion, and in 
the narrower sphere, atheism. 11 (53) 
A reaction to this loneliness seems to have taken place in 
the form of a "surrender to the Dionysian elemen ttt. 
Exactly what the nature of the surrender was, Berdyaev does 
not say. He merely comments that it was a characteristic 
feature of the 'nineties which entailed a substitution of 
beauty for truth, and of individualism for social 
responsibility; it was a mood which lasted though from the 
latter part of his exile until about a year afterwards, 
during which time he wrote almost nothing. 
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It was the note of indivudualism which caused alarm to 
Berdyaev's fellow exiles; for this was the sign of a 
tendency towards a quite different form of revolutionary 
feeling, towards the Russian socialism of Milhailovsky 
and Belinsky. This latter was concerned far more with a 
love of humanity- what Belinsky terms "Marat's love", and 
therefore rebelled against all forms of suffering. Here, 
Berdyaev's earlier sympathy with Dostoevsky's hero, Ivan 
Karamazov, again emerges. He observes that "Belisnky 
had already sharply underlined the problem of how 'the 
little child's poor tears' are a necessary condition of 
creation of the problem which Dostoevsky later put into 
the mouth of Ivan in ~e Brothers Karamaz OY' •••••• Russian 
nihilistic and atheistic socialism arises out of compassion 
for the suffering personality and defence of it against 
society. The purely Russian socialism of the so-called 
narodniki (lovers of the people) was individualistic in its 
origin: one still notices that in the 'seventies in 
N.Mikhailovsky, who built up a whole theory of 'the struggle 
for individuality•n(S4). Berdyaev had earlier developed an 
interest in Mikhailovsky but this had been lost beneath the 
influence of the Marxists he had encountered in the 
University. During this period of restlessness the questions 
raised by the relation between the idea of humani -cy and the 
individual were stirring in Berdyaev's mind. Lowrie 
describes this period as one in which Berdyaev showed a 
surface carefree abandon but underneath there was "deep 
unrest and even dismay". (55) 
This was in the period after the exile when Berdyaev went to 
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live at Zhitomir 9 before being permitted to return to Kiev 
at the end of 1903. A description of Berdyaev's loneliness 
and disorientation is well presented by Michael Vallon; he 
observes that 11 at heart (Berdyaev) kept harbouring his past 
leanings towards Marxism. But he also sensed that the 
relationships with the revolutionaries had reached the point 
of no return: he could not backtrack on his present 
ideological position." (56 ) 1he way forward for Berdyaev was 
through the friendship of Serge Bulgakov, whom he had first 
met while visiting Kiev from Vologda. At thi s time , 
Bulgakov was working as professor of political economy at 
the Polytechnic Institute in Kiev, though he had ualready 
definitely adopted a religious position and was a Christian 
and a practising Orthodox. u(57) 
Bulgakov's progress away from Marxism had not been so 
different from that of Berdyaev. In Loesky's opinion he 
had shown signs of dissatisfaction with orthodox Marxist 
economics as early as 1900 in his work on economics, 
Capitalism and Agriculture~5B) However, it had been five years 
earlier than this that Bulgakov had experienced his first 
crisis: through intellectual growth the light of his child-
hood had faded and a religious emptiness had taken hold of 
his soul; "and then suddenly this came •••• Mysterious calls 
rang on my soul, and it rushed to meet them.u(59) 
(It should be noted that Bulgakov had come from a strongly 
clerical family: he was, therefore, rediscovering the faith 
of his fathers. Berdyaev comments that Bulgakov's 11 whole 
background was pervaded by the a trnosphere ·of Orthodox 
Tradition" (Dream and Reality p .17 4) Tm s atmosphere was 
unfamiliar to Berdyaev.) In 1902 Berdyaev contributed an 
article entitled "The Ethical Problem in the Life of 
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Philosophical Ide ali sm11 to a symposium which contained 
essays by Bulgakov, Struve and other "ex-marxists and neo-
idealistso11(60) On his return finally to Kiev in 1903, 
Berd¥aev consolidated his friendship with Bulgakov; 
philosophically they had much in common, though ~erdyaev 
had not yet developed a Christian outlooko He decided 
that a break with former associates was now the only 
possible course available to him. He therefore enrolled 
for a semester at Heidelberg to study under Professor 
Wilhelm Windelband; here Berdyaev was in the midst of the 
neo-Kantian school. Although Berdyaev had earlier in his 
life read and been influenced by Kant, the decision to go 
to Heidelberg was made under different conditions. The 
revisionism of Marxists like Struve, Bulgakov and others 
was dependant largely on a Kantian philosophy. Masaryk 
comments on the movement at this time: 
For the Russian revisionists •••• the name of Kant 
is little more than a catchword. The reference 
is really to neo-Kantianism or, to speak more 
strictly, to the various Ger~philosphers of the 
present day whose thought is related to that of 
Kant. F~.A. Lange, Schuppe, Riehl, Cohen, 
Windelband, Rickert, Stammler and others, have 
been the teachers of the Russian revisionists. 
',llroperlyr .. epeaking, therefore, Russian revi sioni em 
falls back upon Mikhailovsky. The revisionists 
accept Mikhailovsky's subjective method. The 
orthodox marxists regard this as a reversion to 
the narodniche s tvo or at any rate Plekanov 
identifies subjectivism with the narodnichestvo. 
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But as far as the metaphysics and the philosophy 
of religion are concerned, the revisionists find 
Mikhailovsky inadequate, and therefore these 
sometime marxists have returned to Solovyev and 
Dostoevsky.( 6l) 
Berdyaev's alignment with this revisionism was complete by 
1903 and this semester at Heidelberg had set the seal on 
his break with marxist materialism. Lowrie quotes from a 
letter which Berdyaev wrote in May 1903, setting out the 
stage he had then reached. Berdyaev writes that his article 
uThe struggle for Idealism" (published in June 190l}62Jas 
the beginning of his final move from positivism to 
metaphysical idealism; he claims to belong to the 
idealistic tendency which is. becoming ever more definite, 
and which is expressed in the symposium ·Problem of 
Idealism''. ( 63 ) 
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iii. s. Petersburg, the Symbolist Poets and Religious 
Renaissance. 
The rise and decline or Berdyaev's interest in Marxism 
covered a period of about ten years, rrom the time he was 
at school; through university days in Kiev 9 ending in exile. 
Having noted the course of his disenchantment with the 
materialist ideology of the Social Democrats, we see now how 
he attempted to resolve his uncertainties. We look first 
at the years Berdyaev spent in Strasbourg and then at his 
remaining years in Russia which he spent in Moscow. 
On his return to Kiev from Heidelberg, Berdyaev became 
involved with an illegal organization called the Union of 
Liberation, which had been formed in 1904 by Struve. As 
a result of his association with this organization, and 
through the agency of his friend, Bulgakov, Berdyaev met 
Lydia and Eugenie Trusheff, the daughters of a Kiev solicitor. 
The sisters were both talented. Lydia wrote poetry and 
Eugenie was a sculptress; they had not long been released 
from Detention, having been arrested for political activity. 
Berdyaev proposed to Lydia and the marriage took place in 
1904. In the autumn of that same year, Berdyaev moved to 
St. Petersburg to take over the editorship, in conjunction 
with Bulgakov, of a new periodical: Novy Put' (New Way). 
For the nemt three years Berdyaev immersed himselr in the 
cultural life and activity of St. Petersburg. This period 
was one of great political unrest, overshadowed by the 
disaster of the Russo-Japanese war in 1905. That was the 
year, too, of 'Bloody Sunday', the massacre of unarmed 
workers who were led by a young priest, Fr. Gapon. In June 
there occurred the mutiny by the crew of the battleship, 
Potemkin. The latter part of the year saw the proposition 
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of the establishment of a Duma: in December an armed 
uprising in Moscow registered disappointed reaction to the 
proposals. The attractions of the gllttering society of 
St. Petersburg, in which Berdyaev;s dandyism proved a great 
success, soon palled. He sensed a lack of real in~iration; 
there seemed to be an obligation among certain circles to 
conform to patterns of artistic styme; idealism was the 
philosophical norm: Russian Symbolists dicated the acceptable 
literary genre. Lowrie quotes from a letter in which 
Berdyaev writes that "in all the St. Petersburg society I 
have scarcely met any purity or nobility. I am so painfully 
surprised at the impurity and shallowness of this milieu, 
that I am resting my spirit in the country. 11 ( 64 ) Berdyaev 
recalls again the emergence of a Dionysian element in the 
life around him but he ultimately found it oppressive. 
There was a great awareness of the momentous times in which 
they were living and this was heightened by the "ecstatic 
creative experiences" which seemed to fill the atmosphere. 
It appeared as though a new dawn had coincided with the end 
of the old age. In later life, Berdyaev was able to speak 
of this outburst of cultural interest as the summing up of 
Russian thought during the nineteenth century: 
Only those who themselves lived through that time 
know what a creative inspiration was experienced 
among us and how the breath of the spirit took 
possession of Russian souls. Russia lived through 
a flowering of poetry and philosophy. Intense 
religious enquiry formed part of its experience, 
a mystical and occult frame of mind. As 
everywhere and always, with the genuine exaltation 
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there went the following of fashion and there were 
not a few insincere bubblers. There was not the 
necessary strength and concentration of will for a 
religious renaissance. There was too much cultural 
refinement •..• The extraordinary sense of right, the 
extraordinary simplicity of Russian literature 
disappeared. ( 65) 
Among the people Berdyaev encountered in St. Petersburg at this 
time were various of the Symbolist poets, some of whom Berdyaev 
admired. Perhaps the man whom he most respected was Dimitry 
Merezhkovsky, who was closely associated with the editing of 
Novy Put'. Also connected with the journal was Merezhkovsky's 
wife, the poetess, Zinaida Hippius, whose startli~ character 
greatly attracted Berdyaev. He speaks of having long 
discussions with her, far into the night duri.ng the winter of 
J·f1;,6) 1905. '· ~ However, their characters seem to have been too 
alike to be compatible; that friendship also ended, although 
If Lowrie records that friends felt that he never fully recovered 
from the break with Hippius ... ( 67) Berdyaev also knew Andre7 Bely 
who frequented the salons of Merezhkovsky and Hippius and who 
gives in his book The Beginning of an Age a vivid description 
of Berdyaev's presence at these gatherings; Berdyaev in turn 
speaks of him as 11 the most original and most influential of 
the Russian Symbolists."( 6B) In addition, Berdyaev ea-rned 
the admiration of Vassili Rozanov, a flamboyant writer, to 
whose brilliance Berdyaev pays great tribute, although he 
admits that Rozanov's advocacy of a pre-Christian, Jewish and 
pagan reigion of sex was "a betrayal of the human person."( 69) 
An author whose work was of some influence on Berdyaev was 
Vyacheslaw Ivanov. He w~s one of the few in the St.~etersburg 
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circle who attempted a move away from the individualism 
which had typified their outlook. He advocated a 
symphonic culture, an idea which evoked the kind of 
communion envisaged by the untranslatable Russian word 
sobornost . Berdyaev was also attracted to the mysticism 
in which Ivanov was interested, peculiar though it was to 
Ivanov himself. The friendship between tierdyaev and Ivanov 
is mentioned in Dream and Reality but a dissatisfaction 
underlies the description of it. Berdyeav used to chair 
the Wednesday evening gatherings in the Ivanovs' flat, which 
was known as "the Tower'. His observances on the irrelevance 
of these gatherings to the existence of the ordinary men and 
women who lived around them probably sums up Berdyaev's 
feelings about these three years in St. Petersburg. He notes, 
11 I cannot help realizing that "the Tower" was in the fullest 
sense of the word an ivory tower, while below in the streets 
of Petersburg the revolution was raging and the tragic destiny 
of Russia took its course. tt(70) 
The periodical which Berdyaev had come to St. Petersburg to 
edit did not prove to be much of a success. The reason for 
its failure was that two interests were being represented 
within the same Journal; the compromise between the literary 
and the philosophical and political factions proved ~e be 
unworkable. However, after this venture had failed, 
~erdyaev undertook, together with Bulgakov, the organization 
of a new journal, entitled Voprosy zhizni (Questions of Life). 
This began publication in 1905 but lasted for only one year. 
Already in Petersburg Berdyaev had found that he was moving 
away from the outlook of the intelligentsia and Idealism. 
The new work in which Questions of Life involved him was 
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instrumental in developing this move. He describes the 
journal as undertaking "the formidable task of' giving 
expression to the crisis in the world outlook of the 
intelligentsia; to the spiritual searchings of t..he time; 
the climate to the movement towards Christianity 9 and to 
the change in the climate of religious opinion. 11 ( 7l) • 
The religious aspect of the journal's work was probably 
what affected Berdyaev most during this period. The move 
from Kiev had not answered fully the questions which were 
being asked within hmself. St. ~etersburg had considerably 
widened Berdyaev's horizons but there remained "some hidden 
process going on within me as yet not susceptible of 
expression but pointing towards a deeper appreciation of 
the religious element. u(72 ) He attempted to express these 
stirrings in his book The New Religious Consciousness and 
Society, which was published in St. Petersb~g in 1907. 
A significant development in St. J:letersburg in this period 
had been the establishment in 1903 of the Religious-
Philosophical Society. The 'meetings of this Society were 
to provide an encounter between the intelligentsia, among 
whom there was an awakening of interest in religion, and the 
leaders of the Orthodox Church. The leading figure of the 
Orthodox representation was Bishop Serge Stragorodsky, the 
Rector of the St. Petersburg Theological Seminary, and later, 
under Stalin, the Patriarch of the Russian Church. There 
was inevitably a great difference between the two sides 
engaged in these meetings. On the one hand there were the 
representatives of Orthodoxy, closely identified with the 
establishment and equaipped with their own theological 
language and system, while on the other hand there were 
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the intelligentsia, the revolutionary representatives of 
arts and letters, who approached relig:i.on with interest 
and caution, ignorant of its traditions and state of growth. 
Zinaida Hippius was particularly struck by the differences 
which emerged in these meetings; 11 it was not simply the 
difference in outlook, but even in customs, habits and 
language; everything was different. We seemed to represent 
two distinct cultures. The fact of ordination was of no 
real importance. 11 (73) Merezhkovsky was similarly aware of the 
differences; he expressed them as an awareness on his part 
of inadequacy, for even though he and his friends had heard 
the second call of Christ, yet uwe are still in the darkness, 
but we are approaching the festival hall, though we feel 
ashamed of our secular dress, which is so unsuitable for an 
ecclesiastical occasion."(74) 
Berdyaev mys little in his autobiography about these meetings, 
or the effect they had upon him. The time that he spent in 
St. Petersburg was a period of bewilderment, expectation, 
disillusion~ent and estrangement. These feelings were both 
a symptom of his movement towards ~hristianity and a goad in 
that direction. In speaking of the general course which this 
progress took, Berdyaev writes that ••my original impulse was 
bound up with a bitter feeling of discontent with and dissent 
from the world with its eveil and corruption". ( 75) ':Phis 
formed an important part of ~erdyaev's interest in the meetings 
in ~etersburg. ¥or the representatives of culture were 
wanting to know whether Uhristianit¥ was simply an ascetic 
religion, removed 1'rom the problems of man, society, the world 
&c. oince in this area no clear cut solutions can easily be 
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given, it is not surprising that the answers received were 
unintelligible, or lmsatisfying. Berdyaev also 
the chasm which appeared between the two groups; tt'l'o the 
represc nta ti ves of the clergy, Christianity had long become 
a matter of everyday prose, whereas those who were in search 
of a new Christianity wanted it to be poetry. 11 (76 ) The cause 
~f the difficulty in communication maywell have lain, not in 
the different traditions of the two groups but in the peculiar 
aspect of Russian westernized learning which was the basis of 
Orthodox theology at that time. Russian theology was only 
beginning to develop , in the wake of the philosophical and 
cultural changes which had taken place during the nineteenth 
century. Berdyaev comments that "there ex is ted no theology 
at all for a long while, for there existed only an imitation 
of Western scholasticism. The one and only tradition of 
Orthodox thought, the tradition of Platonism and Greek 
pa tris tics, had been interrupted and forgot ten. 11 ( 77) 
The Orthodox leaders had, therefore, welcomed encounters 
with the intelligentsia; for "Marxism caused no fears to 
the Christian thinkers of the day; rather it opened for 
them the doors to return to Kant, Hegel and religious 
idealism,'1(7B)and it was out of this idealism that there 
emerged the new impetus contributed by Bulgakov, Berdyaev, 
Struve and others. 
The question which now faced tlerdyaev was what the outcome 
of this development would be. Having progressed from the 
Marxism of Kiev to the Idealism of ~t. Petersburg, he now 
needed another move in order to find new surroundings in 
which to explore the implications of his new interest in 
religion. The feeling of approaching a new dawn had not 
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disappeared during his time in Petersburg; now, however, 
he wanted continuity with the past as well. Even at the 
meetings in Petersburg, the expectation of a new 
Christianity, an era of the Hdy Spirit, was rejected. (79) 
Christianity was called upon to be a religion of the flesh, 
bound up with society, culture and histor,y. Lowrie quotes 
from a letter which Berdyaev wrote at about this time; he 
wrote to Filosofov that "I am greatly concerned about the 
organic connection with the holiness of the old Church ••• 
• • It is bee oming clearer to me that there cannot be some 
kind of special and new religion of the Holy Spirit. The 
religion of the Holy Trinity will be only the final 
fulfilment of the command of Christ, i.e., the appearance 
of the Holy Spirit.u(BO) When Berdyaev lef~ St. Petersburg 
in 1907, his estrangement from the circles of the 
intelligentsia there was about complete. He spent that 
winter in Paris, where, according to Zernov, uhe studied 
modernism and other contemporary religiou3and philosophical 
movements."(Bl) He also encountered the Merezhkovskys but 
the meeting was not pleasant. Berdyaev was regarded as 
being dangerously close to joining the Church, and therefore 
suspect. He himself was weighed down by religious problems: 
"I felt that I must face these issues in earnest in order to 
extricate myself from the half-truths and half-realities 
which dominated the scene of my life in Petersburg. u(B2 ) 
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iv. Moscow and Conversion to Orthodoxy. 
In some ways the move to Strasbourg had a :false start. 
Having been freed :from the unacceptable philosphy of' 
Marxist materialism 9 Berdyaev had hoped to :find 
sa tis:fac ti on among the literary :figures of the 
intelligentsia. However, we have observed his dis-
enchantment with the conventionalism of these circles. 
It was acceptance of the Christian :faith, expressed by 
the Orthodox Church, which finally provided Berdyaev with 
sa ti s:faction. In this last section we see Berdyaev, now 
well into his thirties, reach the climax of his intellectual 
development and influence in Russia. 
In 1908 Berdyaev returned from Paris to Moscow, which then 
became his home until exile in 1922. Here, he discovered 
an environment in which he ws able to develop all his 
interests. He found several outlets for his writing, and 
the association with Bulgakov, who was now teaching 
Political Economy, gave him an entre into Orthodox circles.(83) 
The mystical theology of Vladimir ~olovyev, at this time very 
influential in Moscow, provided Berdyaev with fertile ground 
in which to sow the seeds of' the 11 homomysticus". It was 
at this time that Berdyaev became acquainted with the work of' 
Jacob Boehme, who had been much read by Solovyev. Berdyaev 
was also able to develop an interest in the Slavophil writers 
(among them Khomiakov had probably the greatest influence) and 
the ways of Holy Russia. In Moscow, Berdyaev also 
experienced the beauty of Orthodox liturgy, something 
formerly unknown to him. (B4) In these years, Berdyaev 
produced what he considered to be his finest work, !he Meaning 
of the Creative Act,written in 1912 at the end of a visit with 
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Eugenie and Lydia to Florence and ~omeo The creative 
outpouring of Renaissance man had a profound and inspiring 
effect on Berdyaev, and in particular the work of Botticelli 
and Leonardoo(B5) Berdyaev had now found friends 9 an 
audience, respect, a:nd when Eugenie went to live with him 
and Lydia, in 1914, domestic happiness. Thus he writes in 
his autobiography: 11 My life in Moscow was a period which I 
regard as one of the happiest •• ,(B6 ) 
Of the intense activity which took place in Berdyaev's life 
at this time, a few significant details should be noted. 
The most important contribution which Berdyaev made to 
philosophical and political discussion in this period was 
his article in the symposium entitled Vekhi (Signposts). 
This was published in 1909, containing articles by seven 
young intellectuals: N. A. Berdyaev, s. N. Bulgakov, 
Gershenson, A. s. Izgoev , B. A. Kistakovsky, P. B. Struve, 
and i. L. Frank, with the intention of providing a critical 
exposition of the failings of the intelligentsia.(B7) 
Frank, in his Reminiscences of P. B. Struve comments that 
"our task was to denounce the spiritual narrowmindedness, 
ideological deficiency, and dullness of the traditional 
outlook.u(BB) 
Berdyaev's contribution to. the symposium was entitled 
.. Philosophical truth Istina and the Moral Truth Pravda of 
the Intelligentsia ... In this essay, Berdyaev denounces 
the idolatrous attitude towards the people and the 
proletariat, which was taken by the intelligentsia. He 
critidses their opportunism for its utter disregard of 
truth; they value an idea, not because it is true, but 
because it would further the theories of socialism. 
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c. s. Calian comments that "these Marxists gave a different 
value to the rillrodnik idea, which encouraged rather than 
discouraged capitalist development. or d'ourse, their 
promotion of capitalism was not because they thought it a 
good thing, but because the development of capitalism would 
more quickly develop the working class, which would in turn 
be the one and only revolutionary class in Russia."(B9) 
Zernov quotes the following passage from Berdyaev's article: 
"The misfortune of the Russian intelligentsia is that its 
love for justice, for the general welfare of the common 
people, has paralysed and all but killed its love for truth 
All the historical and psychological evidence points to • • • 
the conclusion that the Russian Intelligentsia can come to 
a new mind only as the result of a syn1thlra1s between faith 
and reason which can produce union between theory and practice.49 
Berdyaev's criticism reflects the importance which he attached 
to Truth. It was the question for this which had been the 
foundation of his "conversion" prior to going to University, 
and it was an ideal which remained for the rest of his life. 
A significant aspect of Berdyaev's contribution to this 
symposium is that he had now given expression for the first 
time to his belief in Christianity and membership of the 
Orthodox Church. From this position, the economic 
materialism of orthodox marxists was a betrayal of Truth of 
the highest order. The Ve.khi Group, as they became known, 
took their stand on the Russian tradition, 11based on its 
Christian heritage of truth, law and social morality. 
Their criticism of the intelligentsia pointed out that those 
who claimed to be enlightened among the orthodox marxists had, 
in fact, borrowed the empty form of atheistic socialism, 
without the latter's essential Christian heritage."(9l) 
Masaryk suggests, by way of assessment, that the Vekhi Group 
offered little more than a recantation of Marxism; he points 
to their re j ec ti on of the traidi tional masters of tile 
intelligentsia, Belinsky, Hertzen, Chernishevsky and 
Mikhailovsky, and the canonisation in their place of Chaadev, 
Solovyev, Dostoevsky, Khomiakov and Lossky. In their 
demands for the theoretical and practical primary of the 
spiritual over the outward forms of life and in their 
expectations of what this would produce, they were probably 
over-optimistic. In general, the tone was intemperate, 
reflecting the heady enthusiasm of a newly-championed cause.(92 ) 
The effect which the publication of Vekhi had can hardly be 
underestimated, however. From the Church, the response was 
one of basic approval. A review of the book was written by 
Metrcpolila\"\ Anthony of St • .Petersburg. Although the review 
was not uncritical, it welcomed the revival among Marxists 
of interest in religion. This, however, drew a sharp 
response from berdyaev. In an open letter to the Archbishop, 
II he spoke of the toruuous ways by which he had come to faith 
in Christ and in His Church, which now I consider my 
spiritual Mother." (93 ) This son, however, was born into the 
role of loyal opposition; for as obstacles to faith, he 
criticised the Church's spiritual poverty, its violence and 
condoning of capital punishment. The letter is of 
importance in that it is the first explicit expression in 
public of berdyaev's membership of the Church. But the 
sensation caused by the publication of Vekhi was most effective 
in the area of philosophical debate. lt showed the 
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materialist opponents of religion to be unable to answer 
tee criticisms made against them. The symposium marked the 
arrival of a new school of thought; it was a trend which 
could not be ignored. Zernov records the ~ollowing 
assessment of its influence, from the Autobiography of a 
liberal agnostic, Io Vo Hessen: 
The success of Vekhi was astounding. There was 
no single periodical which did not react against 
that book. The intelligentsia defended itself 
with ardour ••.• (but) did not produce any 
impression. For the first time l realized that 
our epoch was coming to an end; I saw that Vekhi 
had coined the slogans of the future, which were 
supported by modern knowledge; even science was 
moving towards metaphysics. (94) 
Beyond the success~ul publication of Vekhi and The Meaning 
of the Creative Act (in 1916) the significance of these 
years in Moscow lay in the influences which were prevalent 
among Berdyaev's circle of friends. Perhaps the most 
obvious was that of Orthodoxy itself. Through Bulgakov he 
met, for example, Paul Florensky, a man much influenced by 
the work of Solovyev. In 1909, Florensky was appointed 
Professor of the History of Philosophy at the Moscow 
Theological Academy, a couple of years after which he 
published his most famous work, The Pillar and Foundation of 
Truth. or this book, Berdyaev comments that UFlorensky 
substituted 0ophia for the living person of Christ, and 
cosmic order for the freedom of man"(95). 
Debate in this area gave jjerdyaev a stimulus towards 
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investigation of these subjects. The Moscow Religious-
Philosophical Society, founded in memory of Solovyev, 
provided him with a forum for this. Thus, Berdyaev 
encountered the strong blavqphil movement, associated with 
the work of Khomiakov, whose exponents, V. Io Nesmelow, and 
M. Novoselov, had a great influence upon him.(9G) One aspect 
of this association was the interest which Berdyaev developed 
for the pilgrims, tramps and vagabonds of Holy Russia. He 
used to attend gatherings of these people at a Moscow Inn 
called Yama (The Pit). ..BElrdyaev also pursued this 
interest while on holiday in the country. He records the 
profound effect which tta simple peasant, an unskilled 
labourer, illiterate and almost blind" named Akimusha, had 
upon him.( 97) In this way, ~erdyaev met the people whose 
simple beliefs provided the raw material of Orthodoxy. He 
notes also that many of the people he met reminded him of 
Jacob Boehme, who was not unknown in Russia: "But Boehme's 
memory was kept alive only among 'the people', where he was 
even regarded as a saint and a prophet." (9B) 
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CHAPTER 2. FORMATIVE INFLUENCES. 
We have now looked at all four stages of Berdyaev's early 
life in Russia. Each of these stages, childhood at home 
and school, university and exile, life in St. Petersburg 
and finally life in Moscow, contributed something to his 
overall development. Inevitably, some of these early 
influences were stronger than others. But perhaps because 
it was the setting of what remained a life-long interest, 
Moscow was the scene in which the most important influences 
converged. It will not be possible to give here an account 
of all the people, events, books, &c. which belong to this 
period of Berdyaev's life. Instead, we shall consider those 
groups which are of particular importance. They are Vladimir 
SoloTye~ and Jacob Boehme; Alexey Khom~akov and the 
Slavophile; Dostoevsky and Nietzsche. The ideas of all 
these groups are inter-related and they were not necessarily 
new to Berdyaev when he arrived in Moscow. 
i. The Mystics. 
(a) Vladimir SolovyeT. 
Vladimir Solovyev was born in Moscow in 1853; his father was 
a Professor in the University there. He developed early an 
interest in Russian folk lore; at university he studied in 
the departments of Mathematics and Pijysics, and History and 
Philosophy; he also undertook a .course at the Theology 
Faculty. His primary inclination was towards mysticism, 
though this could not be separated from his philosophical 
thought. ~arly in his career he experienced thr~e mystical 
visions of the Divine Wisdom which he described in a poem 
entitled Three Meetings· • Throughout his life, Solovyev 
vacillated between extremes; in youth between atheism and 
religious fervour; in later years between Orthodoxy and 
Roman Catholicism. 
The outcome of Solovyev's 'meetings' was the development of 
his sophiology. Berdyaev comments that "Solovyev 's doc trine 
of Sophia, the eternal feminine, and his verses devoted to it 
had an enormous influence upon the symbolist poets of the 
beginning of the twentieth centurey, Alexander Blok and Andrey 
Bely."(l) Zenkovsky notes in his History of Russian 
Philosophy that Solovyev became enthusiastic about the idea 
of Sophia as a result of his study of the mystical doctrines 
of people like Jacob Boehme. ( 2 ) But there are important 
differences between the sophiology of Boehme and that of 
Solovyev. Berdyaev describes Boehme 1 s Sophia as "virginity, 
the completeness of man, the androgynous image of man",( 3 ) 
whereas Solovyev's Sophia was a personification of a purely 
feminine spirit. According to Zernov, it is Solovyev's 
sophiology which Bulgakov sought to develop in his work on 
the subject, entitled The Wisdom of God~4) Yet, this 
understanding of Sophia as feminine, as opposed to Boehme's 
virgin figure, led Solovyev to his own peculiar view of 
sexual love and eroticism: "he insisted that the only real 
object of sexual love was the Divine Sophia: she contained 
the fullness of created life ••• she alone was the attraction 
which drew and held each individual lover. 11 (5) But 
sophiology was not Solovyev's only interest, nor were the 
visions he experienced the only sources of his spiritual 
development. Helmut Dahrn gives the following brief outline 
of the progress of Solovyev's thought: 
Solovyev starts with Spinoza, Hegel, Edward von 
Campenhausen, and §chop enhauer. With a f'ine 
sense of' the danger of' hypostatizing logical 
metaphysics, he quickly achieves the theosophical 
gnostic turn of' the later Schelling, which goes 
back to Boehme via von Baader. He ultimately 
arrives at Plato - noticeably using Leibnizian 
motif's particularly within epistemology- or more 
exactly at Plotinus as the concatenation of Philo's 
Alexandrian doctrine of logos and of Augustine.< 6 ) 
On the basis of this outline it is possible to appreciate the 
assessment by Peter Zoubof'f' of' Solovyev's contribution to 
Russian thought, which he led "out of the tempta tiona of 
socialism, through the allurements of German Romanticism and 
Idealism, to the primary problem of Christianity - the tragedy 
of' the Church schism, of' the body of Christ rent in two - and 
called Christendom back into unity.u(7). Solovyev's 
conception of' the unity of' the Church stems f'rom the period 
in his youth in which he developed Slavophil ideals. He 
envisaged a kind of' theocracy which would give concrete 
expression to Christianity's claims to be a universal 
religion; this unity in the spiritual sphere would be 
reflected politically by the rule of' a king who would be 
spiritually but not politically subordinate to the head of 
the Church, the High Priest.(B) A comparison can here be 
drawn between Solovyev and Ivan Karamazov; the similarity 
between these two f'igures need not have been accidental.(9) 
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If one were to point to a single work by Solovyev which was 
of decisive influence upon Berdyaev, it would be the Lectures 
on Godmanhood, which were published in 1878. These twelve 
lectures deal with the questions of creation and redemption. 
So much of what Solovyev writes here is echoed in Berdyaev 0 s 
work: in the background there are strains of Boehme's 
mysticism. Solovyev sees the cosmic process culminating in 
the appearance of man, as the nodal point to which also the 
theogonic process leads: 
As the cosmogon.ic pro~ ea.~, P~ll?mi:na t~g. 
in the birth or the human being endowed with 
consciousness, so the result of the theogonic 
process is the appearance of the self-
consciousness of the human soul (or its awareness 
of itself) as the spiritual beginning, free from 
the domination of natural gods and able to 
conceive the divine beginning in itself and not 
through a medium of cosmic forces.(lO) 
Within the process of revelation, Solovyevs inclusion of 
Hindus, Greeks and Jews reflects much of the scope of 
Berdyaev's interest. (ll)Man, as the central point of this 
revelation, both its content and the perception of it, is 
one of Berdyaev's greatest interests. That man could be 
at once divinity and nothingness, as Solovyev would insist, 
is the basis of ..t)erdyaev 's anthropology: "Man combines in 
himself all possible opposites which can be reduced to one 
great polarity between the unconditional and the conditional, 
between the absolute and eternal essence and the transitory 
phenomenon or appearance ... (l2 ) The fall and redemption 
take their place within the system of the working out of 
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this process. In Christ the eternal destiny of mankind is 
revealed within history: he is the Second Adam who 
inaugurates the new and final stage of man's development: 
The incarnation of the divine Logos in the person 
of Jesus Christ is the manifestation of the new 
and spiritual man, the Second Adam. As under 
the manifestation of the new, natural, Adam, we 
must understand not only a separate person among 
other persons, but the all-inclusive personality, 
including in himself all natural humanity, so the 
Second Adam is not only this inidivual being, 
but at the same time also the unive~sal being, 
embracing all the regenerated spiritual humani~ 
••• The Second Adam was born on earth not in 
order to eomplete a formal juridical process, 
but for the real salvation of mankind, for its 
actual deliverance from the power of the evil 
force, for pragmatic revelation of the Kingdom of 
God in humanity.(l3) 
In any assessment of the importance of ~olovyev's work, it 
is the 63Cha tological dimension which must emerge as most 
distinctive, for it colours all his writing. Nor does the 
monism of his theology imply mystical or ascetic withdrawal 
from the world; a point which in itself Berdyaev was keen 
to emphasize.< 14) S. L. Frank suggests that it is in this 
area of a religious world-view that ~olovyev (and therefore 
Berdyaev) has most to offer to the West, where a different 
outlook has prevailed. For ~ol0vyev 11 combines a bi~tter 
awareness of the power of evil, unconquerable until the end 
of history, and the foreboding of trials to come, with a 
c 9 9 keen sense of the hristian s responsibility for the worlds 
evils and insistence upon active struggle for Christ's trull1 
in every domain of human life.ff(l5) C. s. Calian asserts 
that Berdyaev rejec~ed the gloom of Solovyev's later 
apocalyptic thought, as he did the idea of theocracy which, 
within the historical context, seemed to detract from the 
central idea of the Kingdom of uod.(l6 ) But Calian also 
points out that Berdyaev worked out from oolovyev's doctrine 
of the Godmanhood an active eschatology, which called upon 
man's creativity to bring about the Second Advent of Christ: 
Berdyaev constructed 11 an eschatological metaphysics which 
connected the coming of the end with a final triumph over 
the idea of objectification and complete victory 1'rom the 
problems of evil, suffering, and subsequently death itself, 
through the resurrection of Jesus Christ, the God-Man.u(l7) 
A quite different assessment of the relationship between 
Berdyaev and Solovyev is offered by Dahm. .He me1ntains 
that the four leading philosophers, Berdyaev, Bulgakov, 
Frank and Struve, who were converted from materialism to 
idealism under the influence of 0olovyev's writing, failed 
to see in the latter the advance from a theocracy to a new 
ethic based on natural morality. Instead, Dahm asserts 
11 the Russian philosophers of the early twentieth century 
reverted to the traidi tional cone eption of a Slavophil Utopia." ( 1 
Dahm's criticism cannot be denied but it can be qualified. 
In respect of the work of Berdyaev, the interests which he 
developed immediately after his "conversion" were undeniably 
Slavophil. Hov.ever, this was not the final stage of his 
mevelopment. One need only point to his book, Destiny 
of Man~, to provide a demonstration of his appreciation of 
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the possibilities opened up by the use of a natural morality. 
Berdyaev is adamant that the creation or a utopia is not 
possible within the historical confines of this world; even 
the Kingdom of God does not bring this about: 11 For in the 
Kingdom of Uod and in the perfect divine life there is 
neither state, nor economics, nor family, nor learning, nor 
any social life determined by law •••• It is left to man 
himself in his freedom to find a creative solution of the 
problems that continually confront him. The Gospel is 
concerned not so much with taaching us how to solve them as 
with healing and reganara ting the texture of the hUDUml soul. 11 ( l9) 
(b) Jacob Boehme. 
We come now to a consideration of the second of these two 
influences upon Berdyaev: Jacob Boehme. Boehme has been 
linked with Solovyev not only because of the similarity of 
their interest(in the area of sophiology and speculative 
mystical theology) but also because it seems likely that it 
was through their common interest that Berdyaev came to 
appreciate Boehme's work. Jerome Ga1th observes that 
Berdyaev's move from s. Petersburg to Moscow was an important 
:f'ac tor in thi s respect. For Moscow was the centre of the 
Slavophil school which took its inspiration from Solovyev: 
"Berdyaev fell heavily under his influence •• It was the 
theandric doctrine of Solovyev which formed the basis of his 
conception of freedom." ( 2o) 
lt was, ~ot surprisingly, in view of what has already been 
said, through the idea of man as a free being that Berdyaev 
was attracted in this direction. Solovyev's understanding 
of this was that man is not a being who is free by his own 
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decision: "His being is by de:fini tion his :fr~edom, which is 
itsel:f given to him by a free act o:f the divine will."( 2l) 
This is an understanding o:f man and :freedom whichp in 
Berdyaev's opinion. Solovyev had derived ~rom Boehme, but 
indirectly, through Schelling. In an introduction to 
Boehme's Mysterium Magnum Berdyaev writes that "Schelling 
drew together Boehme's ideas o:f indeterminate :freedom, 
although he did not always understand Boehme •••• For 
Schelling, :freedom is the will. He was the :first in German 
philosophy to develop Boehme's voluntarism." ( 22 ) A similar 
sequence o:f thought is outlined by Masaryk also. He says 
that Solovyev's interest in Boehme :followed on :from the 
slavophil concentration on Plato and Plotinus, and so he 
"passed to Schelling, and Schelling smoothed his path to 
Baader, Jacob Boehme and all the mystics." ( 23) 
We have already referred to Berdyaev's statement in his 
autobiography about his dependance on the ungrund; o:f 
Boehme, his theory o:f uncreated :freedom. ( 24) This is the 
di:f:ference between Berdyaev's approach to :freedom, and 
Solovyev's, even though they both stem :from the same source. 
0 olovyev, as we have seen, identifes freedom and being with 
one another. Berdyaev, however, following on from Boehme's 
notion of the ungrund, rejects any idea that freedom can be 
created.( 25) To imagine, therefore, that it is given by 
God to man "is tantamotmt to saying that if the nature of 
man has been created, it is not the same as his :freedom. 
Freedom precedes being: it is anterior to the understanding 
of creation ... (Porret)( 26 ) Further exploration in this area 
led Berdyaev to the understanding o:f the symbolic nature of 
the language and the structures o:f what he was trying to say. 
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Here, the tradition of apophatic theology, strong in 
Orthodoxy, provided Berdyaev with his conclusion. From 
his reading of the mystical writers, he accepted the 
distinction made by Eckhart between Gott, the revelation 
of ka tapha tic knowledge, and Gotthei t, the unknowC~.blt: depths 
of God's being, which neither reason nor concept can express. 
It was with the Oottheit of Eckhart that Berdyaev identified 
the ungrund of Boehme. ( 27) Here, Porret observes, Berdyaev's 
gnosticism "reaches a limit where it must prostrate itself 
before the mysterious. Human knowledge ••.• remains 
incomplete.lf( 2 B) It is likely that the gnostic style of 
Boehme's writing appealed to Berdyaev's taste for the 
esoteric. W. R. Inge, for example, comments that Boehme's 
theory of the seven Quellgeister bears a striking, if 
concidental, resemblance to Basilides' system of emanations~ 2 9) 
But an important aspect of Boehme's mysticism is its concern 
with the problem of evil and suf'fering. There were two 
periods in Boehme's life when travel beyond his home town of 
Alt Seidenberg in Silesia brought him into contact with wide-
spread human suffering. These were when, as a young man, he 
travelled in search of agricultural work, before being 
apprenticed to a cobbler, and later, when as a tradesman he 
and his family shared in the hardships brought about by the 
Thirty Years War.( 3 0) Whereas with Berdyaev a social concern 
expressed itself in a political philosophy, with Boehme this 
awareness was translated, under the influence of Lutheranism, 
into a personal sense of human sinfulness and the wrath of 
God. ~ II o, Boehme could write that your heart in Time does 
not synchronize with God's Heart in Eternity. And there is 
a jar. From this one primordial discord arises ever,y 
discordant element in our life. 11 ( 3l) The core of Boehme's 
mysticism is the antithesis between good and evil, between 
Yes and No. It is thus that he envisages strife or longing 
within the Godhead, by which what is Nothing yearns to become 
Something; the will to create is a will f'o r the lover to 
receive from the freedom of' the beloved the response of love. 
This becomes one of' the fundamental aspects of' Berdyaev's 
theology. He takes as a motto for his book, The Meaning of 
the Creative Act the line from Angelus Silesius, a spiritual 
descendant of' Boehme: "I know that without me God cannot 
exist for a single second. If I cease to be, He too must 
cease necessarily to exist. tt It is the centre of this 
strife which Boehme refers to as the ijngrund. · R. Otto agrees 
with Berdyaev that this bears some smilarity to Eckhart's 
thought, for they both f1nd a starting point for their 
speculation in a 'primal bottom'; here is located Boehme's 
voluntarism and his theodicy. The ungrund stands to Boehme 
••not for being an Above-Being but for s'tress and will; it is 
not good and above-good but a supra-rational identification 
of good and evil in an indifferent, in which i$ to be found 
the potential! ty for evi1b as well as for good. n(32 ) 
Boehme also appealed to the 'homo mysticus' in Berdyaev. 
Rather like Solovyev, Boehme experienced a number of periods 
of mystical illumination. Although Berdyaev never seems to 
have experienced anything like this, there are suggestions in 
Dream and Reality of something similar.<33 ) Beyond this, the 
significance of Boehme's place in the development of Western 
mysticism is not unimportant. He was, in the opinion of 
Evelyn Underhill "a channel through which the teaching of 
the German mystics - Eckhart, Tauler, The 'German Theology' -
aff'ected the Protestant world."(34) 
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The richness of' thls seventeenth century mysticism and its 
diversity, are ref'lected in Boehme's writing. The streqj;h 
and pervasiveness of' this trend is indicated by the f'act that 
Boehme never had any formal education beyond that of' the 
village school. From the local Pastor, Martin Moller, 
however, he received instruction in many of' the greatest 
mystics.( 35) Within his own age he inherited an interest in 
alchmmy and the speculative theology of' the Cabbala. Thus, 
when in Russia the intelligentsia developed an interest in 
religion, it was probably inevitable that a tradition such as 
this, which was not necessarily tied to any denominational 
conf'ession, would appeal to them. Zernov comments that in 
this period there was an enormous demand f'or a new type of' 
literature which would stimulate the growing interest in 
religion and mysticism. A f'eature of' this was the 
publishing company set up by Emil Medtner, who "introduced 
to Russian readers a number of' the works of' Western mystics 
such as Francis of' Assisi, Eckart, Ruysbroeck, Jacob Boehme 
and Emmanuel Swedenborg." (3 6) 
An assessment of' the overall inf'luence which Boehme had on 
Berdyaev's work would probably point to two f'eatures: the 
style of' writing and its prophetic tone. Berdyaev himself 
speaks of the prophetic nature of mysticism and in the West 
this is an aspect of his work which has been particularly 
noted. (37) Berdyaev's style also ref'lects the mystical 
strain of' Boehme. It has been observed that part of the 
dif'f'iculty of' understanding Boehme's work is that he uses 
words in his own peculiar way, and it has also been pointed 
out that the reason f'or this is simply that no language then 
existed which would express what he wanted to say. A 
similar point could be made about Berdyaev's work. Although 
the terms and the language have all been hammered out, yet 
nevertheless he expresses the conviction that rational 
thought and language cannot be adequate for the purpose of 
speaking about the mystery of God, A link in the 
development of this can be seen in the symbolist poets. 
ii.. . Alexey Khomiakov and the Slavophile. 
·:This group ~-!).eludes, t4e .na:n:tes"' ~f·Andre~ Bely.,). Alexander, Blok, 
.. ,•·~ l"'. '. . 
Vyacheslav' Ivanov, . DIIiitcy:·,M~rezhkoysky ,, Valery Bryusov &c. 
These poets were developing their new style of writing in 
the last years of the nineteenth century. They were much 
influenced by Solovyev, and through him the general trend 
of German Romanticism. Their interests also·ranged as far 
as the Cabbala, the 'atman' of Hindu philosophy, and Christ 
as Logos. As part of the reaction to the materialism which 
was dominant in Russian philosophy at this time, they 
developed a sense of the spiritual, of mystical inspiration. 
Thus, Russian Symbolism became "a philosOJ?hY which proclaimed 
that a poet possessed the ability in moments of creative 
ecstasy to perceive the other, the 'real' world"~38)Berdyaev 
retains this awareness of the penetration into another 'real' 
world through creative ecstacy; for him this creativity is 
the lif'e of the spirit in man, which is expressed in the 
material, objective world, whether by poet or mystic, through 
symbol. He offers the following assessment of this 
flowering of Russian poetry: 
The fundamental influence upon the symbolists 
was that of Vladimir Solovyev; he expressed 
the essence of' symbolism in one of his own 
/ 
poems in this way: 
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Everything visible to us 
Is only a flash, only a shadow 
From what cannot be seen by the eye. 
reality and the symbol is a link between two worldsp 
the mark of another world within this world. (39) 
In addition to the influence of Sol~ev there is that of the 
slavophil movement and its leaders, Kireevsky and Khomiakov. 
This was particularly strong in Moscow during the time that 
Berdyaev lived there, and he has worked certain aspects of 
their thought into his philosophy. It is to a brief 
consideration of their ideas that we shall now move. 
As a distinct and recognisable school of thought, slavophil 
philosophy emerged in Moscow at the middle of the nineteenth 
century. The slavophils developed a concept of the destiny 
of Russia as a prophetic nation among the nations of Europe . 
. They ttabeerbed the Hegelian idea of the Vocation of peoples 
and what Hegel applied to the Geramn people they applied to 
the Russianu.(40) Moscow was to become the Third Rume. 
Their rejection of Western thought was on the grounds that it 
was rationalist; only Orthodoxy preserved an inward 
integrality of spirit and for this reason only the Orthodox 
are free. Berdyaev sees this feeling for freedom as the 
foundation of Khomiakov's philosophy, a foundation derived 
from the work of Kant and German Idealism. (4l) Masaryi sees 
similar influences at work in the thought of Kireevsky, who 
used Schelling's teaching as a directive back to the true 
faith, based on the Fathers. Thus, Kireevsky accepted the 
datum of Kantian criticism that the highest religious truths 
are not cognisable by the understanding: uWi th the 
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establishment of this proposition Kant deprived European 
rationalist civilization of its roots but he failed to take 
the further step that was necessary. Schelling ws s the 
first to turn away from rationalisation to intuition~ to 
intellectual contemplation."(42 ) 
Such were the bases of slavophil thought. Their opponents 
were the westernizers whose views were expressed most clearly 
by P~er Chaadaev. This party regarded Western civilization 
as the goal towards which Russia should work. In the early 
days of their development, these two groups shared a common 
interest in Qerman idealism and official discouragement of 
their work; an independent intelligentia was mistrusted by 
8he insecure Tsar, Nicholas I. Although originally the 
leaders of both parties had been friends, they became estranged 
from each other on ideological grounds. The Westernizers 
moved towards a revolutionary programme, and a theism; the 
slavophils developed their own form of political utopia. 
Although Khomiakov became the popular leader of the movement, 
it was Kireevsky who outlined the fundamental ideas which 
were to be developed. Lossky offers the following account 
of Kireevsky's thought, the kernel of slavophil philosophy: 
He does not rate highly 'abstract logical thought'; 
for the possession of truth, he says, it is essential 
' to gather together all ones capacities into a single 
whole, logical thought, feeling ('the heart'), 
(; 
aesthetic sense, the cons~ence, 
unfolded only to the whole man; 
love. Truth is 
the inner root of 
understanding is there 'where all the separate 
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(I 7 \ 
faculties unitA!.in one living whole vision'. \'+.JI 
From the emphasis on wholeness, on the unity of man, both as 
an integrated individual and corporately as mankind, there 
follows the idea of sobornost, which is developed by 
Khomiakov. Kireevsky had seen that the inner life of man 
cannot be lived in isolation from the people (or the world) 
around him: "Each moral victory is in the inmost depths of 
one Christian soul is a spiritual triumph for the whole 
Christian world. 11 (44.) The word sobornost is impossible to 
translate. It is derived from the verb sobirat, which means 
"to bring together• or ''to assemble": sobornost is, 
therefore, the state of being together.(45) Berdyaev defines 
it as "a unity which knows of no external authority over it, 
but equally knows no individualistic isolation and seclusion."(4E 
In this sense it derives its unity from the Uni~ of God, for 
the Church exists in a two-fold form. It has as its members 
a multitude of rational creatures, and yet its spiritual nature 
is that of a single body. There is a continuity between the 
Church on earth and the Church in heaven. Nor is the Church 
to be seen as existing in isolation from those who are not 
her members: "The rest of mankind, whether alien from the 
Church, or united to her by ties which God has not willed to 
reveal to her, she leaves to the judgement of the great day':·(47) 
It is from this that Berdyaev developed his ideas about the 
traditional understanding of hell. His universalist doctrine 
issued from this belief that if mankind forms a unity, it is 
impossible to conceive of the sal va ti on of some, ani the 
eternal damnation of others. In a similar way, man's relation 
to the cosmos and to the earth itself has this aspect of unity 
which signifies the eschatological significance of the whole 
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created order. 
Understood in this way 9 the Church could never be thought of 
as located geographically in any particular place; its unity 
and existence do not depend upon place. It would 9 therefore, 
be impossible to understand Sobornost as meaning 'catholic'. 
And it is along these lines that Bulgakov def'ire s it. He 
wri tea that catholicity is the metaphysical depth of' the 
Church; "Catholicity has neither external, geographical 
manifestations. It is perceived by the Spirit which indwells 
the Church and searches the heart ... (4S) However, the 
slavophil notions of the Church were not so spiritual that 
they prevented any .comment on the non-Orthodox demominations. 
The Church in the West was fiercely criticised by Khomiakov, 
the Roman Church f'or its authoritarian and aggressive spirit 
and the Protestant Churches for their individualism. It 
seemed as though Russian Orthodoxy had a monopoly on truth. 
But, to be fair to Khomiakov, this awareness that Orthodoxy 
had so~ething precious to off'er the West gave him an interest 
beyond Russia itself. Zernov comments that "he realised that 
the Roman Catholics and the Protestants represented, though in 
opposite forms, essentially the same type of Christian tradition 
and that the East possesses the key to its possible synthesis~49) 
An example of this interest is the correspondence between 
Khomiakov and the Reverend William Palmer, a Fellow of Magdalen 
College, 0xford~50) The idea of Russia's special mission to 
establish Church unity between the divided Churches featured 
also in Solovyev's thought: he wrote that "Russia has a 
religious calling of world-wide significance," and that the 
sufferings of her people signified their election to this role~Sl) 
Berdyaev expresses a similar attitude, though more muted, aware 
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of the course taken by the Orthodox Church in Russia after 
{c_r,\ 
the revolutiox\:;.::; This aspect of Berdyaev 1 s work has been 
noted by his readers in the West. From America, Vallon 
comments that "above all, he was the first original 
theologian of Russian Orthodoxy and an authentic spokesman 
of the Russian Church."(53) In France, ,l!;ugene Porret 
commented on this theme of the relation between Russia and 
Europe; that in the West the Russian people could not be 
ignored, for, as Berdyaev had pointed out in 1912, the world-
wide theme of our generation is to be 'East and West': 
Porret writes that "among the Russian philosophers in exile, 
Nicolas ~erdyaev is without doubt the best known and the one 
whom France has most welcomed. From his first works 
translated into French, this spiritual son of Dostoevsky has 
interested a number of readers not only on his own philosophy, 
but also in Russian thought in general.~(54) It would be 
misleading, however, to imagine that Berdyaev simply adopted 
the attitude of a slavophile nationalist; nationalism was 
for him simply an abstraction beneath which an individual 
personality was lost. J. L. Segundo comments that on his 
arrival in Paris in 1924 Berdyaev was, as he always had been 
"l'homme universal". However, as such, Western society 
provided him with a less congenial atmosphere in which to 
live; thus "we see that it was for him the concretization 
of that world of necessi~, the dislike of which was the 
source of his metaphysical thought. 11 (55) Freedom over 
against the world of necessity was a theme which Berdyaev 
valued most in the work of his spiritual parent, Dostoevsky. 
Freedom is not exercised without pain and suffering; it is 
a burden to be borne though some may rebel against such an 
ordering of the universe. We move now to a consideration 
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of the influence of Dostoevsky and Nietzsche on these 
aspects of' Berdyaev; s thought. 
iiio The Rebels. 
(a) Feodor Dostoevsky. 
Feodor Mikhailovich Dostoevsky was born in Moscow in 1821. 
His parents were of the intelligentsia class, f'amilies 
involved with the Church, the Military and the medical 
profession. His rather, MikhailrDostoevsky, a d;octor, was 
t-~ 
a man of' oppressive moodiness, given to outbursts of' temper. 
He was, however, adored by his wif'e, Mariya Fyodorovna, a 
weak character who suf'fered bad health. She died 
prematurely in 1837, af'ter which Mikhail Dostoevsky took to 
drink. His stormy temperament deteriorated and in 1838 he 
was murdered by his serf's. Feodor was sent to a private 
boarding school, passing in 1839, to the College of' Military 
Engineering in St. ~etersburg. Although unhappy there, he 
passed his examinations and was given a commission. 
Howev~r, he soon resigned to pursue a literary career, 
following the success of' his firBt novel, Poor Folk, 
published in 1846. A f'riend wrote to him at this time 
that he was "good, generous, trusting, and completely unf'it 
f'or lif'e's realities - and that is how he will remain f'or 
ever."(56 ) His career did not go well and he was constantly 
in debt. He became involved with socialism, through the 
influence of Visarion Belinsky, and, necessarily, with 
atheism. For as a sociDlist Belinsky knew that "he had 
before all else to dispose of Christian! ty; he knew that the 
revolution must necessarily begin with atheism.u(57) As a 
~cstoevsk_y 
result of this J-... was arrested in 1849 and condemned to 
death, though reprieved at the last moment and imprisoned 
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for four years in Siberia. The experj ence is described 
through the character of Prince Myshkin in The Idiot. 
was a crucial event for Doestoevsky ; "his life was split 
in two. the past was ended, there bPgan another existence. 
a 'rebirth in a new form'. "(S8 ) This division remained a 
source of conflict for much of Dostoevsky's life; he was 
torn between atheism and the Christian Faith. 01' "The 
Legend ot' the Grand Inquisitor" he wrote in Journal ot' an 
Author that "even in Europe there are not and have not been 
atheistic expressions ot' such t'orce: consequently, it is not 
as a boy that I believe in Christ and cont'ess him, but my 
hosanna has passed through a great furnace of doubts. 11 (59) 
This autobiographical note is sounded at the end ot' 
Dostoevsky's last novel, The Brothers Karamazov, where just 
before his exile, Mitya comments to his younger brother, 
Aloyosha, "You wanted to make a new man ot' yourself by 
suft'ering. Well, as I see it, all you ought to do is 
remember that other man always, all your life, and wherever 
you may run away to, that will be enough t'or you. 11 ( 60) 
Following his imprisonment, 1.Dostoevsky was allowed to return 
to Russia in 1859. He devoted the next years to journalism, 
working on a successt'ul but not lucrative periodical called 
Vremia (The Time). This was suppressed in 1863 and a period 
ot' further hardship t'ollowed. In 1864 his wife died, and his 
brother soon after. Debts compelled him to live abroad but 
also to produce a source of income. The novels of this 
period (Crime and Punishment: The Idiot; The Possessed) were 
the result. They won him stability and literary acclaim. 
In 1867 he married again and settled down to t'amily ~it'e. 
The two most important products of this period were a 
publication entitled Journal of an Author, which was started 
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in 1873 9 and The Brothers Karamazov, published just before his 
death in January 1881. 
Zernov has suggested that a11 Dostoevsky 0 s wrJt:i.ng ca.n be 
treated as autb~biographical, for each of the heroes re-lives 
the passions, hopes and fears which Dostoevsky himself 
experiencedo( 6l) We find here a life which is in many ways 
similar to that of Berdyaev. The dominant themes are 
rebellion in the name of Truth and justice, and a profound 
religious awareness. Dostoevsky was a leading figure amongst 
the slavophils and from this aspect of his work Berdyaev 
developed an important theme, a sense of destiny. Berdyaev 
wr~te that Dostoevsky combined this historical sense with an 
apocalyptic element which infused his writing with a prophetic 
spirit.< 62 ) Dostoevsky's intuition about the future is what 
Berdyaev sees as a prediction of the inevitable outcome of the 
Revolution. For this reason, he maintains, people in the 
West have heard within themselves an echo of Dostoevsky's 
warning, and they have "turned to the great Russian and 
universal genius who had first explored the inward abysses 
and foretold a catastrophe for the world."( 63) 
The source of Dostoevsky's prophetism was his understanding 
of man. In 1839 he wrote to his brother, Mikhail, that "man 
is a myster,y; if you spend your tntire time trying to puzzle 
it out, then do not say that you have wasted your time. I 
occupy myself with this great mystery, because I want to be 
a man. 11 ( 64) What constitutes the state of being human was the 
issue to which Dostoevsky devoted his interest. And this 
could not be explored through the abstractions of political 
thought. Ahead of Freud, Jung, Adler, &c. Dostoevsky was 
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mapping out a new science of man - he was already working 
on a Christian anthropology. One of his disciples 9 
Rozanov, observes that «Dostoevsky is first and foremost a 
psychologist; he does not depict everyday life .... but the 
hummn soul. 11 ( 65) Man was for him a microcosm, related to 
the whole of the universe and its existence. So 11 to 
' 
solve the question of man is to solve the question of God. 
The whole of Dostoevsky's work is a plea for man", wrote 
. ( 66) Berdyaev. For this reason the notions of socialism, an 
earthly utopia, were rejected by Dostoevsky, for they were 
man-made schemes which reduced every man either to a machine 
or to an abstract concept. This clear definition of the 
nature of human flourishing was to impel Berdyaev later 
towards the Personalism of Edward Meunier. As early as 
1923 Berdyaev was pointing to Dostoevsky's exalted idea 
of personality, and his warning that man must not become 
part of a machine: Dostoevsky's "masterly criticism of 
social eudaemonism is directed towards demonstrating its 
incompatibility with the independence and dignity of 
personality." ( 67 ) 
But "social eudaemonism '' requires closer definition. The 
prevailing trend of Dostoevsky's time was a non-religious 
humanism. Zernov comments that in this Dostoevsky 
detected deep-seated motives behind the revolution which 
was impending: "beneath the ardent long! ng of the 
revolutionaries to assist the poor, to destroy the power 
of the rich, and to establish equality and justice, he saw 
another and even stronger desire to re-arrange the world 
according to their own will, to dethrone the Creator and 
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to prove that emancipated man can be the master of his own 
destiny."( 66) Dostoevsky's penetration into the soul of man 
led him to believe that man could not be free or happy 
simpl:,r b:,r mar1 as a 
microcosm has a spirit which has needs other than material 
welfare; the whole man has the need for love, for unity 
with his fellow man, and with the world in which he lives. 
Dostoevsky expresses this view through Fr. Zossima, the 
"stare tz" in The Brothers Karamazov. From his discourses 
and sermons v.e read: 
The world has proclaimed freedom, especially in 
recent times, but what do we see in this freedom 
of theirs? Nothing but slavery and self-
destruction! For the world says: 'You have needs, 
·and therefore satisfy them for you have the same 
rights as the most rich and noble' ..... 
That is the modern doctrine of the world. In 
that they see freedom. And what is the outcome 
of this right of multiplication of needs? Among 
the poor, envy and murder, for they have been 
given the rights, but have not been shown the 
means of satisfying their needs. ( 69) 
This critique is of man understood as a natural object. 
But Dostoevsky uses his psychological insight to see beyond 
the limited objectives of the humanists' programme. The 
tragedy of the age in which Dostoevsky lived was in this area. 
Man was attempting to emancipate himself in the name of human 
justice from theology and metaphysics; the result was slavery 
to laws of nature and necessity. Dostoevsky witnessed man 
"conceived as a natural being, subject to the principals of 
profit and rational egoism: his metaphysical depth was 
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taken away from him, his third dimension - the image of God. 
Humanism wan ted to exalt man, and shame fully degraded him. 11 ( 70) 
That man degrades himself' when on his own terms he exalts 
himself is a theme which runs throughout Dostoevsky's work, 
from Kirilov 9 s man-god ( 11 if God does not exist, then I am 
God") to Ivan Karamazov's '.Legend of the Gram Inquisitor'. 
The central question which Berdyaev identified in 
Dostoevsky's work is that of freedom. Berdyaev observed 
that both Dostoevsky and Nietzsche 11 knew that man is 
terribly free, that liberty is tragic ani a gr a~vous burden 
to him. 11 (7l) This is expressed in the words of the Grand 
Inquisitor in the Legend. In himself and his colleagues 
(the unfortunate Jesuits) the Roman Church has lifted from 
its members the weight of freedom. 
interrogates the silent Christ: 
He arrests and 
You knew, you couldn't help, 
knowing this fundamental mystery of human 
nature, but you rejected the only absolute 
banner •••• the banner of earthly bread, which 
you rejected in the name of freedom and the 
bread from heaven •••• I tell you man has no 
more agonizing anxiety than to find someone 
to whom he can hand over with all speed the 
gift of freedom with which the unhappy 
creature was born. (72 ) 
It would not be right to give the impression that 
Dostoevsky was not interested in the material, or believed 
that it was unimportant to human life. In his awareness 
of the extent to which the world is shaped by, and shapes 
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man's life, he shows a 1eeling for the soil of his Mother 
Cow1try which was typical of the slavophil outlook, This 
attaches an almost mystical significance to the earth 
itself'. Fr. Zossima tells his readers that when opposP.d 
by malevolent ones, they should "fall upon the earth 9 when 
left alone, and kiss it, drench it with your tears. And 
the earth will bring forth fruit from your tears." ( 73) 
Part of the reason for Dostoevsky's great success was his 
perception of this aspect of the Russian mentality. 
S. R. Sutherland observes that "it is slavonic soil which 
in almost magical fashion is invoked as a source of strength 
and purification. Inevitably, to Western minds this smacks 
of superstition. 11 (74 ) It may have been for this reason that 
initially Dostoevsky's work did not spread wider into Europe. 
Berdyaev sees it as not a matter of chance that there is a 
rel8tion between the consciousness of the Russian people and 
their native land; for the peasantry, in whom this feeling 
was strongest, had always lived with the task of dominating 
the land and overcoming the elements. So, the life of 
Russia is mapped out by its plains: "the geography of the 
land coincides with the geography of her soul, a symbolic 
expression of its spirit.u(75) An aspect of the Russian 
_..,. 
mentality which is bound up with this feeling for the land 
...., 
is a kind of messianism. Land and people belong together, 
and from their knowledge of God intimated to them by their 
native land, the Russian people become God-bearers, 
distinctive among the peoples of the world. This is the 
great tragedy of the incursion of atheism into their culture, 
for it extinguishes what Dostoevsky called the spiritual 
well-spring of their life. So Fr. Zossima instructs his monks: 
11 The people will meet the atheist and overcome him, and 
Russia will be one and Orthodox 00 •• for this people is 
a Godbearer," ( 76 ) Berdyaev qu:i te rightly paints out that 
these things have developed in the Russians an outlook 
similar to that of the Jews; for them both 9 land and 
national destiny have a particular significance, the 
dominant characteristic of which is not humility. (77) 
From this mystical feeling for the land, Berdyaev develops 
two aspects in his own philosophy. The first is that of 
crea ti vi ty. This sees man, made in the image of God, as 
properly reflecting that image through his use and employ-
ment of the earth's resources. In this way, his labour 
shows his real dignity, for it can be creative. Man alone 
is endowed with the spirit which will transfigure the earth 
ushering in the Kingdom of God. This idea was first 
developed by Nicolai Feodorov (1829-1903) and impressed 
both Dostoevsky and Solovyev. In 1877, Dostoevsky received 
a manuscript by Feododv,sent anonymously. Dostoevsky 
··--.. :.~"!,~;_ 
commented in a letter that he had shown the manuscript to 
Solovyev, who also agreed with the unknown author. The 
following is an extract from the manuscript: 
The true task is to tran~rm Nature in such a 
way as to make it instrumental in general 
resurrection. The Kingdom of God or Paradise 
must be the creation of men themselves. It 
can only be the fruit of their matured 
knowledge, of their deep feelings, and of 
their utmost energy all directed towards the 
fulfilment of God's will. They can achieve 
it, not in their isolation, but only through 
their corporate efforts in their entirety. (7B) 
It there is any sign that Dimitry Karamazov is moving towards 
some kind of regeneration, it is in this anticip~tion of the 
, b n • • . ( 7q) - , • ~a~our or n1s own recreation.··~· but the important po1nt lS 
also that this cannot be achieved by man as an individual. 
What torments Dimitry is that he will be alone, unless, that 
is, Grushenka can accompany him. This is the second aspect 
which Berdyaev develops. The estrangement of the human soul 
from communion with others was what Dostoevsky saw as the 
curse of humanism. V. Ivanov writes that Dostoevsky's 
"experience of the other-ego as an original, infinite, freely 
autonomous world, contains in itself the postulate of God as 
a reali ty. 11 (BO) This is the reality that humanism denied, 
this sobornost, the unity of spirit between free and 
autonomous individuals. Bbpoe Gibson points out that this 
concept is "primarily religious, and it enables Dostoevsky 
to present the following schema: Catholicism, unity without 
freedom: Protestatism, freedom without unity: Russian 
Orthodoxy, freedom in unity and unity in freedom.u(Bl) It 
was in the quest for this unity that Dostoevsky saw the 
necessity of suffering. The brotherhood of man will be 
brought about when you have actually become everyone's 
brother and to bring this about human isolation must come to 
an end; men themselves must "suffer'' a change of heart if 
they are to change the world.< 82 ) It was this kind of 
transforming, uniting suffering which Dostoevsky envisaged 
when he wrote about it as an ingredient in the Russian soul. 
He wrote in The Journal of an Author in 1873 that "I think 
that the main, the fundamental spiritual necessity of the 
Russian people is the need of suffering, of constant 
ubiquitous suffering. It seems that we have felt that 
need from time immemorial. 11 ( 83 ) The elder Zossima becarre 
aware of something like this in an exper·lew::e which led him 
as a young officer to resign his commission and go into the 
monastery. Suffering is not a of mind which belongs 
to an individual in isolation; it is the sharing in a 
common destiny in which freedom and potential lawlessness 
of one's fellOw~man is a part of one's destiny. "So for the 
first time in my life", :Gossima declares, "this question 
pierced me to the core. 'Mother, my dearest heart, every 
. ibl f 1 l d 1 t k . t' II ( 84) man lS respons e or everyone, on y peop e on now 1 • 
Dostoevsky's perception of this point about freedom and unit¥ 
in a common destiny constituted his fundamental attack upon 
humanism. In Russia, Dostoevsky's work marked its defeat, 
not merely a crisis, according to Berdyaev, who regards 
Nietzsche as an ally in the struggle.(B5) 
(b)~~drich Nietzsche. 
Berdyaev himself speaks of having a high regard for the work 
of Nietzsche; he considered him to be one of the spiritual 
giants of the late nineteenth century. Nietzsche's back-
ground was German Protestantism but Berdyaev's interest lay 
in the tragedy of Nietzsche's life. This man of great 
intellectual sensitivity, profoundly influenced by Wagner 
and the spirit of German Romanticism, spent the last ten 
years of his life, having resigned his Chair at Basel, 
wandering homeless and tormented by migraine. It is from 
this period that his writings emerge. He died, after a 
final mental collapse, in 1900. Nietzsche saw man 
tormented by his existence; as Dostoevsky had pointed out 
in the Legend of the Grand Inquisitor, man is terribly free. 
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Nietzsche interpreted this as being faced by an open sea. 
He regarded man as living in an era in which Christian 
truth:fulness had drawn its last and strongest conclusion-
a conclusion against itself. Man then faces the moral 
question of what he is to do with his lifeo Dostoevsky 
posed the question, "Is everything permi tted?tt For 
Nietzsche "morality becomes a problem because neither the 
machiavellian or pagan good conscience nor the Christian bad 
conscience is any longer possible: the Christian faith has 
been undermined and has collapsed, and with it the entire 
European morality. tt ( 86 ) The loss of these norms imposes on 
man the burden of finding new laws by which to live; 
Dostoevsky's vision of the tragic consequences implicit in 
the humanist programmes is here restated from a different 
perspective • Nietzsche writes in The Will to Power that 
.. 
as soon as no thinker can any longer relieve his conscience 
-
with the hypothesis 'God or etemal values', the claim of the 
lawgiver to determine new values rises to an awfulness which 
has not yet been experienced. ,,( 87) Nietzsche was mong the 
first to put to modern man the possibili~ of non-being, of 
the absurd. In his rebellion against God, against the 
meaning of life, he oversteps the old limits. He has an 
affinity with Ivan Karamazov, the personification of the 
refusal of salvation, of whom Camus wri tea: "Ivan's most 
profound utterance, the one which opens the deepest chasm 
beneath the rebel's feet is his 'even if': ••z would persist 
in my indignation even if I were wrong,• words which might 
also be written of Nietzsche. u( 88 ) The question is, how 
far a man will really go. While Dostoevsky's rebel can 
regard his attempted theodicy as no more than bar-room 
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speculation, Neitzsche's language is more dramatic; his 
writing also reflects the horizons of his surroundings. 
"Nietzsche 9 s thoughts were fascinated by unexplored forbidden 
regio.nt> of abys~,;es, glaciers and mount a in peaks. One can look 
down into the bottom of an abyss refusing the possibility of 
throwing oneself over the edge, but one cannot explore the 
possibility by a tentative jump."(B9) Nietzsche's crisis of 
the decision between belief and unbelief, the lure of the 
abyss of non-being, was founded on a presentation of options, 
both of which seemed unacceptable. Just as Berdyaev regarded 
rational theology as presenting a choice between two 
unacceptable choices, monism, a denial of the dignity of man, 
and pantheism, a denial of the existence of God, so Nietzsche 
regarded the devaluation of all values (i.e. nihilism) as 
placing him in the same situation. Walter Kaufman writes 
that "to escape nihilism - which seems involved both in 
asserting the existence of Uod and thus robbing this world of 
ultimate significance, and also in denying God and thus 
robbing everything of meaning and value- that is Nietzsche's 
greatest and most persistent problem.u(90) Berdyaev had 
profound respect for Nietzsche, not only for what he wrote, 
but also for the identification in his life of theory with~ ' 
practice. Nietzsche's agony was not simply an intellectual 
torment: it was that torment which shaped his life and 
drove him to madness. He experienced the dark humBn 
suffering of meaninglessness, unalleviated by the meaning 
which can be given to it by the mystery of the Cross: 
"Nietzsche says that it is not so much the suffering as the 
senselessness of it that is unendurable. Man can go 
through the most terrible suffering~ if he sees a meaning 
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in them. 11 ( 9l) The theme of this kind of spiritual suffering 
is one which Berdyaev notes as particularly strong in 
Dostoevsky and, indeed, the Russian spirit. He takes 
suffering as an index of man's depth. for it is interior and 
metaphysical, not social and exterior. Man is responsible 
for it, and tnough it is an evil which must be hunted do.vn 
and desbroyed, it is paradoxically 11 the tragic road that man 
has to tread, the des tiny of his freedom." ( 92 ) That Nietzsche 
trod this road was the basis of Berdyaev's admiration for him 
as a man who demonstrated true aristocracy of spirit and 
prophetic vision. 
CHAPTER 3. EXILE - ENCOUNTER IN THE WEST. 
Having considered in sequence the stages of Berdyaev's 
development from Marxism, to Idealism and finally 
Christianity 9 and having outlined also the most formative 
influences which emerge from those years, we come now to 
deal with Berdyaev's expulsion from Russia and his life in 
the West. We shall look first at the course of events 
which brought him and his family to Paris, where they 
remained for the rest of their lives. We begin with the 
period following the publication of Vekhi. (Signposts) and 
The Meaning of the Creator's Act (cf. Ch.2 iv) which is, 
in fact, the time of the Revolution in 1917. 
1. Transition from East to West. 
Berdyaev's reactions to revolution in 1917 were a mixture 
of satisfaction at the fall of the Holy Russian Tsardom, 
but a feeling also of personal involvement in the events 
which followed. In The End of Our Time, Berdyaev writes 
that the revolution did not take place outside or beyond 
him: "The revolution must not be considered only 
externally, as though one saw in it simply an empirical 
fact without any relation to my spiritual life and to ml 
destiny ••.•. all are responsible for all.u(l) But he also 
pointed out that this own lack of spiritual power was 
reflected in the course of events which followed the 
Revolution; though it may have been richly deserved, 
Berdyaev never saw it through rose-tinted spectacles: 
11 on the contrary, I foresaw that in the Revolution the 
cause of freedom would be jeopardized and elements hostile 
to culture would prevail ... (2 ) An interesting account of 
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the reaction by Berdyaev and his friends to the Revolution 
is given by Julius Hecker in a book entitled Moscow Dialogues 
published in 1932. Hecker 9 a Russian by birth, returned 
there arter many years working in America. John MacMurray 
comments in the Preface to the book that on his visit to 
England, Dr. Hecker impressed those he met by his Christian 
character, his sympathy, simplicity and humanity. However, 
as an ardent supporter 0f the Soviet regime, Hecker showed 
no sympathy with the views of the anti-materialist philosophy 
of Berdyaev, Bulgakov, &c. In the Introduction to these 
dialogues (which reflect discussion with English-speaking 
friends on revolutionary philosophy) Hecker observes that 
"it is evident that the much talked about pacific and mystic 
qualities of the 'Russian soul' have proved a myth- a soap-
bubble pricked by the exigencies of the Revolution." (3) He 
maintains that the new generation of Russians have 
characteristics quite unlike those portrayed by Tolstoy, 
Turgenev and Dostoevsky. Thus, it is not surprising that 
in Dialogue XIII his mouthpiece, Socratov, speaks of the 
romantic idealists and mystics like Berdyaev, s. Frank, 
L. Kersavin, P. Florensky and others as attempting to salvage 
"their shattered philosophical arsenal in the hope of finding 
new spiritual weapons to start an offensive against the hated 
Communists who had defeated them in the recent revolutionary 
battles. 11 (4) A strong sympathy with the ooviet position 
underlies the reaction expressed by "the Professor'' to 
Berdyaev's post-revolutionary writing (The Philosophy of 
Ineguali ty and "The End of our Time): "Should one wonder 
that the Communists prefer that these savants continue their 
philosophizing and propaganda outside the boundaries of the 
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Soviet Union?"(5) 
In 1920 Berdyaev was elected to the Chair of Philosophy in 
the University of Moscow where for a year he lectured quite 
openly and without hindrance and was able to offer his own 
criticism of Marxism. He notes that a change began to 
develop in this situation in the Spring of 1922 and in the 
Summer of that year, returning alone to Moscow from a 
holiday in the country, he was arrested for a second time. 
Shortly afterwards, he left Russia, exiled on ideological 
grounds.( 6 ) The break with his mother-country was traumatic: 
"It is not easy"1 he wrote, "for me to speak of the experiences 
and emotions which stirred me when the moment came to take 
leave of my country, of all the things and all the people 
that had become the inmost part of my life."( 7 ) But the 
departure was also the opening up of new creative 
possibilities. The Berdyaevs left Moscow for Berlin in the 
company of several other families exiled for similar reasons. 
In Berlin, Berdyaev met Max Scheler, Osward Spengler and 
Count Keyserling; with Scheler he found that he shared many 
ideas; Keyserling was much impressed by Berdyaev's work, 
and was to become influential in its publication in German. 
Among the exiles there were also a number of scholars, and 
within their circle there was a certain amount of cultural 
and social activity, much of it organized by the Y.M.C.A. 
Following the publication in Russian of The Meaning of History 
Berdyaev also public&:<~-" i in Berlin a short book which off'ered 
../ 
his own reflections on the significance of' the Russian 
Revolution. It appeared in 1924 under the title 'he New 
Middle Ages (the English edition is entitled The End of Our 
Time.) Berdyaev notes with uncharacteristic modesty the 
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enthusiasm with which the book was received. (B) Vallon 
comments that 11 the book achieved an immediate and laSing 
success. It was translated into fourteen languages and 
threw the author at once into the limelight of the 
European intellectual stage. 11 (9) In this book, Berdyaev 
describes the period Chrough which he was living as one of 
incubation, or comparable with the 'Dark Night of the Soul! 
He writes that the world is going through a gigantic 
spiritual revolution which is more profound than what had 
happened in Russia,the latter had rather to do with the 
rotten elements of the old world, individualism and humanism, 
democratic theories and monstrous economic systems. 
Berdyaev wished to sound "the call to a new Middle Age 
to a complete renewal of consciousness."(lO) 
Berlin did not suit Berdyaev; it was too much a part of the 
Russian boundary. He sensed an atmosphere of impending doom, 
no doubt associated with the aftermath of defeat, but also 
related to the potential for recrimination which existed 
between the emigrE( and the Sovlt!lt 'Russians. Berdyaev himself 
encouraged dialogue between them. (ll) In 1924 the Berdyaeva 
moved again, to Paris. Here they established themselves 
permanently, as did many other exiles. Fro~ this time until 
his death, Berdyaev became editor of the Y.M.c.A. Preas and, 
in the following year (September 1925), he founded the 
Review, ~'(The Way), which ran until 1940. Berdyaev 
remained for the rest of his life a somewhat contradictory 
figure, a person who did not fit into any particular category. 
A friend who knew him in Paris wrote to him that he "often 
used to talk about his beloved Russia to close friends; to 
other exiles he seemed a Communist, but to the left-wing 
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French he remained an exile from Soviet Russia, while to 
-- - .• ( 1 2) his friends he represented .tioly Hussia." - ' 
The years which Berdyaev spent in Paris formed 8. pP.ri.od of 
great activity, in many ways a continuation of the life-style 
which he had adoptedin Moscow. The exiles made ~aris their 
home in Europe, making their own particular contribution to 
life in the West. The regular gatherings to discuss 
religious and philosophical matters were again started soon 
af'ter Berdyaev 's arrival in Paris. These took an ecumenical 
outlook, comprising Orthodox, Catholics and Protestants. The 
@ 
presence of the exiles was strengthened by the deve~ment o~ 
the Russian Orthodox Institute in Parish, under the direction 
o~ Fr. tierge: · Bulgakov. But Bulgakov, and rather more so, 
Berdyaev, were regarded with suspicion by many Orthodox, for 
holding views which were considered unsound. Although these 
meetings lasted for only a short period of time before they 
ran out o~ steam, they did provide an introduction ~or 
Berdyaev into the circles o~ the French intellectuals. He 
speaks o~ the value he attached to similar meeting.s at the 
home o~ Gabriel Marcel. (l3 ) He also attended similar 
meetings at Pontigny, a large country house {originally a 
monastery) owned by M. de Jardin. These meetings 11 the 
Decades~ lasted ~or a week and took place about three times 
a year. They were an international gathering, and it was 
here that Berdyaev met Martin Buber, Andr~ Gide, Leon 
Brunschwig, among others. (l4) In this period many of his 
most important works were published: Freedom and the Spirit 
(1927-28), The Destiny o~ Man (1931), Solitude and Society 
(1934), Spirit and Reality (1937), Slavery and Freedom {1939), 
The Russian Idea ( 1946). During the course of this time, 
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Berdyaev's reputation spread. His work was translateft into 
English and began to appear in this country from l93j.(l5) 
i i. Progressive CR. thol ic Thoua:h t in France: Mari tain & Mo1.mi er 
Having considered how and why it was that the Berdyaev's came 
to live in Paris, we come now to look at what was happening 
in the theological and philosophical circles in France at that 
time. It is important to bear in mind the distinctively 
Russian and Orthodox tradition in which Berdyaev stood. For, 
in spite of obvious differences, there were striking 
similarities. It is for this reason that Berdyaev found Paris 
so congenial and was able to exercise the influence he did. 
This common understanding was the more welcome in that it came 
from unexpected sources; French progressive Catholics and a 
liberal Russian Orthodox. We turn now to consider the back-
ground of two leaders in the international scene in Paris, 
Maritain and Meunier. 
t Any assessment of Berdyaev s most significant contribution to 
philosphical and theological debate in France at this time 
would probably point to his association with the Personalist 
Movement. Having already considered some of the influences 
upon the formation of Berdyaev's thought up until the time he 
left Russia, it should be understandable why his interest 
developed in this direction. One can point to his 
appreciation of Nietzsche's grasp of devalued man's 
meaningless existence; to Dostoevsky's insistence that man 
must be more than just an individual; to Khomiakov and the 
concept of spiritual communion (sobornost) which binds 
individuals together in freedom and unity; ' to Solovyev s 
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exalted doctrine of man which finds it fullest expression 
in Jesus Christ, the Second Adam, the God-man. All these 
must be seen in the context of the general development of 
Berdyaev 0 s thought. He finally rejected Marxism, which he 
had adopted in protest against his society, because he had 
slowly realised that it would, in fact, destroy what he 
hoped it would bring about, a society that ensured defence 
of the freedom, the rights, the dostoinstvo (dignity and 
worth) of the individual person. This theme was what had 
directed the other associates of Berdyaev (Struve, Bulgakov 
&c.) along a similar course. The direction of this trand 
is also noted by A. P. Mendel, who observes that what was 
facing the revisionists was "the problem of individualism, 
the conflict between determinism and free will, and the 
relationship of objective social and historical laws to 
goals, ideals and values."(l6 ) 
These were the issues which the incipient personalist movement 
was raising in France not long after Berdyaev arrived from 
Russia. Berdyaev became involved with this movement through 
his friendship with Jacques Maritain, whom he met shortly 
after arriving in Paris, in 1925. In spite of Maritain's 
Thomist outlook, there was a genuine friendship between them~l7) 
Berdyaev had been introduced to Maritain by Mme. Bloy, the 
widow of L~on Bloy whom he had met in Russia; Bloy had been 
a great friend and mentor to the Maritains. Jacques and 
Raissa Maritain showed a certain interest in the Russian 
exiles and groups of them often met at their house in Meudon~lB) 
The difference in their outlook was most obvious during these 
meetings. One who frequented them comments that "they were 
especially absorbing when Maritain and Berdyaev led the 
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conversation; it was a bout between two thinkers of 
exceptional speculative force and erudition. Yet Maritain 
was too strictly a Thomist and berdyaev too much the 
representative of Eastern Mysticism to be able to agree. u(l9) 
However, in spite of their differences, they were agreed on 
some matters. ( 20) Berdyaev considered that Maritain's 
philosophy was largely unaffected by his "great sensitivity 
and responsiveness in regard to the social and cultural 
movements of the day." ( 21 ) The agreement between them in 
this area was given expression in their common interest in 
the growth of the Personalist Movement, and in particular 
the work of its journal, Esprit. Berdyaev . records in his 
autobiography that he was present at the meeting, largely of 
, 
young people, at which Esprit was founded. "I was greatly 
moved", he writes, "when it was unanimously adopted that the 
~ fundamental purpose and concern of Esprit should be the 
vindication of man. I felt that there was a place where a 
(22) 
new spirit was blowing." This journal combined in its 
outlook socialism and personalism, for which it coined its 
own term, personalism communautaire. The founder and editor 
of the journal was Emmanuel Monnier, "a man of great 
intellectual gifts and remarkable energy."( 23) 
Emmanuel Monnier was born in Grenoble in 1905. His 
education was given its direction by Jacq~es Chevalie~ who 
brought to him the work of Descartes, Pascal and Bergson, 
together with a firm foundation in the principles of Catholic 
philoep~. In 1927, Monnier moved to Paris to study at the 
Sorbonne. A year later, he met Jacques Maritain and began 
to attend the monthly meeting at Meudon. 'l'hey both shared 
an interest in the soldier-poet, Charles P6guy, a man who 
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remained an ambiguous figure during his lifetime but who 
achieved na ti.onal fame after his death. ( 24) 
P~uy had been of considerable influence upon Maritain, who 
was a student at the Sorbonne at a time when the anti-
religious trend of philosophy was particularly strong in 
France. Although not a practising Christian at the time, 
Mari tain and his wife were dissatisfied with the philosophical 
systems then in vogue. It was due to P~guy that the 
Maritains were persuaded to attend Bergson's lecuures. 
Raissa Mari tain comments in her memo ires that tta t the time 
we were attending his lectures, shortly before the 
publication of Creative l!Ovolution, we received only the 
benefits of the horizons he opened to us -away from the 
empty and colourless world of universal mechanism and 
towards the universe of qualities, towards spiritual 
certainty, towards personal liberty. 'The act which bears 
of the mark of our personality is truly free', he said. tt ( 25) 
The course of their conversion was aided by their meeting 
with L~on Bloy. Maritain writes of him as a man who 
combined the suffering and ecstacy of a mystic with the 
temperament and impatience of an artist. Bloy' s aftec t 
upon these "two young children of twentytt when they tjet him 
in 1905 was decisive: 
They bore within them that distress which is the 
only serious product of modern culture, together 
with a kind of active despair illuminated only -
they did not know why - by the inner assurance 
that the truth for which they hungered •••. 
would one day be shown to them ..•. In the 
meantime they had cleaned their minds, thanks 
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to Bergson. of the scientific SLlp ers ti tions with which the 
Sorbonne had nourished them - but knowing well that 
Bergsonian intuition was but a flimsy refuse against the 
scepticism all modern philosophies logically bring in their 
train Bloy seemed to us the ver,y opposite of other men 
- who hide their serious deficiencies in the things of the 
spirit as well as so many invisible crimes under the 
carefully maintained daubing of the social virtues. 
Instead of being a whited sepulchre like the pharisees of 
all times, he was a charred, blackened cathedral. The 
white part was inside, deep in the tabernacle. ( 26 ) 
Maritain's intellectual development now turned away from a 
materialist concept of man and society. He took up instead 
the integrity in man, an idea from Aquinas, whose work was 
receiving fresh attention. Rejecting the mechanistic approach 
of scientism~ Maritain developed a theory which sought to base 
the social order of the primacy of the spirit. One of the 
greatest ~ontributions Maritain made to the philosophy of 
personalism was the distinction he drew between the individual 
and the person. "The individual" refers to the concrete, 
physical single entity, while ''the person" refers to the 
spiritual entity which indwells and transcends the individual. 
In 1919 Maritain initiated the circles d'~tudes thomistes as a 
forum for the development of his new appreciation of Thomism; 
it was out of these that there emerged his Sunday evening 
gatherings, at which Meunier met many of the people who played 
an important part in the establishment of Personalism. 
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Among the other people who influenced Mounier at this time 
was ~~re Pouget, an elderly Lazarist priest of encyclopaedic 
knowledge and interest. Although in the opinion of William 
Rauch, Mou...n.ier's debt to Pouget remains elusive, it is known 
that for a period of five years (1927-1933) Mounier 
regularly visited Pouget and "filled little notebooks with 
material on the Bible, the history of religions, the two 
St. Thereaas, St. John of the Cross, the themes of action 
and meditation, and other subjects of a similar nature. "( 27) 
In addition, Mounier was friendly with the young Jean 
~ M . ' Danielou, who also attended ar1tain s gatherings and was to 
become a leading progressive among the Jesuits. Another 
long-standing frienship from this period was that of the 
Dominican P~re Henri de Lubac, later one of the architects 
of the Second Vatican Council. The importance of these 
friendships is that they gave Mounier association with 
"circles that were noted for their interest in the many 
problems relating to the adaptation of Catholicism to the 
world. 11 ( 28 ) 
Mounier never offered any final or definitive account of 
what constituted Personalism. He did not regard it as a 
closed system or a fixed school of thought. Like Berdyaev, 
he rejected the idea of a philosophy which became an end in 
itself. Mounier regarded personalism as an approach to 
life, a state of mind, as attitude towards existence. He 
expected that it would be experienced as at the disposal of 
a convergence of wills. So he declares in the opening of 
A Personalist Manifesto that " we shall apply the term 
~ersonalist to any doctrine or any civilization that affirms 
the primacy of the human person over material necessities."( 29) 
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The distincition between person and individual is maintained 
by Mounier. He does not advocate a state of spiritual 
isolation; the centralization of an individual within himself 
is overcome by the necessity of communication with another 
person; this is the mark of personalism. It is to the 
problem of this communication that Mounier addresses himself. 
He writes that "the individual darkens communication by his 
very presence, which produces some degree of opacity whoever 
he is. My body itself gives me the most obvious image of 
this opacity.••( 30) Beyond the physical separation between 
individuals, there is also the element of custom, class, 
culture &c. In his Manifesto, Mounier observes: "One might 
say with Berdyaev that to live as a person is to pass 
continually from the zone where spiritual life is 
objectified and naturalized to the existential reality of 
the subject; that is, to pass from the exterior - from the 
zones of the mechanical, the biological, the social, the 
psychological and even of the morBil code - to the interior. u (3l) 
But within the spiritual life of man, no boundary is to be 
delineated. Dostoevsky spoke of man as a microcosm, as 
does Berdyaev.(32 ) Within this microcosm, Mounier perceives 
varying depths of consciousness; he refers to one's caprices, 
the scope of one's imagination, the desires and actions 
which run counter to one's intention. These varying levels 
are not, therefore, capable of being systematized or even 
isolated from each other; definition of the person cannot 
be given by means of a summary of his levels of existence. 
Or, as Meunier puts it, using a phrase borrowed from Marcel, 
ubeing is a reality whose contents 'cannot be put into an 
inventory'. u (33) 
81 
Thus, while unhappy man might seek ror an integration or 
himselr into a unity, Meunier suggests that he will never 
achieve this. "My knowled.i e or JllY person and or the 
realization of my person is always symbolic and incomplete 
o•• it is something beyond consciousness and beyond time. 
It is more vast than the vision I get or it, rarther within 
me than the constructions I attempt or it. 11 (34) It is 
possible to see here how the thought or St. Augustine was 
or importance to these personalists. For it is in this 
area that man discerns a faculty ror his awareness of God. 
Meunier rejects the description of this in spatial terms, 
since ''as St. Augustine said, God is closer to me than my 
inmost thoughts • .,(35) Marcel points out that Augustine was 
led to an extraordinartly precise awareness of this 
inexplicable presence within himself, because he had been 
through the experience of conversion; he continues "I am 
thus, as it were, essentially unequal to myselr, I am too 
great ror myself. By fathoming this mystery, ot.Augustine 
will be led to recognise first of all that God Himself is 
in some way in our memory, but that this would naturally 
be inconceivable if the memory were in us a sort of 
container."(36 ) 
The role of symbolic language was something which Berdyaev 
had already explored through his reading of Solovyev and 
encountered in the work of Boehme and the poets of the 
school of Bely, Ivanov, &c. Here, the personalists found 
themselves confronting scientists whose rationalised 
approach to man leaves no space between its definitions 
ror what can only be hinted at by spmbol. Thus, Meunier 
offered a critique or a philosophy which was in league with 
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scientists in ridding the worldof man's presence; he sees 
the conception of existence being slowly drained of its 
substance."This sort of world, in which no form of existence, 
with its opaqueness, its oddit;y, its unpredictability and 
exhaustible spontaneity, could withstand critical analysis, 
offered philosphy a temptation to which it has always been 
greedily susceptible. It could be systematic ally set out. 11 ( 37) 
Against this is set the 'No!' of Kierkegaard's protest. 
Mounier takes up the protest against the world as the theatre 
of absolute laws and functions; he affirms instead the person 
( 8' is an absolute, and for the Christian, the Absolute is personal? ' 
For those who were deve~ing this kind of philosphy, Marcel's 
example of the Underground ticket collector seemed to become a 
standard reference. Here, man was presented as an 
agglomeration of functions, dispensible and worthless, the 
citizen of a 'broken world', living without mystery. On this 
subject Mounier directs his readers' attention to Marcel's 
Being and Having and Berdyaev's Solitude and Society.(39) 
Mounier asserts that the picture of such a man confronts us 
with the world of the impersonal ( 'le monde de l'on'); 
this provokes an urge to inquire into the secret fulness of 
that person's existence, but this is an urge which, even though 
it confronts us with our own metaphysical problem within the 
context of everyday social enouncter, is stifled. (40) 
On this level, the kind of spiritual aristocray of which 
Berdyaev had written is acknowledged. 
personal transcendence" Mounier writes 
"This effort at 
II 
constitutes the true 
quality of a man. It distinguished men among men •.. It is in 
this sense, and in this sense alone, that one can characterize 
a personalist humanism as aristocratic or anti-equalitarian-
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if we may use words that usage has twisted about in a 
dangerous manner. 11 ( 41 ) 
The example which Meunier has given here as an encounter 
between two people demonstrates that irrespective of their 
state of being, there is some kind of a bond between them. 
The assertion of personalism was not that some men or women 
could achieve a greater degree of personal encounter and 
inter-personal awareness than others, but Ehat all men and 
women have the faculty for this and to find fulfilment in 
life must use and develop that faculty. Thus, personalism 
sought to proclaim the dignity of all people. It therefore 
sought also a proclamation of human community. Community 
is not to be found by an external ordering of life; ever,y 
person must work to achieve it: "We thus find human 
communion implanted in the ver.y heart of the person as an 
integrating factor bf its existence."(42 ) This idea is not 
• 
ver,y different fro1fbomiakov's concept of the unity of 
mankind, or Dostoevsky's view of an integrated society based 
on common moral responsibility. As in the case of both 
those writers, Meunier asserts that this communion can only 
be establisehd on the basis of freedom. The question asked 
by Meunier is: "In a world in which every freedom arose in 
isolation from all others, what would finally become of the 
community of persons 1· ''I cannot truly be free' wrote 
' 
Bakunin,'until everyone round me, man or woman, is equally 
free •••• I become free only through the liberty of others•." <43 ) 
This community is not to be envisaged as a disembodied 
spiritual association. Man exists subjectively and bodily 
in one and the same experience. He is thus intrinsically 
related to his environment. This idea echoes the 
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peculiarly Russian concept of a relation between the very 
soil of its land and a nation's communal destiny. Berdyaev 
frequently speaks of man's creative destiny in this a rea. (44) 
Mounier also speaks of man exploiting the possibilities of 
his natural environment through his creative liberty "Only 
then 9 11 he writes, "when the belonging to nature turns into 
the mastery of nature, is the world joined to the body and 
man to his proper destiny. 11 (45) 
iii. Association with forms of Personalism. 
(a) In France. 
The object of this brief outline of personalist philosophy 
has been to attempt a demonstration of its points of contact 
with tlerdyaev's background and outlook. We should now 
attempt to set the personalist movement in its historical 
context. The social background of the growth of the 
personalist movement was the depression in France which from 
1931 was the result of the Wall Street Crash. The 
atmosphereff crisis produced a polarization between the 
political left and right. The views of the right wing 
were circulated through the Monarchist newspaper and movement 
On the left, a journal named Nouvelle 
Revue Franlaise was established; although not professing any 
particular creed, this review published many articles by 
members of a group called Ordre Nouveau. The outlook of this 
group was shaped by Arnaud Dandieu and Alexandre Marc, a young 
Russian exile. Meunier was impressed by many of the 
tendencies of Ordre Nouveau, although his dealings with them 
were not always happy. O:f Dandieu he notes that 11his 
'personalism' •.••. is a fundamental affirmation of the 
:85 
creative power of the human person, Nietzschean in a sense~ 
he admits .... In God, he literally sees an opposition to 
human creation", and of Marc he says: he "sees all things 
with his Catholic vision of the universe where God is a 
person living in the Christ and, through His Mystical Body, 
in ourselves. 11 (4G) 
The development of a personalist outlook independent of 
Mounier's is a feature noted by Hellman. He identifies 
personalism as a movement wider than the confines of French 
Catholicism, 'observing _ that "most of' the earliest and 
most important articulations of personalism were by German-
educe ted, militantly anti-communi at Russians" among others 
who, independently of the Gospels, were inspired in their 
defence of the person by Bergson and Neitzsche. Hellman 
lists Berdyaev as an example of these early personalists~ 47) 
In May 1931, Pope Pius XI issued the encyclical Quadragessimo 
Anno, which directed attention to economic and policitcal 
problems. Although the Pope put forward practical plans for 
the ordering of socie~, plans which were generally ignored, 
the really constructive outcome of the encyclical was the 
' 
assertion of the relevance of Catholic social doctrine and the 
encouragement given to examine its foundations. In his study 
of the deveopment of Papal policy on social reform, Richard 
I Cramp describes the encyclical s analysis of the social 
structure as "absurdly over-simplified", He continues: 
Pius XI knew very well that society consisted of 
more than simply 'individuals and the state'. In 
fact, hundreds of different types of 'intermediary 
associations' existed for all classes, many of 
which had been created under the blessing and guidance 
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of the Church. Most of them had the specific purpose of 
giving the individual a collective voice in order to safe-
guard his or her interests. The Pope spoke of these at 
length on t.h.i s Beirne encyclical and clearly approved of them 
but when he referred to the structure of modernsociety, he 
seemed to forget that they even existed. Instead, he 
wanted a new structure in which a new set of intermediary 
associations would be erected and in which he ghought it 
would be easier to achieve truly Christian principles of 
social order. His model was unmistakably that. ofr .. the 
M·edi-e.val past. (48) 
Kelly notes that the encouragement given to examination of the 
encyclical rejected both individualism and collectivism; it 
denounced "the evils and abuses of the capitalist system and 
attempted to lay down structures for a solution to some of the 
problems, strongly inspired by corporatist theory."(49) 
This des~ription of the encyclical's outlook reflects not only the 
intellectual viewpoint of the time but a viewpoint held by those 
both inside and out of the Church. Hellman describes it in the 
following way: "The assertion of the 'absolute value of the 
human person' was not simply an abstract affirmation of human 
dignity but rather a movement of defence against two antithetical 
threats: individualism and its manifestation, liberal capitalism, 
and communalism and its manifestation, communism. It mirrored 
the desperate effcrt of intellectuals in the early nineteenth 
century to navigate a 'third way' between Capitalism and 
Communism. 11 (50) This movement can also be detected within the 
development of the theological thinking of the period. Karl 
Adam, a German theologian, had recently published a book 
entitled The Spirit of Catholicism. Writing in La Vie 
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Intellectuelle, in April 1932~ Congar described the Mystical 
Body or Christ as a doctrine stimulating a 'communitarian 
spirituality' which negated religious individualism."(5l) 
Already in December 1930 Meunier had been asked to edit a 
review to be set up by Georges Izard and Andr~ D~l~age, 
specifically for the consideration of these issues. 
Throughout 1931 plans were being made and funds raised for 
, 
the publication of Esprit. Various pressures were brought 
to bear on Meunier to choose contributors unlikely to arouse 
the hostility of Church authorities against the journal. 
The Index still exercised considerable influence and had been 
the fate of Bergson's Les Deux Sources de la Morale et de la 
Religion in 1932. Since Maritain had agreed to underwrite 
its respectability, he felt entitled to have some say in its 
direction. In a letter to Meunier in July 1932 he suggests 
some names for the rirst edition- Arland, Roualt, Marcel, 
Babokorf', and~ with Berdyaev7 it would make an interesting 
c~llection.(52 )But before the journal could be published, 
serious differences within the ranks of its directors had 
to be sorted out. In August a conference was held at 
Font-Romeu in the Alps; the opposing sides were Meunier 
and Deleage, with Izard acting as mediator. The issue 
over which they were divided was that of the practical 
application of the theory of' personalism. Deleage wanted 
to set up a pressure group; Meunier was unwilling to 
permit a divorce between theory and practice. The result 
\ 
was an uneasy compromise with Troisieme Force set up as 
the political wing of a doctrinal movement. Meunier had 
insisted on the primacy of' principle over practice, the 
spiritual over the material. 
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" The first edition of Esprit was published in October 1932. 
Monnier's article was entitled "Refaire la Renaiss~ce" and 
was a "re-worked version of the paper which had be en 
accepted at Font-Romeu as defining the spiritual directions 
of the review."(S3 ) Much of the thinking behind this essay 
reflects the impression which Berdyaev's ideas had made upon 
Mounier. Rauch, basing his judgment on Berdyaev's books, 
The End of Our Time and Dream and Reality, and the 
correspondence and other material published in the collected 
Works of Mounier and the Bulletin of the Friends of Emmanuel 
Mounier ('Bulletin des Amis d'E.Mounier'), states: 
Mounier sought the roots of the contemporary crisis 
in the distant past and initially defined 
personalism in this particular context. Drawing 
upon the work of Nicolas Berdyaev, the Russian 
Orthodox Catholic philosopher who was an early 
supporter and collaborator of ~spri t, Mounier' s 
"Refaire la Renaissance" meant to assist in the 
downfall of an era of civilization born towards 
the end of the Middle Ages ••••• Capitalist in 
its structures, liberal in its ideology, 
bourgeois in its eth1cs."(54) 
Mounier identified the modern crisis as a profound disorder 
in the spiritual world; the solution to the crisis could 
not, therefore, be found exclusivly in political action, 
for, as R. Pierce has observed, "essentially, Mounier was 
a moralist; he believed that all political choices must be 
anchored in moral values and he did his best to elucidate 
them, but heknew that the specific application of values to 
concrete cases cam1ot be derived !"rom any political system." ( 5S) 
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\. Thus, the spiritual maintained a priority over the rnate:rrl: 
Mounier employed the ambiguous term le spirituel to convey 
a range of areas to which it could be applied, from 
,, 
religious ~r secular int~Jlig~ntsia~ to afergsonian concept 
of spirit. On the concept of spirit as a motivating force 
on political action, both Maritain and Berdyaev were agreed. 
In True Humanism, Mari tain observes that "Bedyaev likes to 
point out the presence of this eschatological element in the 
thought of revolutionary communism."( 56 ) It is in this area 
that Berdyaev undoubtedly exercised most influence over 
Meunier. As the Second World War broke upon Europe, Meunier 
wrote to Berdyaev telling him that "we are, perhaps, at the 
beginning of the new Middle Ages. 11 (57) A friend of Meunier, 
Ignace Lepp, observes that it is the awakening of 
consciousness to a crisis in civilization which is the point 
of departure for personalist philosphy. Here Mouni er found 
an affinity with Berdyaev, for they both had "the same keen 
sense of humanity, and the same horror of a disembodied 
intellectualism which took no account of the economic and 
political realities of the human condition. 11 (58 ) 
Berdyaev's contribution to the first edition of Esprit was 
entitled "Veri t~ et menson'"'ge du Communisme." He pointed 
v 
to the mixture of truth and error in Communism and 
attributed its success to a failure on the part of 
Christianity to appeal to the soul of the masses. The 
truth of Communism, he maintained, was to be found in its 
critique of an exploiting Capitalist system and the alliance 
upon between theory and practice. However, the error of 
communism lay in its employment of a Marxist economic 
determination, an affirmation of materialism to the 
exclusion of spiritual interests; its denial of God was a 
denial of man. Thus, Berdyaev's main contention was, 
Hellman comrnents 9 that "Communism's great lie, even greater 
in magnitude than its partial truths. was its negation of 
Godo The Russian regime had installed a new militant 
religion, exclusive of all others, 'the religion of the 
King<l_om of this world' o " (59) In the opinioh of KeltY, 
"Berdyaev' s analysis, adopted by Mounier, became a classic 
statement of Esprit's position on Marxism.< 6~). Maritain 
thoroughly approved of the article. In August he had 
written to Mounier telling him of his particular pleasure in 
the publication of the article which "was of great importance 
, 
and on many points would position the revie~ first blow 
. n(61) 
cleanly and prec1sely. Among others who welcomed Berdyaev's 
- / 
statement on Communism was Andre Gide. Berdyaev refers in 
Dream and Reality to Gide' s request to meet him as q_ result 
of reading his article in Esprit,< 62 ) and Maritain also 
comments to Mounier on th~ir encounter.( 63) Gide comments in 
his journal, around 1933 , "remarkable, the article by 
Berdyaev: Truth and Communism's Falsehood, which I have just 
read in the first number of ~sprit. I read it with keen 
satisfaction and relief."( 64) 
, 
As a journal, Esprit proved to be successful. Kelly quo tea 
figures to show the rapid growth in subscribers and points 
out that since many of them were study groups, schools and 
seminaries, as well as teachers and journalists, the 
influence of Esprit was probably wider than its circulation.< 65 ) 
However, the facts which had emerged at the outset continued 
to cause division within the movement. Troisi~me Force 
, 
eventually split off to go its own way, leaving thereby Esprit 
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with no organization for action. To combat this, Meunier 
•" began the Amis d Esprit, a series of study groups, following 
the idea of the David~es with which he had at one time been 
associated. ( 66 ) Although the study gr•oups were a successful 
development, they marked the limitation of the movement and 
a reason for its eventual decline. Personalism as a movement 
remained confined to the intellectual circles from which it 
had grown; as Rauch has observed 11 the positions of Meunier 
and Esprit never found significant expression in French 
political life. As a consequence, Meunier has been severely 
criticised for attributing greater efficacy to his engagement 
and t~moignage than they actually possessed." ( 67) 
Ber~aev maintained an interest in the work of Esprit until 
the end of his life. In particular, he used his association 
with groups of young people to develop interest in the review. 
Helen Iswolsky recalls that her contributions to Esprit began 
in this way: 11 I was working at the time with a group of young 
Russians who called themselves the 'Post-revolutionaries.' 
They were pupils of Berdyaev and specially interested in 
present-day Russia. u( 68 ) Berdyaev himself continued to 
contribute to Esprit(~9) although most of the articles he 
wrote at this time were published in Put'. Although he had 
contributed much to the formation of the movement, he was also 
aware of its falings. In his autobiography he offers the 
, 
following assessment: "The movement centred in Esprit was 
deserving of the greatest sympathy. The only drawback was 
that it, like so many similar movements, was confired to a 
comparatively small group unable to do anything which could 
effectively influence the modern world, in which everything 
seemed to move contrary to the aims of ~sprit. (70) 
(b) In Britain. 
We have now seen how Berdyaev fitted into the development 
of the Personalist Movement and how the distinctively 
Russian background of his thought contributed to and 
blended with ideas developed independently in France. 
A similar process can be seen at work in Britain. This 
has two outlets: one is mainly through the work of John 
MacMurray, and the other is through V. A. Demant and the 
Christendom Group. We now consider briefly both of these. 
Even seen from outside the movement centred on ~sprit, 
Berdyaev's association with Personalism was very strong. 
Writing in England just after the Second War, J. B. Coates 
observes that cardinal importance attaches to the thought 
of Nicholas Berd.yaev in conn.ection with the development of 
Persqnalism, which he sees as a reaction to~e establishment 
in Europe of a Marxist Communi at State and, "more generally, 
by the new political totalitarianism with their attacks on 
the rights of the person ... (7l) Coat~ indicates that in 
Britain a distinct personalist group did not emerge until 
after the War, although personalist conceptions had, prior 
to that, been evident in the work of some thinkers: 
e 
Goa~ mentions Aldous Huxley, John Middleton Murry, 
H. G. Wells, Arthur Koestler and John MacMurray. Among 
these, John MacMurray perhaps most clearly shows an 
assimilation of personalist thinking. His Gifford Lecutres 
for the years 1953 and 1954 were published under the title 
The Form of the Personal. MacMurray is aware of a crisis 
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within European thinking and society, one which he clearly 
lldent'iftes as a crisis of the person, suggesting two areas in 
which this is to be seen: the apotheosis of the State and 
the ddcline of religion. The first of these 11 involves the 
subordination of the personal aspects of human life to its 
functional aspect" (a remark reminiscent of Marcel's ticket 
collector), while the second betrays 11 a growing 
insensitiveness to the personal aspects of life and a 
growing indifference to personal values. u(72 ) MacMurray's 
critique of modern philosophy points to its egocentricity; 
he observes that 11 firstly, it takes self as its starting 
point and not God, or the world, or the community; and that, 
secondly, the self is an individual in isolation, an ego or 
'I', never a 'thou'."(73) The distir£tion implied here is 
similar to that made by Maritain between a person and an 
individual. ' MacMurray s way out of this idealism was 
through a kind of Kantian "Copernican Revolution". Albert 
H. Nephew describes this as "like reversing the relation 
" between sun and earth • Thus, MacMurray reversed the 
relation of subject and object, making the object dependent 
on the subject, that is, making knowledge dependent on the 
categories of the mind of the knower •. < 74) In so doing, 
MacMurray was in no way intending to withdraw from the world 
of objects into a state of mind-dependent existence. For 
human life in its fullness not only binds u~ together "in 
dependence upon one another but equally in dependence on 
the natural world. The two forms of dependence - upon 
other people and upon nature - are interwoven and 
inseparable. They constitute the communicy of all existence."( 75 
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Nephew also notes that MacMurray regards the self-as-thinker-
and-knower upon whom this individualistic metaphysics is 
centred is in fact a "chimera of contemplation, a non-existent 
(-,c\ 
9 pure self' ott\ fUJ This is a reflection of the movement which 
personalism outlined away from the abstraction of a collective 
towards the individual person. A similar view is expressed 
by H. D. Lewis, who writes in the same collection of essays 
in honour of MacMurray. Warning against collectivist 
thinking, he comments that "there is no bearer of any worth 
other than the individual. 
metaphor."(??) 
The 'soul of the people' is a 
Aspects of the personalist movement were not only to be found 
, 
in the area of philosophy. Just as in France Esprit had been 
intended to uniteboth theory and practice, so in England there 
developed at about the same time an interest in social action 
by members of the Church. Interest in a critique of society 
from a largely personalist viewpoint had been the brief of a 
journal called Christendom: it was a journal of Christian 
Sociology, edited by Maurice Reckitt, Ruth Kenyon, v. A. Demant, 
and P.E.T. Widdrington. It was probably through the visits to 
this country arranged by the Fellowship of S.Alban and S.Sergius 
that Berdyaev encountered this group. In Dream and Reality 
he writes, commenting on the valuable contribution of 
Christendom to the study of sociology, that "the Anglo-
Catholics struck me as genuinely alive to the issues in modern 
society.u(7B) Many of the areas investigated by French 
personalists were at the same time being investigated by some 
of these English theologians. V. A. Deman~ wrote in 1933 
that the Churc~es had come to recognise the social life of 
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man as material for redemption, acknONledging that "the 
problems of the individual soul are problems raised by the 
necessity of the individual pe r·son living with the three-
fold task of relationship to his personal destiny to his 
fellows and to the natural world. 11 Among the evidence that 
Demant produces for the recognition of this fact he mentions 
the Russian exiles in Paris who were attacking the whole 
question of the relationship between religion and civilization, 
referring specifically to Berdyaev and Bulgakov.(79) Demant 
locates the emphasis on man as the crown of the universe quite 
firmly within the Christian tradition, citing Eusebius of 
Caesarea, Gregory of Nyssa, Augustine and Pascal and, among 
modern authors, Berdyaev and his book, !he Destiny of Man.(80) 
He sees the future of Christianity in the presentation of a 
doctrine of man which involves all the tragedy and paradox 
found in Berdyaev 's work. He maintains that "if the truth 
of man as a being is to be upheld it must be sustained by the 
dogma of his link with God as transcendent. This link is 
constituted by his specific nature in the divine order of the 
world; in so far as he is truly human, he is in the right 
dependent relation to God, which is his essence.u(Bl) The 
lea"'dera of this school of lihristian Sociology also saw the 
future task of Christianity as the ordering of ever.y aspect 
of human li~e towards an end beyond the temporal. L. s. 
Thornton pointed out in an essay entitled "~e leaning of 
:~christian Soci ology 11 (which appears in the first edition 
of Christandom) that at the Incarnation Jesus had assumed 
human nature in its completeness. 11 If then"' he wrote , , 
11 in the name of religiom the Church suppresses the 
legitimate emancipation of human individuality or remains 
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indif'f'erent to human liberties, that suppression or moral 
indifference are as blasphemous as the heresy of' 
Apollinarius."(B2 ) Berdyaev 's con tri bu ti on to the 
consideration o1' how Christianity should face these issues 
was warmly welcomed by the Christendom group. In December 
1931 they publshed in English f'or the f'irst time in this 
country an article by Berdyaev~ It was enti tJ. ed "'l'he Pcoblem 
of' Christian (.;ul ture in Orthodox Consciousness." In 1937 
the Destiny of Man was published in England, and was reviewed 
in Christendom by A. L. Lilley, who wrote that: 
it is in Berdyaev's treatment of these concrete 
problems as they confront the creative spirit of 
man, and especially of' the problems which centre 
around the conceptions of the state and society, 
that readers of Christendom are likely to be most 
immediately interested. In each case the problem 
raised by the paradoxical nature of' the moral 
judgment which the absolute claims of the free 
human spirit must pass upon entities which 
condition its existence in time.(B3) 
Other people beyond this group also showed interest in the 
issues it was discussing. In a book published in 1932 
entitled Belief in Man, P. s. Richards offered a critique 
of Russian Communism which shows a personalist outlook 
similar to that of Berdyaev. Richards points to the way 
in which Soviet Russia has dedicated itself' to an abstract 
collective understanding of man, by which the individual man 
is, in fact, oppressed, and he described this as "a functional 
and quasi-religious devotion to the idea of the proletariat, 
conceived as an entity greater and holier than any or all of 
its members."(B4) 
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Among the people interested in the ~hri~tenfloro Group there 
was an awareness of the changing philosophical view of man. 
This had been acknowledged by Berdyaev in The End of our Time 
and was a theme which had been taken up by Mounier in his 
first article i~sprit. In a similar vein, ~. L. Mascall 
contributed an item to Christendom on the end of humanism. 
Referring to The End of our Time and Maritain's True Humanism, 
he observes that "it is generally agreed today that the 
humanist era which began with the Renaissance is drawing to 
an end. Lippman, Aldous Huxley and Huizinga all bear witness 
to this but perhaps the most detailed analyses have been made 
by Professor Berdyaev and M. Maritain. Their substantial 
agreement on this point is all the more striming because 
there is in general little similarity between the apocalyptic, 
semi-gnostic Russian Orthodox •••• and the calm, scholastic 
French Catholic."(B5) 
iv. V----•vo..J.·o. 
Berdyaev 's remaining years in Paris were overshadowed by the 
war and ijerman occupation. Unable to take part any longer in 
the social activities he enjoyed before the war, he spent the 
time writing and reading;( 86 )he still entertained on Sunday 
evenings and their house in Clamart became a centre for 
Russian patriots. In the period after the 1 ibe ration of 
Paris Berdyaev speaks , in Dream and Reality, of his growing 
nostalgia for Russia and the development of his connections 
with those of a "soviet orientation'•. He reflects on the 
irony of the fact that although his work 'filrS quite widely 
known in the West, almost nobody had heard about him in his 
own country. Approaching the end of his life, Berdyaev 
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felt tormented by his exile and he writes: 
Never have I felt so close to Russia, and yet 
there is so little joy in that feeling, and my 
heart bleeds every time I think of her. I am 
faced, again and again, but never so vividly 
as now, with the complexity and tragic nature 
of Russian destiny. I do not think that 
people in Western Europe will ever know or 
understand it. But nothing can prevent its 
being a des tiny and nothing can deprive it of 
its meaning. It must be lived out to the end 
by Russia. ·· ( 87) 
In September 1945 Berdyaev suffered the loss of his wife, 
Lydia, and was comforted by her sister, Eugeny. In 1946 
he visited Geneva to give ten lec~es at the Ecumenical 
Institute at Bossey. The following year, he visited 
England to receive the degree of Doctor of Divini~ 'honoris 
causa •· from the University at Cambridge. In March 1948, two 
days after the customary Sunday evening "at home", Berdyaev 
died suddenly while working at his desk.< 88 ) 
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PART T W 0 
CHAPTER 4. AN OUTLINE OF BERDYAEV'S DOCTRINE OF GOD. 
1. Man's knowledge and Apprehension of God. 
If we were to pose the question, "Does God exist?" and then 
to look for an answer in the works of Nicolas Berdyaev, we 
should be hard put to it to find anywhere a systematic 
argument in reply to our question. There is much space 
given over to discussion about belief and non-belief (or 
rather, the rejection of belief) in God. But the fact that 
there is no logically worked out argument for the existence 
of God does actually tell us something quite important about 
the way in which Berdyaev thinks and speaks about God. For 
here he abandons the titles of "philosopher" or "theologian" 
and seeks to take up instead that of "mystic". In the 
tradition of the East, Berdyeav pursues the way of apophatic 
mysticism - the "via negativa. • ••Mys tery, 'doc ta 
ignorantia: have a profound significance •••• mystical 
negative theology alone brings us closer to the depths". (l) 
So Berdyaev rejects the arguments for the existence of God 
which many would regard as traditional. He regards them, 
attached as they are to the ·':t'play of concepts" ( 2 ) as 
stultifying. His rejection of the importance of such 
arguments results in an open and shut case; they are 
dismissed without further discussion: "We must recognize 
conclusively that all the traditional proofs of the existence 
of God, ontological, cosmological or physico-theological, 
are not only insolvent; they are quite unnecessary, even 
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harmful." 
Berdyaev here refers to Kant: "Kant's criticism of these 
proofs of God's existence is very convincing and has not 
( 2 \ 
been overthrown by traditionalist apologetics."\JJ 
Instead, Berdyaev focuses on the nature, the disposition, 
the quality of the person considering the question unoes 
God exist?" What Berdyaev is concerned to investigate is 
rather more the question of how and in what way we are able 
to know whether or not God exists. Knowledge of God is not 
something which can be attained through reasoned argument; 
it belongs to the two-sided nature of a relationship or 
drama played out between God and man. (4) The way in which 
that relationship is revealed (that is, the extent to which 
it is revealed as existing at all) will, therefore, be in 
some part governed by the attitude of the human partner: 
"Revelation is tinged with various colours according to the 
state of the human mind and the whole trend and bent of the 
man."(5) But even a disposition towards believing that a 
deity does exist may not lead to the sort of knowledge of 
God that Berdyaev envisages. For arguments that affirm 
God's existence can be apprehended and given assent by the 
mind; they do not, however, bring a man into the relation-
ship with God which is properly revelatory. Thus, man 
cannot be handed belief as a sort of package deal: 
"Revelation is not something which drops into man's lap 
from outside and in which he has nothing but an entirely 
passive part to play." ( 6) 
1 01 
Berdyaev is quite emphatic that knowledge of God requires 
I 
man s complete response; the response to what he sees as 
God's longing for a loving response from what He has createdo 
The language that Berd.yaev uses to express this: however; 
reflects his own deeply held belief that man is not 
completed without his relationship with God. Thus, he 
speaks of man's awakening response to God as though it were 
the creation of God by man: "This birth of God in the human 
soul is the true birth of man." ( 7+. ' ,By thfs, 
he means no more than s. Augustine did when he said "Our 
hearts are restless until they find their rest in thee." 
Berdyaev quotes a similar idea from Augustine: "God is more 
deeply within me than I am myself". (B) This theme is one 
that occurs again and again in Berdyaev's writing.(9) We 
should note, however, that Berdyaev, in using this language, 
is careful to distance fiimself from the ideas of the birth 
of God in human consciousness that are found in German 
Idealists like Feuerbach. It should, of course, also be 
remembered that Berdyaev (along with Bulgakov, Struve, Frank) 
and others passed through an "idealist phase" in their 
conversion from Marxism to Orthodoxy. In Truth and 
Revelation Berdyaev comments: "Not only is man made in the 
image and likeness of God, but God is also made in the image 
and likeness of man. Feuerb ach was half right." ( 10) 
Elsewhere, Berdyaev offers a critique in three "acts"of 
German metaphysics. In "Act 2'' ("Idealist Philosophy'') he 
discusses Feuerbach, among others, and cites his book 
Das Wesen des Christenthums as "one of the most remarkable 
books of the nineteenth century" (ll) However, he is critical 
of Feuerbach whom he regards as exclusively anthropocentric. 
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He considers that Feuerbach sees man's knowledge of God as 
merely the self-consciousness of man himself, of his own 
human nature. But at the heart of his criticism is not that 
Feuerbach has deified human rather, that it is human 
nature in abstract, the race, or society, that has been 
deified. Such a move Berdyaev opposes as ultimately 
matertalist, as leading, of necessity, to the subjection of 
the individual personality to the rule of the racial or of 
the universal. That was the basis of his rejection of 
Marxism. 
Here he comments that "Hegel renders to God what belongs to 
man whilst Feurebach renders to man what belongs to uod •.• 
Feuerbach was the child of Hegel, as was Marx later on. 
Thus did destiny overthrow that dialectic (between the divine 
and the human) of genius~. ( 12 ) 
So the first and perhaps most important thing to say about 
Berdyaev's understanding of man's knowledge of God is that 
it is divine- human. God's revelation to man is divine-
human because man as the recipient of that revelation is 
required to take part in bringing it about. The part that 
man must play in the forming of this relationship with God 
"could not be revealed by man to God, it had to be brought 
to light by the destiny of man himself. Otherwise, there 
would be no freedom of creative power, there would be no 
answer made by man."(l3) 
Berdyaev is, however, critical of the way that man has 
responded to God's call, to the formation of a divine-human 
relationship. His criticism arises from the fact, 
mentioned above, that he regards the 'via negativa' as the 
way to knowledge of the Truth. Man, on the other hand, 
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has elaborated a rationalistici logically determined system 
of belief in God. The nature of this belief in God, the 
way in which man speaks about or conceptualizes God~is a 
topic that he discusses in several of his books, and it is 
important for our understanding of his thought to try to 
grasp something of the meaning of the terms that he uses 
repeatedly. He states the nature of the problem thus: 
"There is an immense distinction to be drawn between God and 
the human idea of God, between God in His essence and God as 
Object. Between God and man there stands human consciousness, 
the exterioization and projection of the limited condition of 
that consciousness there stands objectification. u(l4) 
Berdyaev's use of the word 'objectification' is frequent and 
technical. It requires further explanation. We have 
already seen that Berdyaev rejects the ontological and 
cosmological arguments for the existence of God. This 
rejection stems from the conviction that such arguments view 
God in too naturalist and phenomenal a way. He says that 
"all the proofs of the existence of God are naturalist in 
character and conceive of God as an objective reality similar 
to that of the natural world." He also says that arguments 
against the existence of God are "naturalist and naively 
realist. •• ( l5) Berdyaev is concerned to see the idea of God 
(e.g. man's consciousness of God) and the reality of the 
existence of uod. But this reality is a spiritual re~lity 
and is experienced spiritually. Therefore, to speak of a 
spiritual reality using the language of the natural world 
is inappropriate and will, inevitably, lead to distorted 
notions about the nature of Uod. We might take as an 
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example ontological argument for the existence of God. This 
stems from the understanding of God as Perfect Being. But 
such a notion is derived from naturalist conceptions. It is, 
Berdyaev maintains, a projection by man of qualities derived 
from human existence but envisaged in such a way as to make 
them non-human (e.g. "perfection" is a human notion of the 
attainment to something whole or complete, yet since it is 
never realised by man it is also a non-human quality). So 
he writes: "Man has made God in his own image and likeness ••• 
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here is not philosophical but one that is in a sense more 
"religious", e.g. the atheism of a Nietzsche or an Ivan 
Karamazov. Berdyaev formulates the question, therefore: 
"Is a rationally elaborated category of being applicable to 
the spirit, to God?"(l7) In reply to this question 
\fhe answer must be that such a category can never be applied, 
simply because "spirit" is not an object. Hence its 
existence may easily be denied. But to leave open the 
possibility of denying the existence of God because He is 
"spirit" and not "object'' is, clearly, to Berdyaev, a more 
honest approach than applying the category of being and 
ending up with God as "super-being'' or ''non-being" 
(categories which correspond to the transcendent or immanent 
anti thesis). So, in answer to this question, he states: 
"God is spirit because he is not object, because he is subject 
•••.• Spirit is revealed in the subject, whereas in the object 
we can only discern an objectif'ied spirit."(lB) 
Now it is should be clear f'rom this that Berdyaev uses the 
terms "subjective" and"objective" to ref'er to two dif'f'erent 
types of' reality. One, not evident in object f'orm (e.g.love, 
truth &c.), is still a reality, :, and a more "primal" one, 
Berdyaev would say. The other is the world of' tangible 
objects {e.g. body, wind, heat &c.) or visible objects {e.g., 
light)~ At the end of Chapter One of the second Meditation 
of ~olitude and Society, he asks the following question: 
"Why is the material and irrational object reflected in the 
immaterial and rational subject in the form of knowledge?"(l9) 
In seeking to answer this question, Berdyaev pursues his 
understanding of subject/object further. 
It is the introduction of a distinction between Being and 
Knowledge that Berdyaev regards as the effect of an 
"objectifying process". He considers that the subject, 
the personal being, man, elaborates a super-structure, above 
the subject. This superstructure is an abstraction; it is 
a form of knowledge. But as such it is impersonal and can 
have no life of its own. The strong di.s tinction between 
what is general, abstract, impersonal, and what is personal 
and existential pervades all Berdyaev's thought on this theme. 
He says that to objectify is "to rationalize in the sense of 
accepting concepts - substances, universal ideas and the rest 
- as realities. Rational and objective thought is abstracted 
from the spheres of the irrational and of the individual."( 2o) 
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Thus, knowledge in the objective sense is "social" because 
it is not centred on the existential and per~onal; it is 
''that which is to be universally valid1'. There are various 
wa;/s in \AJhich Berdyaev distinguishes between pe l"SOnal and 
subjective and the impersonal and objective. He uses the 
term "existence" in preference to "life"; the latter being 
a biological category, the fotmer an ontological one. 
Similarly, he sees "society" as an objective category and 
"community" as a subjective one. The objective is the world 
of phenomena and the subjective is the world of noumena. 
The connection between them is that "appearance is the 
objectified world, the natural and social world of necessity, 
servitude, enmity and dominance; whereas the noumenal world 
is spirit, freedom and creative power ••• What is called the 
other world is not an ~other" world to me; it is pre-
eminently my world. 11 ( 21 ) The two worlds of phenomenon and 
noumenon form a part of man's own existence and are related 
symbolically. One might~ therefore, speak of objectification 
as symbolic for 11 i t presents us with signs but not with 
realities". ( 22 ) It is this symbolic relationship that is so 
important for understanding Berdyaev's difficulty in putting 
into words the true meaning of what he believes. The 
intellection and knowledge of the subject is only ever 
imperfectly expressed in the form of language by which it 
becomes "Objective" and "social". So he writes: 
"There is the interior logos, the inward word which is in 
close proximity to the depth of the one who exists, it is 
hard by the primary reality. And there is the exterior 
logos, the outward world which is oriented to this world 
and adjusted to its fallen state. 11 ( 23) 
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It is this "interior logos" which provides man with the 
noumenal faculty through which he both apprehends God and 
enters into communion with his fellow men. This ''interior 
logos tt j_s "a creative act in the depth of being ...• it is 
the innermost light itself in the depths of' .being. 11 ( 24) 
Berdyaev further explains the relationship between the 
noumenon and the phenomeon in terms of cause and appearance. 
He says that the noumenon (the thing-in-itself) "is not a 
necessary cause of the appearance of the phenomenon .... 
necess;:,ry causal relationships exist only in the phenomenal 
world. 11 ( 25) He refers to this also in our understanding of 
our relationship with God about which he says that causal 
relationships are .. completely inapplicable" and in the 
reference to Kant he says that 11Kant expressed this clearly, 
though he was inconsistent when he recognised a causal 
relationship between the thing-in-1 tself and its appearance." (26 ) 
We have to acknowledge, therefore, that in dealing with the 
topic of the noumenal "spiritual intuition", the thing-in-
itself, we are facing something which is 11 to the world of 
objects and the world of compulsion the least generally valid 
and convincing appearance, although it is the most universal. 
For this reason, the position of metaphysics has always been 
precarious, and open to suspicion. u( 27) On the universal 
nature of this intuition or knowledge, Berdyaev comments that 
how to arrive at its universality or "general validity" was a 
problem that Kant had eaced. His own attitude to this is 
determined by "the social relations that hold good among men11 ~ 28 ) 
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If, then, we return to our point of departure, we might now 
be able to see why Ber~yaev's thought about God takes a 
personal and "subjective" form. In a discussion of the 
existentialism of Heidegger and Jaspers, Berdyaev acknowledges 
that he has more in common with Jaspers than he has with 
Heidegger, and comments that "no concept is able to reveal the 
purpose of existence or its underlying values,"( 29) Only in 
the personal sphere can the purpose of existence be found. 
ii. God: Person or Absolute? 
It is to the personal sphere that we should now turn to 
pursue Berdyaev's thinking further. In Destiny of Man 
he writes that "personality is the image and likeness of 
God in man. u( 30) This leads him to talk about God as alone 
being the universal concept or thought common to all man-
kind while not abstracted from mankind. He writes: 
"God is the most exalted of universals and at the same time 
He is the most concretely individual. He is personal. 
God is the one, true and admissible hypostatization of the 
universal. u( 3l) God is revealed in the fact that man exists 
not just as an organ in society or as an organism forming a 
particular species. Such categories as these relate to man 
in an abstract or "objectified'' way. They reduce man to a 
collection of individuals who bear no relation to each other 
at all, or they obliterate the significanceto the individual 
with a universal concept. But Berdyaev is convinced that 
the existence of personality "presupposes the existence of 
God; 1 ts value pre-supposes the supreme value - God." (3~) 
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This paradoxical view of God is typical of Berdyaev's 
writing. He views God as both universal and yet uniquely 
personal. The paradox turns on the way that the term 
universal is understood. By this he does not mean a sum 
total or an all-inclusive unity, as he maintains Vladimir 
Solovyev had taught: "The idea of the all-inclusive 
\llnitXff";W_htc;ht1Q it~mpti<ngutQvphtlQ~.gphi9.al: reasQ:t}· if? 
r•-labQ}r:'aQt:~iO.e.~sQ~ 
1
,God. ?t (~~) c;,o.1tt · 9.ppeilrs_, that 
~ understand fully the concept of unity, universalism, 
totality that Berdyaev has in mind we should have to find 
out what he means by 'sobornost', an untranslateable Russian 
term, and a concept which lies behind all Berdyaevts notions 
of God as both universal and personal • 
.e;~f- has, all-uded tn the ·idea in the following way: 
11 It might be said that the Kingdom of God is by no means 
objective unity •••• The Kingdom of God is, above all, 
personalistic. It is a personal and free Kingdom, not a 
unity which stands above personal existence, but a union, 
a communion in love.u(34) 
The most important idea of God as personal that Berdyaev 
uses is that of the Trinity. This is for him a doctrine 
of tremendous importance "which must be understood 
mystically, in terms of spiritual experience, and not by 
rational theology."( 3S) The importance of the Trinity has 
always played a significant part in the thinking of Eastern 
theologians and this is no less true of Berdyaev.(36 ) 
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It is the notion of the community of the persons of the 
Trinity which together form a unity that leads Berdyaev 
on to speak of God as 11 personal11 : "God as a ~erson pre-sup-
poses his other~ another ferson, and is love 
o o The Holy Trinity is a Trinity of Persons just because 
they pre-suppose one another and imply mutual love and 
in tercommunion." (37) 
Elsewhere Berdyaev writes that the Trinity reveals the 
interior lire or the Godhead; it indicates the surmounting 
or duality and division. It is only because the triune God 
is !~personality" that man is able to form a relationship 
with him and is not dissolved in divinity. ( 38 ) Man can 
only have any knowledge or God through a personal 
relationship with him: 11 Personali ty exists in the relation 
of love and sacririce. It is impossible to conceive of a 
personal God in an abstract monotheistic way. A person 
cannot exist as a self-contained and self-surficient 
Absolute.'' ( 39) 
The development of man's relationship with God reveals the 
inner lire of the Godhead to man. It is here that man dis-
covers the divine longing for a relationship with him. Here 
man discovers that 11 God is active in the rna tter." (40) 
Berdyaev is critical of the view er God that is normally 
given by theologians, portraying God as an "absolute and 
immobile Divinity". (41 ) Once more, it is the understanding 
of the doctrine of the Trinity which leads Berdyaev to 
reject such a notion: 11 It may even be said that such a 
doctrine which fears to admit the mobility of the divine 
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life subject to its own inner tragedy 9 is in bla t~:w t 
contradiction with the fundamental Chrjstian mystertes 
of the Divine Trinity, of Christ as the centre of the 
divine life and of Golgotha.»( 4~) 
Berdyaev has so clear a notion of God as person, as 
personality, that the concept of an immobile Absolute 
inevitable contradicts it. For a person cannot be abstract; 
a person must have what jjerdyaev would call an .. existential 
centre" and as such must be capable of reeling sorrow and joy. 
He speaks of the notion of God as ACTUS PURUS as a 
"degradation of the majtesty of God".(43) Clearly, here 
Berdyaev is rejecting a Thomist approach to theology which 
he regards as denying potentiality and the possibility of 
motion in the divine life; offering instead tta rationalist 
doctrine of God which is based upon Aristotelian Philosophy. u('44) 
He comments that "if God is ACTUS PURUS, then the creation of 
the world, that is, creative activity in God, remains 
unintelligble. On this point Berdyaev refers us to a work 
by Laberthonni~re, Christian Realism and Greek Idealism which 
he says "treats this problem very well." Berdyaev is quite 
insistent that the concept of God as the unmoved cause is 
essentially foreign to the Christian tradtion: He reiterates 
n 
the poin t• taking up the theme from Laberthon.(!.~re: 
"The static conception of God as ACTUS PURUS having no 
potentiality and completely self-sufficient is a philosophical, 
Aristotelian, and not a biblical, conception."(46) 
Elsewhere, Herdyaev refers to the influence of Greek 
philosophical thinking in relation to the development of 
Christian doctrine. He writes: "Greek philosophy had already 
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the f'undamen tal types of' philosophical approach which were 
to be developed in later hi story •... Thus, Parmenides and 
the Eleatic philosophers conceived the deepest spiritual 
and divine reality, that 1s, the true metaphy8ical reality 
as something that was unique and immobile. But Heraclitus, 
one of' the greatest philosphers, conceived it as f'iery 
movement." (47) 
In outlining a concept of' God which he regards as more in 
the tradtion of' Christian revelation and experience, 
Berdyaev suggests that we should conceive of God as 11 one 
who suf'f'ers and yearns for an Other, as one who loves and 
gives Himself' in sacrifice ... (4B) Berdyaev considers that 
the notion of God as self-sufficient may, indeed, imply an 
imperfection in the divine life, for it implies the lack of 
creative movement. Together with this goes the movement 
of love which seeks for a response from man. The question 
that is put before us is whether it might not be more worthy 
to ascribe to God "a longing for the loved one, a need for 
sacrificial self-surrender?" (49) In place of self-
satisfaction, self-sufficiency, stony immobility, pride" 
we should conceive of God as one who "shares in the 
sufferings of man (who) yearns for his other, for responsive 
love." 'l'o ignore this is to ignore the fullest expression 
of this love seen in the crucifixion of the Son on Calvary, 
the deepest mystery of Christianity. For 11 if Christ the 
Son of uod suffers a tragic destiny, and if historical 
destiny and movement are also manifest in Him, then this 
constitutes the recognition of the tragedy experienced by 
the divine life.u(5~) We should note that Berdyaev is 
careful not to imply any idea of patripassianism, as he 
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points out specifically in Freedom and the Spirit·: "It is 
not God the Father who suffers, as the Patripassians used to 
hold, but the suffering of the Son is a measure of the 
( c, \ 
suffering in the inner life of the 'I'rini ty". ':.;..1. 1 
The idea of a movement from God to man which reveals itself 
in the suffering of the Son is revelatory also of the dynamic 
movement which within the divine life found expression in the 
creation of the world. It is in this way that God shares in 
the destiny of His creatures: for the same dynamic, yearning 
love that was seen at the creation is to be seen also in the 
unfolding of the world's destiny. It is the dynamic movement 
within the relationships of the Trinity which is at the heart 
of both creation and redemption' and of the divine love: 
11
•••• the mystery of the creation of the world cannot be 
understood intimately and esoterically except through the 
inner life of the Divine Trinity, the divine dynamic."(52 ) 
Berdyaev conceives of the involvement of uod with the hisory 
of the world as the sharing in a destiny Which is from its 
beginnings a tragedy. That is the nature of the drama that 
is played out between God and man. For God's movement to man 
is complete and totally self-giving, as was shown by Christ. 
But what of man's response to God? It is with this in mind 
that Berdyaev quotes from the French writer, L~on Bloy: 
"God is the lonely and uncomprehended suffer~J;'.( 53) 
The relationship between the creation of the world and the life 
of the Trinity, Berdyaev sets out as follows: 
''The creation of the world by God the Father is a 
movement of the deepest mystery in the relation 
between God the Father and God the 0 on. The 
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revelation of the divine mystery in the depths of 
the divine and spiritual life, of the inner 
passionate divine thirst and 1onging for Rn 
other self 9 that other self which may be the 
subject of a great and infinite love on the part 
of God, and that infinite thirst for reciprocity 
and love on the part of the other self, determines 
for the Christian consciousness the very principle 
of movement and process. This inner tragedy felt 
by God for His other self and its longing for 
recipnocal love constitutes that very mystery of 
the divine life which is associated with the 
creation of the world and of man. (54) 
ii. Mysticism and the Language of Symbols. 
We may not proceed without heeding the warning that ~erdyaev 
gives at this point. For here we approach the very brink 
of mystery and find ourselves on a "razor edge". Berdyaev 
reminds us of the notion of the COINCIDENTIA OPPOSITORUM 
which is for him a truth of spiritual experience. To 
express his understand of "the coincidence of motion and 
rest in God" he quotes from S.Simecn the New Theologian: 
"Come Thou, who remainest unmoved yet who ever moveth ani 
dost direct Thyself towards us."(55) 
This idea he considers to be more profound and an advance 
beyond Greek and Scholastic rationalism; an idea that 
belongs to the mystical tradition, in connection with which 
both Augmstine and Nicholas of Cusa are cited. (56 ) We 
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have already suggested that Berdyaev abandons the position 
of theologian or philosopher at times and takes up that of 
mystic. In speaking of God as the coincidence of opposites, 
we are very much in the realm of mysticism. In addition to 
those that have just been mentioned, we might offer the 
names of Origen, Clement of Alexandria, Gregory of Nyassa, 
S.Martin, Jacob Boehme, Francis Baader and Vladimir Solovyev~ 5 7) 
as typical of or influential on Berdyaev's thought. We 
should, however, make completely clear that Berdyaev 
envisages no logical relationship between mystical 
experience and rational or positive theology or philosophy. 
We return here to the problem of language. It should be 
stressed that Berdyaev's writing is so unsystematic and 
contradictory because he is struggling to put into words 
something which he has experienced within his own spirit but 
which he can express at best symbolically, as he says in the 
preface to ·Freedom and the Spirit ; "I recognize that there is 
~ometh:k_ng~ essential':•which-. Ltcanhot:-;J)u:t -into words~ :and that I 
cannot adequat:ely ·dev)elopl mytk1..tlmbst_ though ts~\!!1o (58) 
These inmost thoughts form a part of the spiritual life in 
such a way that they should never be questioned. To ask 
whether mystical experience is some form of auto-suggestion 
is to imply a form of detachment and external objectivity 
quite foreign to such experience. Berdyaev points out 
that God and man are neither external to each other, nor 
are they identified together. But the expression of this 
experience does not correspond to any adequate concept: 
"it can be expressed in symbols. Symbolic knowledge which 
throws a bridge across from one world to another is 
apophatic. ii (59) Here we can see most clearly the influence 
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of the mystical tradition of the East (and certain elements 
of the West) on Berdyaev's thought. In particular, of 
course, Jacob Boehme. Part of the reason for this may be 
"Boehme uses the language of symbol and myth, and it may be 
just for that reason that he succeeds in letting in some 
light upon that depth, the knowledge of which is not 
attainable in rational philosophy. 11 ( 60) 
Berdyaev distinguishes symbols from realities and yet they 
lead us on to realities. This is the mark of growth and 
development in the spiritual life. The external world of 
nature, history, society &c. belongs to the r~m of symbol. 
Yet it is these things which are the highway of the spirit, 
the path to the spiritual realities which they symbolize. 
For it is among these symbols that life is lived; through 
these external things life proceeds. The relationship 
between the inner life of the spirit and the external life 
of symbols is explained by Berdyaev thus: "As we pursue 
the course of our spiritual development we launch out fnto 
the obj ec ti ve world of symbols, and then ve return again to 
achieve a f'resh integration of ourselves in the inmost 
depths and at the very centre of life and reality. 11 ( 6l) 
The "centre of life and reality" is quite clearly a spiritual 
centre which is discmvered only beyond the symbols. Too 
often, Berdyaev suggests, the symbol is mistaken for the 
reality itself. But to be bound to the symbol as though 
it were a reality is to prevent a real transfiguration of 
l i f'e. For example, Berdyaev comments as follows on the 
symbolism of the Eucharist: 11 In the sacrament of the 
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Eucharist the bread and wine are changed into the body and 
blood of Christ. But this is a rt-alist and symbolic 
trans-substantiation behind which there lies the mystery of 
the basic and original 1 ife, for it is in the inmost depths 
of existence that the Lamb of God is offered in sacrifice for 
the sins of the world. It is by means of the sacrament that 
the other world penetrates into ours ..• The matter of the 
!Y\ 
sacrament is not accidental, for it is s~olically linked 
with the outward spiritual phenomenon its~lf •••• The true 
symbol is not an allegory and the sacramental possesses a 
cosmic nature, for its significance is not confined merely 
to the human soul. Its symbolism is real and absolute but 
its reality originates in the spiritual world and not in our 
natural world. 11 ( 62 ) 
This transfiguration is to be disc~rned in the lives of the 
mystics. Mysticism demonstrates the realities behind the 
symbols because it is unfettered by the gogmatic or canonical 
structures which belong to "official theology'. Berdyaev 
notes the suspicion with which mysticism is regarded by the 
Church and equates the life of the mystic with that of the 
prophet al1~·one who is free and open to the life of the spirit. 
He does, however, also note that mysticism or prophecy is the 
vocation of only a few, though he draws the following 
distinction: 11We may resort to conventional terminology and 
call religion "democratic 11 and mysticism 1 aristocratic'."( 63) 
Since mysticism is concerned with the realities behind the 
symbols it is incapable of being rationalized. To this 
extent it might be said that mysticism is concerned with that 
which is unknowable. Its " " unknowableness should not, 
however, imply an absolute and irreconcilable rupture between 
God and man: "Apophatic theology is mystical rather than 
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Acrn ... .,+i,.. 11 ( 64) Indeed. it is ti-us very ''mysteriousness'i 
-o· ....... - .... J,..- o J 
rather than rational argument, which leads to the 
knowledge of God. For "the world is bounded by a mystery 
in which rational thought ends 11 (bS)and man falls back on the 
use of myths and symbols. The importance of myths is, for 
Berdyaev, similar to that of symbols. He has some sympathy 
with the gnostic systems because of the way in which they 
employed myth. He considers that mythology will make 
possible an understanding of "the essence of celestial history." 
ttOnly a mythology, which conceives the divine celestial life 
as celestial history and as a drama of love and 1~eedom 
unfolding itself between God and His other self ••.• can 
provide a solution of celestial history and, through it, of 
. "(bb) 
the de7>tinies of both f\1\(l.t\ and the world. 
The importance that Berdyaev attqches to t.he use of symbolic 
language when speaking about the mysteries of God can be 
seen in the criticism that he offers of his friend and fellow 
exile, Fr. Sergei Bulgakov. He maintains that Bulgakov's 
work implies a knowledge of the inner life of the Trinity· 
which he considers to be objectified and over-familiar. 
Berdyaev is here thinking of Bulgakov's Sophiology.(~7) 
He also offers at this point a criticism of two of his 
oldest friends, Bulgakov and Shestov, and suggests that they 
are, in fact, polar opposites. He says: "Shestov sets 
revelation and faith in opposition to reason and knowledge. 
Bulgakov wishes to make use of reason and its apparatus of 
concepts for the knowledge of revelation." Both, however, 
he maintains, raise the problem of what he calls his 
"critique of reason~. This pre-supposes that God is not 
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above or subordinate to Truth but thAt He is "existent truth". 
As such, He is also "spirit, freedom, love, conscience~ . 
. e., 
Berdyaev wishes to vrspiri tulize ~ rev~ation not in the sense 
of introducing an antithesis between spirit and matter, since 
"the body also can be in the spirit". The 01 critique of 
revelation'' will enable him to move away from rationalistic 
theology, towards mystery and mysticism. It should be a 
critique, not of reason but of the spirit; "and there is no 
criterion of Spirit outside Spirit itself". ( 6B) Bulgakov's 
system Berdyaev regards as dependent on the antithesis 
between transcendent and immanent which, for him, is "out 
of date. " Berdyaev associates with this outdated antithesis 
all ideas about monism and dualism and the significance of 
pantheism. These ideas follow from a rejection of the 
symbolism which links God and the world. 
Berdyaev maintains that the abandonment of a symbolic way of 
thinking leads to a dualistic theism which is, in fact, a 
two-foid atheism. For there is an atheism which regards God 
as unknowable, utterly transcendent and totally removed from 
the life of this world. 'l'here is also an a theism that 
regards God as so completely absorbedin this world that he 
has no "other'' existence. But Berdyaev maintains.that ttGod 
and man are not external to each other; neither are they 
identified, the one nature does not disappear in the other. 11 ( 69) 
While rejecting all ides of a transcendent/immanent antitheses 
and exclusively monist or dualist concepts, Berdyaev is more 
guarded about the idea of pantheism. 
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Beyond transcendental dualism and immanent monism, mystical 
experience does, Berdyaev suggests, triumph over creature-
liness. That is to say, there is an a Wei rene ss of both the 
divine r1a ture of Uod \~rrhi ch ic rev cal cd in the vvorl d and an 
awareness of the abyss between man and God which introduces 
into the spiritual life a dialogical struggle and inherent 
tragedy. It is this aspect of mysticism which, according 
to Berdyaev, theology labels "pantheistic''. But it could 
only be susc~ptible of pantheistic interpretation in that it 
envisages a divine nature in both creator and creature. 
Rational pantheism tails to explain the relationship between 
God and the world just because it is a rational system and as 
such cannot express something inexpressible. It ends in a 
denial of the reality of the world and of man; or, again, 
a form of atheism, a denial of divine reality."(70) 
Berdyaev notes that theologians, and especially Roman Catholic 
theologians, are particularly critical of the idea of 
pantheism. But their criticism is due to the fact that they 
have not understood that mystical language is not pantheistic 
but paradoxical. What they cannot grasp is that pantheism is 
a heresy about man and not about God.(7l) In Berdyaev's 
opinion, most theologians put forward a theology which is 
implicitly pantheistic in that it views God as holding and 
directing everything. Berdyaev wishes to avoid this by 
emphasizing man's freedom (which is not determined by God) 
and his capacity for creativeness. The fact that man does 
share in divine freedom and creativity is the extent to 
which pantheism is true. And it is true to the extent that 
it does not allow any kind of dualism. Man has a divinity 
similar to the way that God has a divinity, in that they are 
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' both free creators, although man s autonomous creativity 
is given him by God. To this extent, God is in all things. 
But God does not determine everything. 'l'bat is what 
Berdyaev would Uilderstand by a "false . " mon1sm , This is a 
misinterpretD tion of pantheis!p, as he sees it; it is an 
example of rational theology pushing the terms of mystical 
understanding too far. Berdyaev really envisages somethihg 
like a Ppaneleutherismq. He explains his idea in The Realm 
of Spirit and The Realm of Caesar: 
'To identify the realm of spirit with the realm of 
Caesar, in one or another form is a false monism, 
which inevitably gives rise to slavery. Dualism 
between the realm of Spirit and the realm of Caesar 
is an absolutely necessary confirmation of man's 
freedom. But this is not a final dualism; it is a 
dualism in the spiritual and religious life of man. 
The final monism will be confirmed in the Kingdom 
of God: it is only to be revealed eschatologically. 
This "false monism" is an abstract concept and for Berdyaev 
no sufficient explanation of a plural world. He maintains 
that it must ultimately be transformed into "another extreme 
and unresolvable form of dualism. u(73 ) Deism is an exanple 
(72) 
of such a process. Here there are combined false conceptions 
of dualism and monism which permit of "no transfusion of 
energy" from one realm to another and which brings us to 
atheism and the negation of religion. Deism is the fatal 
product of a rationalist theism which combines within 
itself an abstract dualism and an abstract monism. 
Berdyaev instead seeks to bridge the gap between the two 
worlds and to overcome such a hopeless dualism, to 
122 
discover an interior connection between man and God which 
will give some meaning to the drama that is played out 
between them. But the drama must be one that is freely 
determined on both sides. Unless this is properly a dual 
encounter, it will deny man the right to play his own role: 
nF;or man stands in the centre of the world and his destiny 
determines that of the world. Only this mystery of the 
mutual relations between God and man, of love and freedom, 
and of freely given love, can elucidate the depths of the 
inner divine life and the mobile plural world ... ( 74) 
Freedom here becomes the criterion of what is true and what 
is false. ttpantheism is false if only because it is bound 
to deny freedom. u(75) The same is true of monistic or 
dualistic interpretations of the relation between creator 
and creature. In connection with this, Berdyaev cites N. 
Hartmann's form of atheism which is based upon the idea that 
human freedom and creative values are incompatible with the 
existence of God: "If God exists, man is not free and cannot 
create values", is the way Berdyaev puts it. He considers 
that "HartmaM's contention is false", but the problem is a 
real one. (76) For if God is everything there can be no 
response to His love; there would be no communion or 
"dialogical struggle" since the Almighty and Omniscient God 
is constantly confronted by Himself. And then, inevitably 
in this context, evil must be determined by God. 
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iv. Freedom. 
Freedom is the coping stone of the whole structure of 
Berdyaev 's thought. An investigation of his thought on 
this subject will both illuminate the ideas already out-
lined and open the way for further exploration. For, 
without an understanding of this aspect of Berdyaev's 
thought, it would be difficult to understand his thinking 
on the subjects of man, evil, the world, history, &c. 
Much of the reaction of Berdyaev's work was an interest in 
this theme of freedom.(77) 
It should already be clear that Berdyaev had a very clear 
understanding of God as mystery. This meant that no 
analogy could be applicable to liod. In this sense, one 
could say that God is ~reedom, for He is free from categories, 
free from being categorized, "objectified''. But though God 
might be free, theology has made a slave of Him. Theology 
has enslaved Ood because it is based on cataphatic knowledge. 
But Berdyaev regards knowledge, or the basis of knowledge 
(that is the existential subject) as free, conditioned by a 
freedom which is ~preontic" and irrational. This freed om 
is the essential condition of the existential subject. It 
is also, however, a source of tragedy. For it is the source 
:Of rma:ny errors, blunde~s;::-and--insurmountable contradictions, 
although these will only be discerned if freedom is given the 
primacy over Being. In doing just this, Berdyaev maintains 
that he is rejecting the venerable tradition of ontology 
which goes back to Parmenides, Plato, Aristotle and Acquinas. 
He chooses instead an existential philosphy which is 
radically anti-ontological. For Berdyaev, the primacy of 
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freedom over being means the freedom to determine onself 
from within and to be oneself: ''Being is as it were 
' ' 
freedom arrested and congealed." This concept of freedom 
is one that he took from Jacob Boehme, about whom he says 
that "I regarded his thinking concerning ungrund as 
susceptible of my own interpretation, and I identified 
ungrund with primordial freedom which precedes all 
ontological determination," and goes on to say "according 
to Boehme this freedom is in God; it is the inmost 
mysterious principle of the divine life; whereas I 
conceived it to be outside God, prefering as I do, not to 
speak of the unspeakable and ineffable apophatic mystery 
of, God's life. u( 7B) In several of his books, Berdyaev 
gives a brief outline of those aspects of Boehme's thought 
(concerning the ~grund ) which are of most interest to him. 
Very often this is given in contrast or comparison with 
Eckhart's notion of the distinction between God ( 'Gott ) and 
the Godhead ( 1 Gotthei t' ) • Within this tradition Berdyaev 
also shows interest in the work of Angelus Silesius and von 
Baader. Schelling is also mentioned. (79) 
Looking at the dfrference between the two mystics, Boehme 
and Eckhart, Berdyaev suggests that this difference is due 
to the fact that Boehme takes his vision from the :cabbala 
Eckhart from Neo-Platonism. Berdyaev quotes from Boehme 
on the ungrund in "Spirit and Reality". He seeks to 
explain the vision of the ungrund as something deeper 
than. God. He quotes: 
'The cause of the will is the nothingness 
and 
it'The uncauseable and uncaused is an eternal 
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nothingness, and the cause of an eternal 
beginning, a craving; for nothingness is 
a craving for something. 1'(BO) 
We may recognise here something along the lire s of a meonic 
freedom, but Herdyaev rejects the idea that this may be the 
·meon in the Greek sense; for in this we are beyond the 
realm of Greek intellectualism and ontology. The simplest 
and basic definition that Berdyaev proposes is that "freedom 
is NOT CREATED. tt ( Bl) 
For Berdyaev this established Boehme as the first in a 
tradition of voluntarist thought, something which he 
identit'ies as an important element in the lat-er development 
of German tradition. It is this m~tical tradition in which 
Herdyaev·feels that he stands together with Schelling, von 
Baader, Angelus Silesias, and those philosophers whom he 
considers to have been influenced by this strain of thought 
(e.g., Kant, Fichte, Hegel and Schopenhauer.) 
In particular, Berdyaev speaks of the influence that 
The Dark ~ature of God had on him and its abili~ to 
communicate to him something which is beyond the categories 
of human speech, of good and evil, of being and non-being. 
He speaks of this uncreated freedom that Boehme has 
experienced, as lying deeper than within the nature of God. 
It is "a sort of primal dark abyss, and in its inmost depth 
occurs a theogonic process or that of divine genesis."( 82 ) 
This divine genesis is a secondary process, for its succeeds 
the ''primal source'' and "fount of being'' in which it is 
taking place. That Berdyaev envisages a seconda:ry process 
is due to the fact that he conceives of freedom as outsidd 
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God. On tllis, Vallon hat> commented that "in spite of 
all Berdyaev's reservations and qualifications, the meonic 
freedom conveys much more the idea of 'somethingness' rather 
than 'nothingness' .• (B3) It is precisely that idea of 
usomethingness" , defying description, that Berdyaev seems 
to suggest. "Outside" should here be interpreted as 
"beyond" or "anterior"', a dis tine tion that is not made by 
Boehme. The Theogony should not be thought of, either, as 
having a beginning; it is rooted in the ungrund:, it is 
etemal. It is, however, the very fact of this movement 
at the primal source which imp~s the possibility of tragic 
destiny in the divine life. For here there is a ponring 
out, a dynamic, a passion, at the centre of which stands 
the Passion of God Himself and His Son. Thus, in this 
secondary process we should see the mysteries of creation 
and redemption. Creation is what Berdyaev calls the 
"anthropogonistic process" at the centre ot' which is the 
person of Christ, in which is brought about the perfection 
of the genesis of God in man and man in God. And at the 
centre of the world process stands the crucifixion, 
\-w-4., 
"because God~desired,~edom and because the primal drama 
and mystery of the world ~'~ those of the relations between 
God and His other self, which He loves and by which He 
desires to be loved. A.n~~ C~\1~ fre~JOlb'\ l(,i'\l1C\..J~ H"' ~ ic:ve 
~~~ th Cv'\1.1 S:ttt\'\lf i(.{;l/\lt' • u(B4 ) Berdyaev envisages different 
'J J 
types of freedom in the world. There is the irrational 
freedom which he identifies with the uncreated meonic 
freedom. There is also \'intelligent freedom" which he 
sees as something striven for, the freedom of Socrates 
and the Greeks and which leads to slave~J; it tends to 
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become organized into a pattern which does, in fact~ destroy 
the freedom of the individual spirit. But there is a third 
type of freedom, not imposed by an outside authority, namely, 
that of' grace. It is in this divine moment of genesis,when 
the creation and redemption are revealed in eternity, that 
the Trinity is also revealed. Berdyaev quotes Boehme as 
u T 
'saying that the cause of the rinity is the single 
un:fa thomable wi 11." ( 85 ) 
Having stated that it was his intention to re-examine the 
idea of creation, which he declared stood in reed of 
"revision and deepening~, he explores the idea :further in 
· · ~ _Destiny o:f Man. Here, Berdyaev suggests that there 
was a stage in this process of creation when, in a 
paradisal state the world existed, and man existed, but in 
a state of ignorance or unconsciousness. Further to this 
Berdyaev states that Paradise is the unconscious wholeness 
o:f .Nature. In connection with this, he cites Freud and 
his school, :for whom the con:flict of the conscious with the 
unconscious gives rise to neurosis and psychosis and is a 
product of civilization; Klagess, for whom the birth o:f 
consciousness is decadence and disease; Bergson, who 
contrasts instinct with intell~ct; Shestov, and the under-
lying idea in his struggle against the rational and the 
good; Dostoevsky, for whom suffering is the only cause o:f 
consciousness; Hegel and his "unhappy consciousness~.C 86 ) 
In this state the irrational meonic :freedom was temporarily 
obscured. At this stage, the Father only was present, 
1
'but He was not yet the Father, for the oon had not been 
revealed. God the Word was present but the Word was not 
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incarnate as man and h8d not made the sacrifice of love. u( 87) 
It was only at the point of man's loss of Paradisal innocence 
and unconsciousness, at the awakening in him of the knowledge 
of good and evil 9 that creation is seen as coming about 
finally in time. This is the event of the Fall. This 
brings about man's final creation, the stirring in him of an 
irrational freedom, engendering both good and evil. 
Consequently, it revealed man's destiny to deification and 
the suffering of Christ. "Chnist could not have appeared 
in the life of Paradise".(BB) 
Creation isao::ompl_ishEd in eternity and then in time. It is 
when the freedom which, in man, is the true reflection and 
the image of the Creator, becomes active that the movement 
in the world (i.e. a movement towards good or evil) begins. 
But this "ancient tale" is something which is beyond the 
boundary between time and eternity. It is an account, a 
myth of primordial history. This is a "frontier line idea" 
(89) 
For beyond creation, beyond the revealing of t'reedom, of the 
movement or conflict between@od and evil, beyond this divine 
mystery everything is inexpressible and so could not be known 
in human or personal terms. 'l'he movement of irrational 
freedom towards evil, the rebellion against the creativity 
of llod, brings about the revelation of the Trini cy, which is 
di rec tE'd towards the world in which is revealed Uod 's 
suffering. Vallon comments: "Creation is about man's 
response to God's call". Since that response was to be a 
free one, it had to be possible that man could respond in 
rebellion. (go) 
That man is born from a nothing which is primeval uncreated 
meonic ~reedom is a view which Berdyaev suggests is "less 
insulting" to man than the notion o~ createdness in 
traditional theology which suggests an impassable gulf 
between man and his Creator. But man, endowed with 
~reedom, is called to play a part in the destiny of the 
world. This is played out in the activity of the three 
principles: ".Providence, i.e. the super-cosmic God; 
~reedom, i.e. the human spirit; and ~ate or destiny, i.e. 
~ature, the solidi~ied, hardened outcome o~ the dark 
rneonic ~reedom.u(9l) 
The destiny o~ the world is man's own destiny. It is a 
two-fold movement: from God to man, that is, creating, 
longing for, yearning; and from man to uod, that is, the 
work of creating the image of God in man, the image which 
is properly man's and for which he was made. For: "The 
image of man is defaced when the image of God is obliterated 
~rom the human soul.n(92) 
And this two-fold work must equally be the work of man and 
his freedom, since in freedom man was born. But the 
tragedy is that freedom not only af'firms man's dignity and 
ability to create a new and better life, it also leads to 
evil and has a capacity for self-destruction. But, above 
all, goodness must be free, since ttthe servitude of the good 
is an evil thing and the freedom of evil can be the greater 
good than the good which is a result of compulsion. 11 
"Freedom, therefore, is not a trifle to be lightly assumed; 
it is a difficulty and a burden which man ought to take 
upon hiself.u(93) 
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The burden is the part that man plays in the conflict 
betwedn the elements of providence, freedom and fate. 
In this conflict, man is torn between the consent to 
creating the image of Uod within himself and rebellion 
against creating that image, rebellion against Uod. But 
such a rebellion is a denial of himself and a return to 
non-being, a refusal to answer the divine call. The way 
of creation and response has been shown to man by Christ, 
the uod-man. For in the primal drama, when man was first 
awakened from unconsciousness, the Word became revealed and 
the life of the Trinity directed towards the world. This 
is the mystery of redemption. Berdyaev suggests that the 
"inca mat ion" of the Son was the emergence of the Trinity, 
to be fully revealed later on earth in the man Jesus Christ. 
In Him, "for the first time, in response to uod 1 s movement 
and longing, a perfect man is revealed to Him." We may 
compare ~'with t!1is; ••the eternal face of man abides in the 
~~ea-r-e. or, .,~th«J:IDioohrien ~1 "tY» ~ner&~p cm.Q. rll:YPJIS'I(.a~ a 
1b.P :IJ)iaf~ttyl~ Di vane Jiuma.ttl. t~!:,t!_,;:~~LVis 'Jl:be~vit.fhA~qiW;rUi ty 
l!Jrr:iJ~lni'S.luam1Son uJ:P~an and Son of God. 
It is because God requires a free response from man that 
suffering becomes a part of the life of the Godhead, and 
of the world. The suffering is not only that of Calvary; 
it is a destiny, a history of suf:f'ering, of the longing 
:ror the response of love, which is demonstrated most fully 
·:.1-nc.itlie·.-person of the crucified Son of God, Jesus Christ: 
"The tragedy of :freedom is overcome by the tragedy of the 
Cross.u (95) 
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Berdyaev insists that the cause of this tragedy 1 freedom, 
must be absolute. If it were not beyond the control of God, 
then the irrational evil and suffering of the world would be 
meaningless. In the discussion of the problem of evil we 
should be forced into the position of admitting that Uod is 
responsible for the cre~on (or for allowing the creation) 
of evil. Berdyaev regards this as suggesting that "God is 
playing a game with Himself.'' ( 96 ) For this reason, it becomes 
impossible to speak of the providence of Uod, in the way that 
it is usually understood. 
v. Providence and Grace. 
Berdyaev gives some reference to a notion of God's providence 
in hJ.s Destiny or Jlan as one of the three principles active 
in the world. In this context, however, it is seen over 
against the background of freedom and fate. That is to say, 
Berdyaev does not regard freedom and fate as countermanded by 
God's providence in the destiny of the world. But the notion 
of providence that is a part of traditional theological and 
metaphysical doctrine is, Berdyaev maintains, inconsitent when 
faced by the importance and disquieting nature of the problem 
of evil. The question of how divine providence is effective 
in the world is a question posed by reason. But this question 
is meaningless when confronted with the myste~ and secret of 
love. There can be no rational system of world order, since 
this could not take into account the element of freedom. The 
theme of world history which reveals God's providence most 
fully is that of free±y given love. This is the way of 
freedom and not necessity: 11 It endows his tory, however, 
with that terrible and disastrous character which compels 
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many to doubt the existence of Providence and to conclude 
that the whole of world hi story is a refutation of !t. "(97) 
It is probably true that our ideas of God turn more easily 
towards concepts o~ power, omnipotence, sovereignty &c. 
rather than the precarioJs and vulnerable idea of freely-
given love. It is easier to think in terms of a cosmic 
world order and harmony than the interplay between 
irrational factors involving the divine life in their 
conflict. But Berdyaev rejects the notion of Vod as an 
autocratic Monarch who will establish the commmn world order 
at the cost of every individuality. Together with his 
mentor, Dostoevsky, Berdyaev chooses the idea of Uod as 
f'reely-gi ven love, rather than one .which Wbuld ;give ;a 
3!>.o,reJ,.~ta_tic view which would :fail to see God's striving: 
11 The problem of' theodicy is only solved on the existential 
plane where God reveals Himself' as :freedom, love and 
sacrif'ice, where He surfers for man and strives together 
with man against the :falsity and wrong of the world."( 98 ) 
Here and elsewhere Berdyaev· shows some sympathy for Marcion 
in his attempt to come to terms with this problem. tie 
refers us to the work by Harnack on Marcion. We should also 
at this point note that Berdyaev rejects the idea of Vod as 
Cause: "It is utterly wrong to apply the ca tegocy of 
Causality to God and to the relation between God and the world. 
It is suitable only to relations that belong to the phenomenal 
world. Qod is not the cause of this world any more than He 
is Master and King. When people speak of God as the Creator 
of the world they are speaking of something immeasurably more 
mysterious than a causal relation~ In relation to the world 
God is freedom and not necessity, not determination.-'99) 
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Berdyaev's rejection of God as Pantokrator is consequent 
upon this understanding of God striving together with man. 
He insists that the management of the world is not simply 
a divine au Loc ro.cy but so met hi ng which req-w_ res human 
participation. It is Christ who shows the perfect form 
of this management, for in him the human and divine meet: 
"With Christ, God's autocracy ceases, for man as the Son 
of God is called to immediate participation in divine life. 
The management of the world becomes divine-human." (lOO) 
The actual managing of the world is dependent on grace, but 
not on grace alone. Berdyaev again refers to a complex 
interaction of three principles of necessi4Y, freedom and 
transfiguring grace. We may add here that in connection 
with the references above to these three principles of 
activity in the world, it is not made clear how Berdyaev 
intends these statements to relate to each other. One 
might identify providdnce with grace, and fate with 
necessity. o. F. Clarke, in his book Introduction to 
Berdyaev" comments as f'ollows: 11 'I' , 'Christ' and 'Freedom', 
the triad, which is the core of Berdyaev's philosophy, give 
us plurality and unity, movement, life, time and eterni4Y, 
personality and community, a real world and yet a world 
whose meaning is beyond itself."(1-01 ) In taking part in 
this interaction, man becomes the instrument of grace. 
But this grace is not something external to him. It was 
first revealed in the God-man, Christ, as the revelation 
of' the divine in man. What the theologians call grace, 
placing it alongside human freedom, is this action in 
man of divine freedom.C 102 ) It is by grace that man shares 
in the creating of the world, for the creation is not a 
completed act. Grace, is, in fact, the third type of 
freedom: "Grace proceeds not only from the divine nature of 
Christ, but also from the human and from his heavenly 
humanity. here we see the third kind of freedom, namely 
(,r\7.\ 
that of man 9 in an active and illuminated state."'~v~; 
Man is called to realize his role as creator and in this 
lies his response to Uod. This is the work of grace, as 
something which is God given, and yet which belongs 
inherently to man, without impairing his freedom: "It is 
the act of grace which realizes the communion between God 
and man and offers the solution to the divine drama. We 
must, therefore, note that the principle of Divine Grace 
is active in the history and destiny of both world and man, 
together with that of natural necessity. And without it 
neither this destiny nor mystery would be fulfilled.u(l04) 
Berdyeav shows some interest here in the paradox between 
freedom and grace which is reflected in the disputes between 
Augustine and Pelagius, the Jansenists and the Jesuits. He 
comments that Pelagius failed to understand that "human 
freedom as such is powerless to turn man to God, to conquer 
si·n, •• and similarly that the'·6Vansenists s111isequently:i..:f'ailed 
. " G to see that grace comes from od and not from man ••• it is 
not man's answer to God."(l05) Elsewhere he comments "The 
mystery of God's operation in the world and in man usually 
finds expression in the doctrine of grace, and grace bears 
no resemblance to what we understand by necessity, power, 
authority and causality •.•• grace cannot be set in anti-
thesis to freedom."(l06 ) 
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CHAPTER 5. BERDYAEV'S PLACE IN BRITISH THEO~O~Y. 
In this second part of the thesis we have looked so far at 
Berdyaev's Doctrine of God. We have considered his under-
standing of man's ability to know God and the nature of 
man's apprehension of God's revelation of Himself. We saw 
that Berdyaev understood this process of revelation and 
apprehension as a concrete relationship, a relationship 
betwean persons. We also saw that Berdyaev was critical of 
what he regarded as the adoption by Christianity of an 
Aristotalian approach to our understand about God. Thus, we 
saw that Berdyaev, in looking for a different way of speaking 
about God, drew heavily upon the mystical tradtion of both 
East and West, and we noted that he also pointed to the 
difficulties (Monism, Dualism, Pantheism) connected with this 
approach. In the last two sections of this chapter, we 
looked at how Berdyaev used freedom as the hallmark of truth; 
Berdyaev's Doctrine of Freedom we termed the coping stone of 
the structure of his thought because it enabled us finally to 
approach the boundary between time and eternity, the 
revelation of the lif'e of the Divine Trinity and a true 
understanding of God's action in the world through His 
providence and grace. 
We turn now to look at how some of these aspects of Berdyaev's 
thought can be located in the work of British theologians and 
philosophers of the period up to the end of the second World 
War. By a comparison with the state of theological debate 
in Britain at that time we shall attempt to show that 
Berdyaev's work was welcomed in this country because it 
considered questions already being asked, and o1'fered a 
contribution from a different religious tradition. Drawing 
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on the outline we have just made of his doctrine of Uod 
we shall consider how Herdyaev is engaged in debate over 
the concept of God as ~erfect ~eing and how there is set 
the alogical working of the world. 
i. Perfect Being and the Alogical working of the World. 
To summarize, then, we have attempted to outline Berdyaev's 
approach to the doctrine of God. In discussing the way in 
which our knowledge of God is normally conceived, Berdyaev 
is always concerned to move away from formulae that have 
been shaped by different traditions, from 
that of the Greeks to that of German Idealism. Berdyaev's 
interest is in seeing beyond the philosophical categories to 
the experience of God which they testify. It could well 
be said that his approach is an existential one, since he is 
trying to give express! on, not to a concept derived ·~ 
priori' but to a living relationship, to something that is. 
Thus, much of his understanding of our knowledge of Uod is 
explained in personal terms: it is a drama, a relationship 
lived out between man and God. It is of vital importance 
for Berdyaev that by "God" we do not imply a concept which 
is beyond that of a person; you cannot have a relationship 
with a concept. It might be argued in reply that here 
Berdyaev offers merely an extreme form of anthropomorphism. 
But that would be a misreading of his meaning. It is his 
contention that God is ,_.human'' while man is "'inhuman''· 
Mankind strives not to become something of its own making, 
but the likeness of its Creator. There is a basic 
similarity between God and man which in the first place makes 
man aware of the fact that he has something to which he 
aspires. 
13V 
Three vital things aoout the way in which 
Berdyaev views this destiny must be remembered. The first 
is th8 t it through man's f.r·ee response to 
God. The true imagt of humanity is only to be found in 
God~ :_jut man is free to create an image for himself, of 
himself. Berdyaev's reflections on the outcome of these 
man-made images form the basis of his comment on the 
development of Western Society, philosophy, theology, &c. 
The second point is that the perfect man, the true image 
of God, the only example of a freely-given and total 
response to God, is to be found in the God-man, Jesus Christ. 
Christ is the perfect humanity revealed in the Godhead; 
Christ of'fers the perfect response to God in the life of the 
Trinity. The third point is, that in order for man's 
response to be totally free, God is willing to suffer. The 
Cross is the revelation of God's movement towards man, God's 
call to man, which reveals not only the suffering of a love 
which fails to find a full response from the beloved, but 
which goes out to reach the beloved. God's movement to man 
identifies itself with man's suffering in order to be able 
to elicit from man a free response to that love. 
Underlying this is tlerdyaev's mystical intuition which, as 
we have seen, impels him to employ language which is 
symbolic or mythological. There is a finely drawn tension 
in his thought, through which he seeks to hold together the 
mystery of the transcendent Deity and the uod who lives and 
suffers in the world, who is the ground of our being and 
known to every man, woman and child. The response to God 
takes man from time to beyond-time, from space to beyond-
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space. Through this response, man discovers within his 
life an existence which is beyond time and space, which 
is "spirit", as berdyaev terms it; we might say that it 
is metaphysical. But t t is no less real for being th;;;. t. 
Indeed, it is Berdyaev's contention that in discovering 
"the realm of spirit" man discovers God and the freedom 
to become fully a really human being. 
In England, Berdyaev's work begins to appear in translation 
during the mid-thirties, though this is, in some cases, 
several years after its original composition and appearance 
in French. Just about all of his major works appeared in 
English: some of them were published after his death in 1947. 
The reaction to his work from leading theologians of the day 
was enthusiastic and it would seem that he was widely read. (l) 
Among those who reviewed his work and praised it were William 
Temple, W. R. Matthews, Evelyn Underhill and C. E. Raven.( 2 ) 
While it might not be possible to justify the view that 
Berdyaev influenced the actual development of theology in 
this country, it would seem that his work contributed to a 
development that was already in progress. We shall, 
therefore, take some of tierdyaev's views that have been 
outlined above and investigate how they relate to 
theological debate in Britain at that time. 
The first area of Herdyaev's thought which we might 
investigate in relation to contemporary thought is that 
of God as an Absolute. This theme we dealt with above 
in the sections entitled "Man's Knowledge and Apprehension 
of God." (4.1.) and "God: Person or Absolute?" (4.ii.) 
139 
The main thrust of Berdyaev's argument is that he rejects 
all concepts of God as an immobile absolute, as "actus 
purusa, and with it the rationalist arguments for the 
existence of God, derived from Greek philosophy. l<'or him 1 
God cannot be self-sufficient, omnipotent, omniscient, &c., 
these ideas degrade the Majesty of God. 
Perhaps the strongest defence of the position that he is 
challenging was at this time given by E. L. Mascall in his 
book, He Who Is, which sets out to maintain the Thomist 
approach to the doctrine of ~od. In Chapter 10 of the 
book ("Transcendence and Immanence") Mascall acknowledges 
that to Berdyaev "rational theology is anathema because it 
turns into an object of discussion a God who is already 
comprehended in the depths of the human spirit. 11 (3) 
On the basis that rational ~heology depends on the doctrine 
of analogy in order to make discussion of it possible, 
Mascall asserts that Herdyaev is involved in a self-
defeating pursuit. Mascall' s question is whether "the 
very way in which he is putting them (sc.theological 
problems) may not deprive him of the possibilit¥ of getting 
an answer.u(4) The basic contradiction in Herdyaev's 
thought is, as far as Mascall is concerned, that having 
denied the use by rational theology of analogy, he then 
goes on to use a mode of thought which is symbolic. 
Mascall is able to sympathize with berdyaev's attempt to 
"avoid that type of abstraction which substitutes blood-
less categories for the full experience of life,(5)but 
maintains that he has not succeeded. We may choose to 
agree with Mascall. Certainly, it has been pointed out 
above that .berdyaev readily acknowledged the difficcJlty 
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that he encountered in conveying through language his basic 
experience of God. 
We may at this point take note of the fact that Mascall goes 
on here to discuss the ideas of another representative of 
Eastern Orthodoxy, Fr. Alexis van der Mensbrugghe, and in 
D 
particular the way in which he envisages a soph~ogy over 
against the Trinity. These ideas are explored in Fr. 
Mensbrugghe's book, From Dyad to Triad. (6 ) 1his is part of 
a development of sophiological thinking which is typical 
within the Russian tradition, and, as Mascall points out, 
:flows :from Vladimir Solovyov to Fr. Paul Flcct:n~~:..j an:l 
Fr. Serge Bulgakov. As has been noted above, Berdyaev 
distances himself' somewhat :from Bulgakov's sophiology, 
though he is ready to acknowledge the inf'luence that 
Solovyov had on his own life. ( 7 ) 
However, Herdyaev was not alone in wishing to re-examine 
the language and concepts applied by theologians to God. 
Earlier in his book, Mascall had taken issue with W. R. 
Matthews on a similar subject. Mascall quotes :from 
Matthews' book, God in Christian Thought and Experience, 
the criticism there levelled against the scholastics that 
they fail to combine Aristotelian metaphysics with the view 
of' God which is consistent with Christian revelation. In 
reply to this, Mascall comments that Matthews' view of the 
personality of liod "as fundamentally constituted by 
striving, while it would be congenial to voluntaristic 
philosophies such as those of' Fichte, Schopenhauer and 
Hegel, has little to justif'y it."(B) We should remember 
here that Berdyaev considers Boehme, from whom he draws so 
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much of his concept of God, to be Lhe first in the German 
tradition of voluntaristic thought. 
Mascal1 states his side of' the case quite clearl;y in 
Chapter 8 ("God and the World: 'analogia entis'"): 
God - the self-existent, perfect, changeless 
Being, the Pure Act in whom all that supremely 
is is comprised - how could He not exist? 
The self-existent cannot but be; but that He 
in whom no thing is lac kill?; should confer 
existence on~ - that is the wonder which may 
well stagger our minds. (9) 
It is obvious, therefore, that we should find Mascall 
raising the objection to Matthews' view, ttthat it deprives 
God of the status of self-sufficiency which alone provides 
an explanr.tion for the existence of the world and so makes 
ereation possible.••(lO) It is quite clear here that 
Matthews and Berdyaev are arguing along the same lines. 
Both wish to reject the immobile Deity of a rigid 
"scholasticism" in favour of a God who reveals Himself in 
movement towards mankind, the God who is revealed at the 
centre of the Gospels, not the God of Aristotelian philosophy. 
Suggesting that God tthas been dissolved in Aristotelian 
intellectualism", Matthews maintains that we are presented 
with a God whose love is self-love; "God does not make 
move towards anything, but being in His nature self-
sufficient, cannot love any object other than Himself •.•• 
God loves me only in so far as He finds me good.u(ll) 
Matthews contends that we cannot really believe in such 
a Deity .,because he does not really sustain the Christian 
virtues.u(l2 ) 
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With this view, we may compare some of the quotations from 
Berdyaev given above. In direct opposition to Mascall, 
Berdyaev maintains that the notion of God as 'actus purus' 
'- t h . rl . f t . . t I . ' ~ ,. "' - • ( l 7, ) k ma.:<.es v .e 1~ea m crea lVl y UlHilLel.llglDle'. ,-~' Li e 
Matthews, he regards this idea of God as extraneous to the 
Christian tradition of both the Old and the New Testaments: 
"The static conception of God as 'actus purus' is a 
philosophical, Aristotelian, and not a biblical concept."(l4 ) 
We can find support for this idea elsewhere among the British 
theologians of this period. 
F. R. fennant, in his most influential and conelusive work, 
'Philosophical Theology, survying the argument as it then 
stood for belief in the existence of God, comments that "any 
metaphysical theory or world-view whatsoever, can at best 
claim to be a reasonable belief ultimately grounded on the 
alogical possibility which is the guide of life and science, 
and verifiable only in the sense that it renders the known 
explicable. No a priori', rational, logically coercive, 
or deductive proof is possible."(l5) It seems that here, 
the whole weight of his argument is thrown against the 
concept of discovering uod through and in terms of a rational 
argument. On this basis a traditional (e.g.ontological) 
sort of argument for God's existence is found to be 
unsatisfactory, as Berdyaev had maintained. The rational 
argument is rejected in favour of one that takes into account 
man's experience of the Divine, God's movement towards man. 
God is known through relationship: 11 The cosmos is no 
logico-geometrical scheme, but an adventure of divine love."(l6 ) 
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Concerning the question of God's relationship with something 
or someone beyond Himself, Tennant had, e&rlier in his book 
raised the question of whether God, as perf;onality, could be 
perfect. His argument is t.t'1at since persunal.ity requires 
for its development social relations and compeers, some 
notion of society, as opposed to the Supreme Individual, 
must attach to the concept of l.iod. Tennant points out that 
this must lead to a development of the idea of the Trinity. 
For Berdyaev this also was clearly understood. This concept 
does, however, represent a move away from the sort of 
idealism that had, at an earlier period, led theologians to 
concentrate on the unity of the Godhead, often conceived in 
absolute terms. Matthews refers to this as a trend towards 
Absolute Idealism, among other things, in British and 
American universities at the turn of the century.(l7 ) An 
early example in this trend of its incipient development 
towards a concept of God which would allow a change from the 
monistic interpretation may be found in G. H. Howison. He, 
in America, was developing the idea of man as free being 
"logically prior to ~ature, conditioning ~ature in a way God 
does not since God's conditioning of it can only be indirect 
and remote."(lB) Given that man takes God as his "ruling 
Ideal" in conditioning !'lature,he asserts that through this 
notion of freedom "we come to a pluralistic Idealism, 
instead of that of idealist monism that has for so long 
dominated philosophical theism."(l9 ) It must be admitted 
that this view is far removed from the personal trinitarian 
concept of God envisaged by Berdyaev or hinted at by Tenant. 
It is, however, an indication of the development of 
plurality (one might with the concept of sobornost in mind 
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prefer to say "community") which was being attached to the 
Godhead in association with the notion of a divine-human 
relationship. 
An important figure who WPS investigating the same area o-r 
thought in England at this time was Hastings Rashdall. In 
his essay, "Personality: Human and Divine", he writes that 
"the truth of the world is, then, neither monism, in the 
pantheising sense of the word, nor pluralism •.•• We may 
describe the whole collection of these beings as One Reality 
•.•• But after all, the Reality, whether eternally or only at 
one particular stage of its development, is a community of 
persons. 11 ( 20) Rashdall guards against any pantheistic or 
monistic interpretation of this idea by describing how the 
content of the consciousness may be shared by another 
consciousness. This content may be common to many minds 
because "in speaking of 1 t we have made abstraction of the 
uniqueness which belonged to the experience when it was 
living, present, conscious experience, not yet reduced to 
abstract universals by the analytic work of thought ... ( 2l) 
Once again we are here reminded of the idea of sobornost 
which featured in Berdyaev's thought; also the use and 
interpretation by Berdyaev of the term 11 objectifica tion" 
accords with Rashdall's idea of a living reality reduced to 
11 abstract univerals''. If we associate Rashdall 's "monism" 
with Berdyaev's "objectificationtt we can see that both wish 
to reject this concept because it will end "(as historically 
it always does) either in the denial of all reality, 
permanence or personality to the individual souls and the 
reduction of all individual! ty to mere delusive appearance. "( 22 ) 
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It is the understanding of a divine-human relationship 
which Berdyaev maintains is the basis of God's revelation, 
which acts to prevent the formation of the conception of an 
exclusively Absolute Godo God is not thought ot· in terms 
of a transcendent/immanent antithesis, but as one who enters 
into a relationship with the finite world. An important 
influence in the development of this understanding of the 
fini te-ini'ini te relationship was B. Bosenquet. In a way 
that might remind us of the language used by Berdyaev, he 
writes of this relationship, or movement in God, that "it 
is not imperfection in the Supreme Being, but an ffisential 
of His completeness, that His na&ure, summing up that of 
Reality, should go out into its other to seek the 
completion which in this case alone is absolutely found ••• 
Not, of course, that the Infinite Being can lose and regain 
its perfection but that the burden of the finite is 
inherently a part, or rather an instrument of the self-
completion of the infinite. 11 ( 23) There is a ba$ic 
similarity of thought between Bosanquet and Berdyaev which, 
in conceiving the relationship between God and man, has 
some notion of movement: they speak of God's "longing for 
the loved one" ( Berdyaev) and the divine need "to go out 
into its other" (Bosenquet). This idea of movement is 
expressed by Tenant in a passage quoted earlier about the 
perfection of the divine personality. He refers to this 
idea of movement or dynamism in the life of Uod as the 
realization of potential, or, rather, the non-realization 
of it.. For it is on this basis that Tennant rejects the 
idea of God as perfect being, preferring to abstrain from 
"attributing to Uod perfection in the sense of complete 
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acualization of all potentiality as inconstent with the 
idea of a living spirit, if not with the idea of a 
determinate being. 11 ( 24) 
A similar idea again can be found in W. R. Matthews. In 
1944 he was writing that the modern thinking about God was 
moving away from the conceptions of an Absolute which had 
dominated theology and philosophy from the end of the last 
century. He attributes this, in part, to the influence of 
Bergson and his notion of creative evolution, the "life 
force''. Reference is also made to the effect that A. N. 
Whitehead had on this development. ( 25) We might also 
mention that A. N.Whitehead's work has elsewhere been 
compRred with that of Berdyaev.< 26 ) To return to Matthews: 
he had made a similar point twenty years earlier. Then he 
had written, concerning the growth of a dynamic view of God, 
that "the religious m1=tn believes in a God who is alive, 
creative, doing something now, whereas philosophy and 
theology have often presented him with a God who can only 
be said to will or act or create in a highly metaphorical 
sense."( 27) We are here back with the distinction that 
Berdyaev draws between religious experience and doctrine. 
This is what he refers to as the difference between the human 
idea of God and God in hB essence. It is the latter which 
we discover in our own depths, which we know in spirit. The 
human idea of God is simply "objectification'' (cf.above P·103) 
It is worth noting, perhaps, that the writers whom Matthews 
cites in this second, earlier, work are Bergson (again), 
William James, and the Italian Idealists, Croce and Gentile. 
Berdyaev similarly acknowledges some interest in the 
writing of the last of these.< 28 ) 
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Among other philosophers and theologians who explore this 
idea of a dynamic or creative movement in the life of the 
Godhead we find that there is also an acknowledgment of the 
existence of an irrational element ~n the movement as it is 
associated with the life of the world. In commenting on 
Bergson, Mat thews suggests that over against the familiar 
notion of the cosmic ordering of the universe by an 
omnipotent Absolute, Bergson "seemed as if he was 
substituing a blind tendency for a divine mind."( 29) It is 
not perhaps an unreasonable step to suggest that the 11 bl\ nd 
tendency 11 that Mat thews sees in bergson can be located also 
in Berdyaev's thought. But we must be careful to distinguish 
one part of an idea from the intention of the whole. Berdyaev 
does not seem to suggest that the world is at the mercy of an 
irrational and erratic cosmic force; his conception is too 
personal to allow such an idea. However, we may detect in 
his ungrund theory, in the idea of a dark and irrational 
uncreated freedom, a view of the cosmos which must allow for 
something like this "blind tendency'" which Matthews considers 
central to B'ergson' s theory. 
That such an irrational principle exists in the world is not 
an especially original idea. However, we snould note the 
support that Berdyaev would receive for the view that this 
irrational principle makes a rational theory above the 
existence of God untenable (cf.above.p.121). We have already 
referred to the example of this that is to be found in the 
work of F.R.Tennant. He put 1'orward the view that while no 
argument for the existence of Uod could be justified that was 
worked out from above,neYlertheless, "certain empirically 
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reached conclusions admit of being turned to account for 
the construction of an argument for theism. u(30) It is 
important to observe here that Tennant is not putting 
forward a conclusive and compelling argument for the 
existence of God: he is merely observing that the 
experience of the world around him does not rule out the 
possibility of the existence of God on scientific grounds.(3l) 
He argues that both theism and metaphysics ''can at best claim 
to be areasonable belief ultimately grounded on the alogical 
probability which is the gutle of life and of science.u(32 ) 
If we compare this with the approach to the subject taken by 
Berdyaev, we can see that there is some similarity in the 
recognition of an "alogical probabili ty'1 in the working of 
the world which rules out rational proofs. We should 
remember, too, the notion that Berdyaev has of knowledge; 
the spiritual sphere is, in his opinion, one that is the 
least susceptible of proof, yet it is also the one that is 
the ''most real''. It is the existence within man of the 
knowledge of God, of his own spiritual faculty, which 
renders the known explicable, according to Berdyaev. 
The question of the "alogical'" working of the world in 
relation to our belief in the existence of ~od is also 
raised by William Temple. He sees the idea as raising 
the question of the infinite love of the Creator,a question 
of theodicy. Temple asks whether we can say in the face 
of a world which is "as much selfish as it is loving", 
that the Cosmic Power is infinite love?(33) Temple sees 
two choices. One is that we accept that the world is run 
by an irrational and in~xplicable element. On the other 
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hand, is it not better, he asks "to accept that element at 
its face value, at the risk of scepticism, than to indulge 
in speculation?" Indeed he hints that rebellion in the 
face of this P.lement might be preferable to the imposition 
of a world harmony that over-rides it: "Were not scepticism 
itself, if that be involved, more rational than a hypothesis 
which flouts experience in the interest of an 'a priori' 
rationality?"(34). Surely, here we are thinking along the 
same lines as an Ivan Karamazov. It is, Berdyaev comments, 
in reaction to the imposition of a false rationality that 
atheism comes about.(35) When the fact of this disharmony,is 
acknowledged, as by both Temple and ~erdyaev, then the 
consequence is that if we are still to conceive of anything 
like God at all we must envisage His participation in the 
irrational and inexplicable element in the world, in the 
suffering that is involved 1here. This Berdyaev maintained: 
so, too, does Temple. He says that we can only uphold the 
infinite love of the L;osmic Power 11 if the Supreme Power of 
the Universe has been plainly co-operant in its redemption 
work, carrying the Spirit that displayed it through the 
ultimate self-sacrific that He might see the travail of His 
soul and be satisfied.u(36 ) 
Finally, on this point, we might refer to the work of A.S. 
Pringle-Pattison which also follows the approach that we 
have been investigating. Reference is also made by him 
to the view of the world process taken by Bosanquet. 
Pringle-Pat tis on suggests that the theme from Bosanquet' s 
Gifford -Lectures( 3?) is that life is ''a chapter of accidents''. 
:Further, though this may come as something of a shock to 
some people, he continues: 
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that common phrase correctly enough describes the 
aspect of contingency in de tail wrli ch seems to 
belong to any finite world that is more than an 
The contingence .is, .in the deepest 
view, contributory to - or rather, an essential 
condition of- the perfection of the whole, but 
it wears the appearance of a foreign element in 
which, and in spite of which, the divine purpose 
is worked out; and it carries with it dangerous 
possibilities - extremities of wickedness and of 
suffering, which it would be hard tndeed to 
justify, if we considered them as specific parts 
of a deliberate plan. (3B) 
It is the acknowledgment of the existence of this "foreign 
element~ (which bears some similarity to Berdyaev's notion 
of the irrational element of uncreated freedom) over against 
the divine plan for the world, which might enable us to 
regard the world process as something like a "chapter of 
accidents'', rather than a pre-determined and unalterable 
course. This element Berdyaev refers to as the freedom 
which is the source of many errors, blunders and 
insurmountable contradictions. 
In respect of this, how does Pringle-Pattison view God? 
He comments that it is disheartening that the implications 
of the Incarnation are evaded, so that Father and bon are 
conceieved as separate "centres of consciousness, the 
Father perpetuating the old monarchical idea and the 
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incarnation of the Son being limited to a single historical 
individual. "( 39) This, PringlePattison continuew, is still 
the 11 far-off, self-involved, abstractly perfect and eternally 
blessed 1iod of pure monotheism" which has been inherited from 
Greek philosophy and which, together with Berdyaev, he rejects. 
For this conception removes God from man's experience and 
involvement in the "chapter of accidents" which goes to make 
up his life. It also abstracts the doctrine of the spirit 
which then, according to Pringle-Pattison, becomes not the 
ultimate expression of the unity and communion of Uod and 
man but a separate and distinct ~eing. Thus, the accidents 
of language have combined with the ingrained materialism of 
our ordinary thinking to make the doctrine of the Trinit¥ a 
supra-rational mystery concerning the inner constitution of 
a transcendent Godhead, instead of the profoundest, and 
therefore most intelligible, attempt to express the in-
dwelling of God in man. u(40) The theme of the life of the 
Trinity, which Pringle-Pattison takes up here, has already 
been ~een in Berdyaev's conception of Uod as the clearest 
demonstration of the fact that God is not an II absolute and 
immobile divinityu. Pringle-Pattison's reaction against 
the rationalization of this idea similarly reflects an 
awareness that this is not a ufar-off mystery but, God be 
thanked, the very texture of our human experience.n(4l) 
So fi,r, we have looked at the trend of theological thinking 
in Britain up to the end of th~Second World War, taknng the 
doctrine of uod as the basis of a compHrison with some of 
the ideas of Berdyaev on that subject. We have attempted 
to show that generally there was a move away from abstract 
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and rational ideas of God, and that this should be taken in 
conjunction with the acknowledgment of analogical or 
irrational element in the world process which seemed to 
require that a loving Uod should be closely involved with 
the way in which that element worked itself out in the lives 
of those made in His image. We have sugge-sted that this 
develop~ent finds a similar theme in Berdyaev's thought. 
In having suggested that Berdyaev's notion of meonic freedom 
can be identified with certain features of British thought 
of that time, we should not wish to imply that lfritish 
theologians were already thinking in terms of something 
derived rrom the primor~ial abyss. It may well be that 
many would, then, as now, have wished to question very 
carefully Herdyaev's views on the origin of the 'ungrund' 
and his cosmogony. An important difference to be born in 
mind is that almost none of the British theologians and 
philosophers whose work we have considered writes from within 
the mystical tradition, as does Berdyaev. To this fact we 
might, in part, attribute the interest with which his work 
was received in this country, although at the time Evelyn 
Underhill and W.R. Inge, both of whom represent the Western 
mystical tradition, were widely read, as was Baron von Hugel~42) 
ii. The Relation between Creation and the Creator. 
Having established the fact that some British theologians 
were asking serious questions about the language used in 
relation to the nature of God, questions arising from their 
experience of the world around them, we move now to look at 
how the relationship between God and the world was being 
considered at this time. We shall undertake this survey 
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by examining briefly the work of eight theologians and 
philosophers. For ease of comparison with Berdyaev's 
work we have divided them into four parts. The first 
of these are (a) Dr, Eric Mascell and Canon R. Hanson: 
the second pair are (b) F. R. Tennant and J. Ward: the 
third pair are from a slightly earlier period (c) Dr. 
Hastings Rashdall and A. S. Pringle-P~ttison: the fourth 
pair are (d) Dr. w.·Temple and Dr. W. C. Matthews. 
(a) Mascall and Hanson. 
Having given due consideration to the existence and impact 
of an irrational element in the world and, as a consequence, 
arguing against a concept of God which sees Him as remote 
and distant, Berdyaev also d~als with the attributes 
traditionally associ a ted with God. The 1'irst of these 
which we shall consider is that of the self-sufficiency of 
God. It follows that, if we maintain that God is not an 
immobile, transcendent Being, but one who identifies Himself 
wmd is known within the illogical and undetermined working 
of the world, then there must be something more that we can 
say about this relationship between God and the world. We 
may pose the question why God should wish to be involved in 
the working of the world. In this form, the question 
directs us to an answee that God is involved in the workings 
of the world because He is not a self-sufficient absolute, 
a perfect being. It is because, as Berdyaev would say, 
God longs for a response from his other, from the one that 
he has created. But this is certainly not the omly view 
that is possible. 
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lf we look again at the work by Mascall, quoted above, 
we can see that his approach, which we take to be that of 
traditional thomist position, is in some respects quite 
different. Mascall asserts that "a 'first cause' who is 
not self-sufficient explains nothing. 11 ( 43 ) God 9 s creation 
of the world is a matter solely of His will in an 
unconditioned act. We are unable to say why God wills the 
creation of the world because to postulate a motive for God's 
will is to limit His nature as absolute free will. So, 
while "it is possible to assign motives to these acts wrdch 
our human wills perform, precisely because their freedom is 
limited •.... In the case of God, whose will is supremely 
perfect and whose freedom is absolute, there is no reason 
whatever that we can assign. We shall indeed maintain, 
against the late medieval voluntarists, that God's will must 
act in accordance with His own moral nature ... (44) Mascall 
cites as support for this view an essay by Prebendary 
Richard Hanson, entitled "Dogma in Medieval Scholasticism". 
Hanson sets out quite clearly the scholastic view, showing 
why it was believed that the imperfect order of things that 
we know must depend upon a perfect order which God is 
without shadow of change and as pure actuality. 
Acknowledging the dependence of such a view on 1•pagan 
sources'' (e.g.Plato and Aristotle) Hanson points out that 
"the natural reason of man and the divine revelation concur 
in asserting the existence of this perfect being."(45) 
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It is on the relation between the iniperfect and the perfect 
that we may wish to take issue with this vjew. Hanson 
explains the sch )las tic position as seeing that "the Creator 
possesses within Himself the perfection of all being", that 
is to say, God possesses in perfection all that exists in 
imperfection in the created order. Therefore, understandably, 
"there is no inner compulsion to create ••. Creation, so far 
from exhausting the essentially divine activity, makes no 
demands upon the essential activity at all. u( 46 ) We could, 
therefore, say on this basis that what Berdyaev terms J'God's 
yearning'; is completely sa ti sfi ed by the life of the Trinity. 
Now, while we may agree with Hanson's point that God is not 
'comparable to some lonely Titan existing in splendid 
isola tion1', none the less, we cannot say, if we adopt 
Hanson's position, that the creation is in any way necessary 
to God. And this is the point of the scholastics' argument: 
the creation is simply a free act of uod - the ultimate 
example of His love is that the world exists at all. At 
this point we might call to mind Berdyaev's comment that 
~'if God is "act{4s purus", then the creation of the world, 
that is, creative activitiy in God, remains unintelligble. 11 
The point of difference between these two positions is 
their approach to the presence of the irrational, illogical 
or foreign element in the world in relation to Uod. It is 
Berdyaev's assertion that God does not, in fact, leave an 
imperfect world to follow its own destiny, while remaining 
himself removed from its process. God Himself is involved 
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in the eternal cresting of "an other", a creotion from which 
He seeks response. This is the movement, the creativity or 
yearning in God which is eternal, not temporal. Here also 
thP. unclerst8nding of the role of Christ, 
important. Christ does not enter time and space as a 
concession on the part of the Godhead to restore a plan that 
had gone wrong; at the moment when the world is brought into 
being, when that irrational element becomes active, the 
suffering of God which is the mark of His identification with 
the world, is revealed in the perfect image of humanity,Christ. 
The perfect God suffers because creation is a part of him. 
God's relation with the world is one of going-out, of meeting, 
encountering, evoking a response to His love. In acknowledging 
the existence of man's freedom which enables him to rebel, to 
return to non-being, God stretches out beyond the activity of 
creating, to embrace the whole of the irrationality of freedom 
without thereby destroying it. We may be able to see here 
the meaning of o. c. Quick's comment that "as Berdyaev 
repeatedly insisted, the Biblical doctrine of sin is the most 
profound affirmation of the dignity of man. u( 47 ) For sin is 
that rebellion that God allows to free man and for the sake 
of which God Himself wills to suffer. 
(b) Tennant and Ward. 
We may set this in the context of the thinking in Britain at 
this period by taking up a reference which Mascall makes to 
the work by Tennant to which we have already given some 
consideration, Philosophical Theology. (4B) However, instead 
of looking directly at Tennant's view, we might go further 
back to a work of some influence in this country, Professor 
James Ward's Gifford Lectures. The question as it was 
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debated at tr-1 is time wss in the form of whether or not God 
could exist or be conceived of' without the world- an idea 
to be found in Hegel. Ward comments on this idea, 
comparing it with Hartmann's thinking. He says "whatever 
the reason or motive for creation may have been •... it 
seems 1absolutely inconceivable' as Hartmann put it, 'that 
a conscious God should wait for half an eternity content 
without a good that ought to be.' u(49) But Ward considers 
that this is-a move towards an unacceptable pantheistic 
position. He considers that the notion that the world 
depends on God implies that if God ceases to be (should 
such a thing be conceived of) then the world also ceases to 
be. •Thus, God and the world are identified together in the 
manner of Spinoza, "Deus si ve Natura. "~ But iden ti:ty should 
imply distinction. However, the bare, and therefore 
meaningless, identity of God and the world simply leaves us 
with God only, as the acosmism of ~pinoza or with the world 
t t n ~ I' ( 1)0 ) T only, as the polite atheism of tichopenhauer. · - ' he 
way out of this difficulty, Ward suggests, was the idea of 
the Absolute as "coming to self-consciousness in and through 
consciousness of the world." (5l)And in a footnote reference 
he wonders whether Bergson's "~lan vital" might not simply 
be a variant of this idea. We should at this point note 
that in the critique of German Idealism which Berdyaev 
offered in ~!rhet_ tDf!lr:.ine,·~"'a.nd ··the ~·thiman ;Berdyaev:t;.s imi larly -;. 
dismisses the idea of the coming to self-conscioueness of 
God.(52 ) Ward states his position as follows: 
A plurality of beings primarily independent as 
regards their existence and yet always acting 
and reacting upon each other, an ontological 
plurality, that is yet somehow a commological 
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unity seems clearly to suggest some ground 
beyond itself. (53) 
A God that was not a c rea tor, a God whose creatures 
had no indP.pendence, would not Himself be I'eally a 
God. Herein, theism di!"fers from thorough-
singularism or absolutism.C54) 
If the Creotion is to have any meaning it implies 
internal limitation. It is from the reality of the 
world that we start •.• If the reali cy of the world 
be admitted, then this reality stands over against 
the reality of God. God indeed has not been 
limited from without but He has limited Himself. ( 55 ) 
At this point, Ward refers us to an appended discussion of 
the idea of creationism which is found in Dr. Howison's 
book, The Limits of Evolution, to which we have already 
referred. Ward's criticism of Howison is that he wil~not 
I 
conceive of the Many as Expressions of the One. For 
Howison it is suggested, without a "pluralistic idealism" 
the only option is the "Oriental, Augustinian, monarch-
theistic idea of Creation at a certain date by sheer 'fiat' 
and out of fathomless nothing.u(5G) Ward maintains, as 
does Tennant, whom we shall consider presently(57), that 
such a concept of Creation is untenable, if it is to be 
spoken of' as 11 a change in nothing, whereby nothing becoroos 
something. 11 (58 ) Thus, Ward, from an emphasis on unity 
and Howison, from an emphasis on pluralicy, both agree 
that the notion of' Creation which involves the concept of' 
God as Pure Act ought to be rejected. Ward quotes 
Howison's comment that "creationism must logically exclude 
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the possibility of freedom. !''or the Cre"' tor canna t, of 
course, create except by exactly and precisely conceiving, 
otherwise His product would not differ from non-entity. 11 (59) 
Now, this brings us very close to s orne of Berdyaev' s ideas, 
which we shall look at one by one. 
First, on the question of the Many and. the One. Howison 
rejects the idea of the Many as expressions of the One, 
since that would deny any real self-determination to the 
Many and implies an·'' idealistic monism". Ward has spoken 
of a cosmological unity which, over against plurality, 
suggests itself. Berdyaev quite clearly rejects any idea 
of an "all inclusive unity, which •••• is an abstract idea 
of God. 11 ( 60) On the other hand, he does envisage a unity; 
one which pantheism hints at and which we suggested above 
(p. 52 ) should be identified with the -ttussian idea of 
'sobornos t.;. Of this, Berdyaev says that 11 t'he final monism 
will be-confirmed in the Kingdom of God: it is only to be 
revealed eschatologically. 11 ( 61 ) 
Next, that Creation comes as something out of nothing is an 
idea which it seems that Ward, Tennant and Howison all deny. 
We might relate this to Boehme's doctrine of the ·ungrund • 
Now, while the language of "nothingness~ is widely used here, 
the basic idea of "ex nihi lo" is not present. Rather, the 
concept of "source'' or "fount'' is used. ( 62 ) It does not 
seem that Berdyaev intends that this should be read as 
implying that God Himself, together with the creation of the 
world, should be thought of as part of some cosmic 
evolutionary process. He quite specifically rejects this 
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idea of evolution, together with what Howison terms the 
"monarch-theisticQ idea of Creation or ideas of God as Cause~ 63) 
For Berdyaev God's creativity belongs to the apophatic realm 
of mystery, though it may be glimpsed in this world in the 
realm of spirit. This also was Ward 1 s final word on the 
subject: "How God creates the world and thereby limits 
Himself we can never understand. 11 ( 64) 
The third point which we should wish to relate to Berdyaev's 
thought is that God's creatures are given some measure of 
independence from Him. This is, of course, the heart of 
Berdyaev's idea of freedom. But we can see that, like Ward, 
he does use this also as a rejection of a pantheistic monism. 
On this basis he also rejects any form of dualism. Berdyaev 
states that 11 God and man are not external to each other; 
neither are they identified. u( 65) This point can be taken, 
together with the last of the three quotations from Ward, on 
God's self-limitation. That self-limitation is what allows 
the reality of the world, in that it allows the world its 
freedom. God's self-limitation, we might say, repudiates 
the notion of pantheism, which is itself "a denial of the 
reality of the world and of man" according to Berdyaev. ( 66 ) 
This point links together ~he citation by both Berdyaev and 
Ward of the work of Nicolas von Hartmann. Ward quoted 
Hartmann as objecting to the idea that God should have 
existed at any period without creating, to which the reply 
is given that God is, beyond the temporal process, self-
limiting, creative ( c:r. :~ab:ove':;p .112e).- ( §Z L ',, :::iJ~ 'f.'?) 
Berdyaev cites Hartmann in support of the point made by 
Ward that, to justify the notion of God, the created order 
must be allowed some measure of freedom (cf.above p.20n). 
In both cases the negative view is used to justify the 
argument being expounded. 
For an assessment of the influence of Ward's views on 
thinking about God and the world in Britain at this time 
we might take note of the comment offered in Foundations, 
in the article entitled "God and the Absolute" by W. H. 
Moberly. ( 6B) It is considered that "this school draws more 
from Lotze than from Hegel, lays special stress on will in 
its conception, both of human personality and of the 
Absolute Being, and defends individuality against the 
conception of an all-devouring Absolute."( 69) The 
distinguished reprsentatives of this school are given as 
Ward and Pringle-Pattison. Another indication of the 
influence of this trned on British thinking is given by 
c.c.J. Webb. He calls his readers attention to Tennant's 
Philosophical Theology, noting that Tennant is "in many 
respec~s a disciple of Ward."(70) Webb associates these 
-
men with a general "reaction against the immanentist 
tradition which the present century is witnessing.u(7l) 
Having already given some consideration to the work of 
Tennant, we shall here briefly compare the similarities 
that we have noted in the work of Ward and Berdyaev with 
related ideas in Tennant's work. Three areas in 
particular might be compared: the rejection of monism, 
the concept of cause and creation; the mystery of creation. 
On the first of these ideas, the rejecti8n of monism, 
Tennant bases his argument on the assertion by theism that 
God is known by the creatures who are made in His image in 
a personal vva~' 9 in a form that can be unddrs tood t·rom ti1e 
analogy of human personal relationships. 'l'o this extent~ 
the 11 predelic tion for attributes such as infinitude, 
unconditionedness and meatphysical perfection" which is 
characteristic of the monist view "disallows the iden:flicition 
of its One with the Uod of theism, because personality, even 
as applied to God, must bespeak somewhat of limitation and 
relationship with what is other than Himself."(72 ) 
Three points of similarity with ~erdyaev's view of God can 
be noted here. One is the concern with the concept of a 
personal God. Another is the self-determination or freedom 
of that which is created, which thereby implies a limitation 
of God. And finally, the relational aspect of uod's dealing 
with man, the longing for a response :from 11 hi s other". The 
concept of limitation is one which Tennant has taken from 
Ward, as his re:ference to Realm of ~nds demonstrates. (73 ) 
Concerning the second of these ideas, the concept of cause 
and creation, two quotations from Tennant might be given to 
demonstrate his view. The first; applying the idea of 
cause to Uod is not accepted by Tennant since "causation, 
as commonly understood, relates to change within the 
already existent; in this sense it is inapplicable to 
creative activity. u(74) Berdyaev also rejects the idea of 
God as cause and sets over against it the idea of grace. 
( cf. above pp •. 1.32:f ) • The second: T~nnant comments that 
"God 'qua' God is Creator, and the Creator 'qua' Creator 
I--. ..... \ 
is God; or iGod without the world is not God'."'!'::!) 
This amounts to saying that "when conceived apart from and 
prior to ~is world, God becomes a cosmologically useless 
idea."(76 ) On the basis that ti•is envisages the creation 
of the world in eternity and not in time, Tennant's point 
accords well with the idea of creation which forms part of 
Berdyaev's 'ungrund' theory and his vision of the theogonic 
process. (77 ) 
F'inally, on the mystery of Creation, Tennant notes that 
ultimately it is not possible to apply 'deductive systems' 
to the doctrine of God and still come up with something 
which will account for the illogical and erratic workings of 
the world. Tennant comments: "the fact that they have taken 
mathematics or logic to be the paradigm of knowledge and 
philosophy precludes all possibility of the Deity or the 
Absolute which they affirm being a sufficient ground of our 
'rough and tumble' world. The alogical essence of the world, 
on which mechanical description and logical concatenation are 
contingent, by which value is born and in which meaning is 
lodged, has been strained out or spurned. 11 ( 7 B) We have 
already considered the presence of an ·''alogi cal" element in 
the world and how that relates to our understanding of God. 
It is this element which Berdyaev terms "irrational Freedom'. 
It naturally follov.s that along with this element goes a 
certain degree of mystery; for this is something which we 
have not the tools of language to explain. Hence, at the 
j 
very outset of our outline of Ber~ev's doctrine of God we 
noted that for him "mystery alone brings us to the depths.u(79) 
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(c) Rashdall and Pringle-Pattison. 
The subject of creation, of creativity in God, was one 
widely debated in England and Scotland in the early part 
of the century. Its relevance to the reception given to 
the publication of Berdyaev's work lies in the fact that 
it had already raised the questions which he discusses. 
In addition to the more particular topic of the self-
sufficiency of uod there is the whole question of the 
rejection of the current approach to theology. The 
immanentist approach which had been adopted and developed 
by the deists was being challenged by something which took 
account of the recent developments in philosophy. This 
sought to discover the working of the transcendent through 
the world processes. It was a new kind of immanentism. 
As an idealist mode of thought, its development took it, 
on one side (under the influence of Rashdall) towards the 
formation of a personal form of idealism. However, this 
idealist trend generally, which had sought to divinize the 
historical process, was dealt a fatal blow by the exp erie nc e 
of th~irst World War. In the field of the philosophy of 
religion, commenting on the impact of this new approach to 
this subject, Scott Holland speaks of the innovative T. H. 
Green, whose "message was tough and tangled; and the 
Hegelian jargon W8S teeth-breaking and head-splitting; and 
his way of speculation was hard and grim to tread."(BO) 
On this change in thinking and the development of a different 
concept of God, Berdyaev's thoughts are particularly retevant, 
since he himself had passed from a materialist 
philosophy of Marxism (though Herdyaev himself maintains that 
he never accepted that aspect of Marxism) against the back~ 
grol_Lnd of Kantian Idealism, to s reconsider3.tion of the 
Russian Orthodox tradi tinn. Having a 1 ready noted that 
the mystical tradition played an important part in the 
development of Orthodoxy"" it is perhaps significant that 
an awareness of the contribution that mysticism could make 
to the development of our knowledge of God was rekindled in 
this country by W.R. Inge, through his Bampton Lectures for 
1899, entitled Christian Mysticism~ 8l) Having included 
Boehme among those considered in his lectures, Inge had 
already acquainted theologians with an approach to the 
mystery of creation which would have been recognized in 
Berdyaev's development of it. 
In order to demonstrate how widely this subject was discussed, 
we might take up the reference to T. H. Green and note the 
comments passed on his view ttthat the world is as necessary 
to God as God is to the worldtt as Rashdall saw it. ( 82 ) 
Rashdall focuses on the divine will (as Tennant was to do 
later)~3) He comments that ttif a Universal Thinker be 
conceived of as willing at all, he must be conceived of as 
willing all the objects of his thought, i.e. the world. 11 (84) 
To this extent he admits that "all genuine idealists" 
conceived of the world nas perpetually existing in some sense 
in the mind of God.u( 85) On the basis of this, the theogonic 
process envisaged by Berdyaev is at least a permissible theory. 
However, Rashdall is not prepared to accept the expression 
'the world is necessary to God'. ( 86 ) But, as Pringle-
Pattison points out in The Idea of God(B7 )Rashdall changes 
this attitude somewhat when, in the manner of Howison and Ward, 
he comments that "whatever limitation is implied in the 
existence of other spirits is a self-limitation, not an 
ariJi trary self-limi ta ti on but one wl-Jich necessarily springs 
from the nature and character of God."(SS) Berdyaev's 
contributiol1 to this idea lies in his w-1del•sta11d uf n ' uou as 
freedom, the antithesis and negation of necessity. As such, 
no notion of external limitation could be imposed on God. 
(, 
Similarly, by sharing in this fredom, creat~n is not subject 
to necessity, that is, the necessit¥ which would be implied 
by an absolute divine omnipotence, omniscience, &c. But by 
creating a free order God limitE Himself by allowing 
rebellion into non-being and the rejection of His love. 
In terms of God yearning for a response from His other, as 
Berdyaev puts it, we might equate the idea of self-limitation 
with God making Himself vulnerable to rejection. 
Two other contributions to this investigation might be taken 
from Pringle-Pattison. The first is his comment on the 
Augustinian idea of time created together with the world, 
"so that there could be no lapse of unoccupied time before 
the Creation, there being in eternity neither before nor 
after. u( 89) Now, we have no ted Vallon' s comment that in 
Berdyaev's work the idea of creation is equally expressed as 
a response; being created is responding to God's call of love. 
Berdyaev clearly envisages this call as a constitutive 
feature of the divine nature. So, under the influence of 
Bbehme, he speaks of the nothingness of the ungrund as the 
cause of an eternal beginning, a craving in the divine life. 
But the Creation becomes subject to time at the moment when 
irrational freedom stirs and man moves from unconsciousness 
to consciousness. But time, in the view taken by Berdyaev, 
is identified with one of the eff'ects of the Fall. At 
the moment when the Creation takes on object form, elements 
of which are time and space, good and evil, and suffering. 
On account of this, there1'ore, Berdyaev would reject 
Augustine's scheme of Creation, as does Pringle-Pattison. 
And the basis of the rejection is that "even _if it (the 
- " 
world) had never existed at all, the self-ex;: tent being of 
God would have been in no way affected. " ( ~O) In the words of 
Pringle-Pattison, who in support of this offers a quotation 
from Ulrici, with which Berdyaev might well agree: 
The creation of the world is certainly to be 
understood as the free act of God. But His 
~ ·~ ..-\<:1"1\ 
freedom is nowise an arbitrary IJ 'Willkuhr') 
which at its mere good pleasure might act so 
or otherwise, might act or refrain 1'rom acting 
•... In truth God is not first aod and then 
Creator of the world . . .. Hence, just as God 
does not become Creator of the world but is from 
eternity Creator of the world, so the world too, 
though not eternal of itself, exists from eternity 
as the creation (or act) of God."(9l) 
The second contribution from Pringle-Pattison is a reference 
to Coleridge and his view on the subject. Coleridge presents 
this as an illustration of the difference between the Christian 
view and that of Spinoza. The explanation of this difference 
is expressed by ~ringle-Pattison in the form of an equation. 
Spinoza's position is represented as "(W- G = 0 and G-W = 0) 11 
which amounts to saying that neither God nor the world can 
exist without the other. But according to Coleridge the 
Christian position is "(W-G= 0 but G-W = G) 11 (92 ) 
It is with the last of these that we should wish to take 
issue, as does Pringle-Pattison. He comments that 
131 spirits'cannot be regarded c:s things made, detached 
lime products frmm their maker; they are more aptly 
described in the biblical phrase, as •partakers of the 
divine nature' and admitted to the fellowship of a common 
life. But if so, there can be no ground 1'or the 
supposition of a pre-existent Deity not yet crowned with 
the highest attribute of Goodness or self-revealing love."(93 ) 
This brings us yet again back to Berdyaev's vision of the 
ungrund' and the pre-existence of God's "other" which reveals 
the yearning of self-revealing love. But this should remind 
us, too, of Berdyaev's insistence that revelation is a divine-
human activity (cf.above p. 100). 
(d) Temple and Matthews. 
From here we may go on to the discussion of this topic in 
William Temple's book Christus Veritas. Mascall enlists 
Temple ae support for the traditional scholastic position 
which he was expounding at this time, and directs us to a 
passage from Nature, Man and God as evidence of this support.(94) 
However, it might be maintained that Temple's discussion of 
the relation of God to the world in "Divine Love: The 
Blessed Trinity", the final chapter of Christus Veri tas 
presents a slightly different view. The important feature 
of this discussion is the way that it presents the discussion 
of the relation betwenn the divine nature and the divine will~95) 
It is to express the totality of intention in the latter that 
classical theology maintains that the unj_verse proceeds 
from the divine will and therefore, should it cease to 
exist, God would still be God. But there is a tension 
here. Surely, it would not be crude anthropomophism to 
suggest that since God wills that the creation should exist, 
for the creation not to exist is a frustration of the divine 
will. And, therefore, whilst God might still be conceived 
as existing without the Creation, could we say then that 
this was the sort of God who had been revealed to us in the 
course of the history of the world? It seems that we 
speak o1God as being absolute, in order to express our awe 
and wonder at our partial apprehension of what Otto calls 
the 14Mysterium Tremendum. '' And yet, if we take seriously 
the idea that the Creation could cease to exist and thereby 
leave the Creator whose wi 11 had been spent in bringing it 
into existence unaffected, it would seem that, with something 
like false modesty, we are denying in ourselves and the world 
around us the signficance and dignity bestowed by the very act 
of creation. It is to express something of this tension 
found in the classical understanding of the divine will and 
the divine nature that Temple goes on to say that we could 
not maintain, on this basis, that "creation is capricious". (9G) 
Rather, because the nature of God is love "He is and must be 
self-communicating •••• In this sense the universe is necessary 
to God ... (97 ) Thus, we cannot conceive of a distinction 
between the divine will and the divine nature. We cannot 
imagine that the creation is brought about by the single "fiat" 
of the divine will without involving the whole nature of God 
in the act of loving and sustaining, of going out to seek the 
response of His creation. Temple would maintain that "God 
is active in the process Himself." (98) 
In support of this argument, Temple points to human 
religious experience, as does berdyaev. Both, in fact, 
acknowledge the t such support clear1y cannot be 
verifjahle since, 'I'emple 11 it lS no more explicable to 
the irreligious man than colour is to the blind man •.• 
Con~equently, in this department as in no other the validity 
of experience is challenged:'(99 ) (cf.above p.f07) One of 
the things emphasized by religious experience is, according 
to Temple, that 11 God genuinely cares what men do."(lOO) 
From the human experience of encounter with God we can say 
that He is not known as a self-sufficient absolute; a notion 
of "divine apathy •... makes the act of creation irrational."(lOL) 
This is almost exactly echoed by berdyaev's comment, already 
quoted: "if God is 1 actus purus 1 , then the creation of the 
world, that is, creative activity in God, remains 
unintelligible."(l02 ) Temple goes on to point out, as we 
have suggested above, that the reason why some people shrink 
from the idea of God's involvement in the world is probably 
"due to a radically false estimate of greatness and of the 
relative importance of things; if man is spiritual and the 
stars are not, then God is vastly more concerned about the 
selfishness of a child than the wreck of a solar system. u(l03) 
Temple, in concluding the discussion of this idea, makes 
reference to the work of Traherne and his understanding of 
the Cross as the centre of' eternity, representing God 1 s 
eternal love which seeks for the free response of love to 
its own act of self-giving. This is the act in which "God 
put forth His power; but also God therein fulfilled Himself.u(l04: 
The idea of the eternal significance of the Cross as 
revealing the su1'fering Christ in time is an imy;ortant theme 
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in Berdyaev's work.(cfoabove PP··112f)(lOS) Temple offers 
the following quotation from Traherne, with which we might 
suitably conclude our consider~tion of his thfunking on this 
subject: 
The living and Triune God was from all Eternity 9 
and from all Eternity wanted like a God. He 
wanted the communication of His divine essence, 
and persons to enjoy it. He wanted Worlds, He 
wanted Spectators, He wanted Joys, He wanted 
Treasures. He wanted, yet He wanted not, for 
He had them. (lo6) 
Finally, we should mention the consideration given to this 
subject ~P w. R. Matthews. His understanding of the 
relation between God and the universe has rather more 
emphasis on the personal nature of God than do some of the 
others which we have already considered. To begin with, 
however, Matthews comments on the question of the createdness 
of the universe. It is through this notion of a certain sort 
of dependence on God that the idea of pantheism is avoided. 
This relation of createdness is known to the human soul 
through the faculty which exists within for fellowship with 
God. It is through this fellowship that we discover that we 
are not "phases or aspects of the Absolute, but spirits with 
some limited but genuine freedom to seek God or to turn away 
from Him ... (l07) We can see that here again it is emphasized 
that some element of autonomy must attach to the created order 
to endow its relationship with God with any significance. 
This was the central theme of Herdyaev's understanding of 
the relationship between Uod and the world (c:f'.above p.1'2~) 
and we have seen that it also featured in the thinking of' 
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other writers (e.g.Howison) in the form of a seJf-lim~_tton 
by God. 
~oncerning the nature of Uod 9 Matthews asserts that Uod is 
creative and "every moment must thus be filled with the 
exercise of His creative power." (lOB) This raises the 
question, as we have already seen, of the necessity of the 
Creation for Uod. Two points give an indication of 
Matthews' approach to this. The first is that the Creation 
depends on God in an absolute sense. The second is that liod 
depends on the Creation only to the extent that "it is a 
necessity of His nature to create." ( l09) Bearing in mind the 
comment by Vallon that "creation is about man's response to 
God's call" (cf.abovep.t2$) in Ber·dyaev's thinking, we can 
see that here Matthews is arguing along very similar lines. 
For we can equate the necessity to create with the necessi cy 
to love, i.e., to have a relationship with another. The 
latter is a mark of thinking about God in personal terms. 
Certainly, Berdyaev conceived of God in that way ('cf"".above 
gm~!Hl8:0; so also does Matthews: "it is certainly implied 
in our arguments that the being of God as personal is 
dependent upon the existence of the created order, and that 
we see no way of holding the personality of a Deity 'prior 
to Creation' .u(llO) In one of the chapters of his book, 
Signposts to God (the chapter entitled "God as Pel'eon11 ) 
Matthews developS this personal understanding, drawing on 
his experience of broadcasting on the wireless and the 
response he had received on a popular level. He comments 
that a concept of God which went beyond the ''universal 
mind 11 (i.e. which involved per·sonal attributes) seerred 
childish to most people.(ll 2 ) And yet the difficulty in 
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believing in God for most people wz.s that it involved 
believing in a supernatural person. It seemed, from the 
letters which Matthews had received, that the dif'ficul ty 
in conceiving of a personal God originated in a 
fundamentalist approach to the bible which he terms 
11 the terrible heritage of belief in a verbally infallible 
Book.u(ll2 ) Matthews' reply is that "God is not so 
di1'ferent from us that He is wholly beyond our apprehension, 
and not so remote that He cannot reveal Himself to our minds.'~ll3 
He is thus describing what Berdyaev would call the divine 
image in man, the revelation which is divine-human.(ll4) 
Matthews pursues the topic of the human apprehension of God 
by use of the analogy of imagaination. He notes to begin 
with that imagination ought not to be set in opposition to 
reason. In dealing with human imagination we must say that 
more than remembered experience is involved: II though they are 
rooted in p~revious experience, they are not mere re-
""' 
arrangements of it: they are genuinely new. u(ll5) In 
speaking by analogy, theref'ore, of' the world as "the product 
of the imagination of God,u(ll6 ) Matthews is considering not 
only its d•cpendence on God, as a creative idea is dependt'nt 
upon the mind of the artist before it is executed, but also 
the extent of the autonomy of the work of art in its own 
tt. development. We should say that 1t has a character of its 
own. 11 (ll7) To illustrate this point he asks whether 
Shakespeare could have "turned 'Macbeth' after the second 
act into a :farce or transformed it into a harlequinade. 
Only by destroying the play and creating an entirely 
different one."(llB) However, it will not do to pursue 
this analogy too far. For it suggests that the Creation 
becomes subject to the necessity of following through a 
wholly imper-sonal idea; it is not permit ted autonomy as 
such 9 for its character- is determined by the idea. But 
we s.twuld agree that to use the 11 conception of Creation as 
a work of imagination •..• may take us further into the 
mystery than any other guide."(ll9 ) Berdyaev also employs 
the idea of imagination in a similar way. 
In his discussion of the idea of creativeness in its 
relation to ethics, Berdyaev clearly suggests that the 
likeness between God and man is to be seen in man's 
creative faculty; in this creativity he sees the 
introduction of something essentially new, as does Matthews 
when he insists that imagination is not simply the re-
. t f . . ( 120 ) B dy i t . arrangemen o prev1ous exper1ence. er aev rna n a1ns 
that Creation is not 11 a redistribution of force and energy, 
as evolution is 11 (~2l) Also, he recognises that imagination 
ep.. 
is of tremendous importance to the mystic~ vision of Boehme, 
~ 
as anyone who has read Boehme's work will agree.< 122 ) It is 
over against this background that Berdyaev observes that 
tt the world is created by God through i magina ti on, through 
real images which arise in God in eternity and are both idea 
and real.u(l23) For his own part, Berdyaev's understanding 
or creative imagination is more than as simply analogous to 
God's relation to the world. To him it suggests the ver,y 
image or God in man responding to its Creator. 
As such, it has a religious significance, for "creation may 
acquire a religious meaning and justification if, in the 
phenomenon of inspiration, man is responding to the divine 
call to co-operative with divine creation."(l24) 
Through inspiration man may become aware of something within 
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him which is more than simply like the divine crea ti vi ty; 
it is a participation in that very activity: 
The very possibility of Creation presupposes the 
infusion of the Gpiri t into man, &nll that we call 
inspiration. And this raises the action of 
creative forces above the world. (l 25) 
We do, perhaps, approach something like an analogy to the 
divine necessity to create when this human creativity is 
understood as something which demands expression. Berdyaev 
maintains that "the creative act cannot be stifled within 
the Creator and find no outlet for itself."( 126 ) We might 
read this in relation to either divine or human creativity. 
The important di1:'ference, however, between Be rdyaev 's and 
Matthews.' use of the idea of imagaination is in the 
understanding of the end product. Matthews suggests that 
the imagination produces something which is almost autonomous. 
Berdyaev's view would permit this to be said of the divine 
creative imagaination in respect of the world. He is less 
optimistic of human creativity. He regards the spritual 
value as attaching simply to the inspiration, not to its form 
as product. He speaks of this as a conflict between the 
objective and subjective; it "consists in the maximum break 
through of the creative act, out of the closed circle of 
objectivisation •••• in the irruption of the maximum of 
subjectivity into the objectified world."( 127 ) He speaks of 
this as the tragedy of Creation and, here again, we can apply 
this notion of tragedy to both the divine and the human 
creativity: 
There is the inner creative conception, the 
creative image arising out of darkness, the 
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primary creative intuition, springing from the depths 
of the unconscious. And then there is the realization 
of the creative conception .... In the inner creaUve act 
the spirit is aflame; the outer creative act, subject 
to norms and laws implies a certain cooling down •.. 
that is the tragedy of creativeness. (l2B) 
Here, Berdyaev emphasizes the human aspect of creativity which 
is inevitably objectified, since man, though a free spirit, 
lives in an objectified wor.ld. It is, however, the response 
or free spirit from within the objectified world which 
t . t t ' . . cons 1 ~s man s response to the Creator and thereby infuses 
subj ec ti vety into the ob j ec ti ve, allowing the irruption or 
spirit into the material. The application of this to Dod is 
that He, as pure spirit, is capable or pure creation. 
Ho. ever, in calling for a free response from man, God requires 
that man should transcend the objectivity of· that world, which 
is the outcome of his own very freedom. Thus, by relieving 
the world of its objectified form, man is co-operating with 
God in creating the perfect, free world which is subject, not 
object. ~o he speaks or man who should be God in miniature 
(ttmicrotheos 11) as the "dethroned king or nature•· (129), since 
he has chosen instead to become subject to "the petrified 
parts or nature''. (l30) But if man is to make the true 
.. 
response his creative calling demands he must give back 
spirit to the stones, reveal the living nature of stones, 
in order to free himself from their stony, oppressing power. u(l3l) 
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iii. The Passiblc Trinity. 
Finally 9 we come to consider the implications of the 
relationship between God and the world. We have seen 
throu~1out most of this chapter a tendency to reject static 
concepts of Uod among both theologians and philosopherso .~we 
have noted an attempt to locate the -sources I._Of our 
knowledge of God within the realm of normal living. 
Here we consider how Berdyaav 's Russ ian background compares 
very closely with the concepts of the p?Jssible Trinity 
which some British theologians had put :forward. We begin 
by turning again to the personal aspect of our knowledge of 
and relation with God. This is central to Berdyaev's thought. 
A God who is not personal has no "existential centre"; as 
such He is unable to experience sorrpw or joy. This idea 
Berdyaev referred to as a degradation of the majesty of liod. 
This leads us on to consider an aspect of the doctrine of 
God which is common to both Berdyaev and many of the British 
theologians of the period on which we have concentrated. 
That aspect is the idea of the suffering of God. For 
Berdyaev the reasoning behind this idea flows :from the central 
position of the doctrine of the Trinity in the understanding 
•\ 
of Ood as a personal being. He speaks of God as a trinity of 
persons u~ust because they presuppose one another and imply 
mutual love and intercommunion. "( 137 ) ,_ .. It is from 
within this relation which is one of love and sacrifice that 
the tragic destiny of Christ is revealed on the Cross; for 
11 the suffering of the o:>on is a mea sure of the aufferi ng in the 
inner life of the Trinity 11 .( 138 ) This mystery is 
revealed as an element of the creation which, together with 
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redeJ!lption, has its source in the single fact of the 
dynamic, yearning love of' God. However, to the figure 
of the suffering tJhrist we should pay special attention. 
The idea of suffering is a constant theme of Berdyaev's work 9 
as it is of the work of many Russian authors. o. F. Clarke, 
commenting on this as a national characteristic says that 
"Berdyaev, like so many Russians, forced to think of the 
meaning of suffering more poignantly than thinkers of nations 
whose history has been happier, saw that the link between 
suffering and freedom must be there in the very heart of the 
(~ 
Godhead, in H-. interior life. n(l39) Nade~ Gorodet~y 
confirms this observation in her 'Qook·: The ,-Humiliated;.\.;.; -•-··. ~ • .. ·--· ... 
Christ in Modern Russian Thought. Noting the difficulty of 
giving a general characterization of the religious nature of 
so complex and diverse a body as the Russian nation, 
Gorodetzky comments that "the figure of the humiliation of 
Christ, unconsciously felt and expressed in the accounts of 
some historical lives, in folk-lore and in secular 
literature, and finding its final expression in theology, 
.. is among the most constant features."(l40) 
As an example of one who offers some expression of this theme, 
the work of Fr. Serge: Bulgakov is suggested by Gorodetzky. 
He"represents a bridge between the literary-secular world 
and the theological world". (l4l) Bulgakov presents a more 
systematic Christology than Berdyaev does and, in spite of 
the important differences between them, their thinking 
reflects the same tradition. Two quotations from 
Gorodetzky's account of Bulgakov's kenotic Christology 
will illustrate the similarity by pointing to an idea 
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which we have already seen in Berdyaev 's thought, namely, 
the Creation and redemption envisaged as a single instance 
of the Father's revelation of His love, which achieves its 
f'inal aim in eschatological f'uJ"fi_lment. (l42 ) Gorodetzky 
notes that man 1 s freedom allows what Bulgakov terms "a 
certain risk of unsuccess."(l43) But the Father will wait 
for the creation to rFspond in love. Thus, the divine love 
has its kenosis in the act of creation, Gorodetzky 
continues: 
This creative kenosis is shared by the Son also. 
As the 'word a bout the world' (~ .p .169), He 
is already sent into this world. Not only is he 
already perfectly obedient to the Father, but he 
comes down serving the self-revealing God and he 
becomes the content of this revelation. He 
gives himself to the Father and, emptying Himself, 
He gives what is His own to the world. The Son 
is, for s. N. Bulgakov, the Lamb o1'fered already 
and offering himself in the act of c rea ti on; the 
other aspect emphasized is the beginning of 
divine sacrifice in that the Father not only 
condescends towards the creation but also sends 
The necfssity of this kenosis in the act of creation flows 
from what Gorodetzky calls "the impossibility that God 
should not love". (l4 5)The Incarnation is thus an extension 
of His kenotic activity. The account of Bulgakov's theme 
is continued thus: 
Now we face the Incarnation as a fact eternally 
foreseen by liod (l Pet.i.20). The Incarnation, 
says our author, cannot be a mere outcome of sin. 
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It actually did happen as the ac~ of redemption; 
but before .Adam existed; He is the fil'st (Lamb.p.l92), 
1be coming of the Son is not only a providential act 
resulting from the fall of' man~ but an originaJ good 
will of God which existed 'before the creation of the 
world as its basis and aim'. The Incarnation of the 
Son is not merely a means of redemption but its highest 
achievement; the last goal is 'to unite all the 
heavenly and the earthly world under one head, Christ.' 
Hence 'the soteriological task is included in the 
eschatological as a means into the aim; the redemption 
is the way to our glorification.' (~ p.l93)(l46) 
In a footnote reference, Gorodetzky refers to the work by 
R. M. Relton(l 47) which expresses a similar view. In 
discussing the patristic debate on patripassianism, Relton 
comments that "once full weight is given to the revelation 
in Christ of God not only as possessing the ethical 
attribute of love, but as being in Hisvery essence Love 
Himself, the ·a priori· theory of His impassibility fades 
into insignificance before the tremendous historical fact 
of Love Himself cru~ified, a revelation in time and space 
of an eternal truth. 11 (l4B) Here we come back to the idea 
which we have identified as a feature of Russian thought, 
and have located in the thinking of Berdyaev and Bulgakov, 
namely, that the suffering Christ reveals from eternity 
the nature of God. Rel ton locates tr1i s idea also in the 
patristic debate. He points out that Tertullian, in his 
debate with Praxeas, maintains that a God who is able to 
sympathise with us must be able to suffer with us; as 
Rel ton puts it, 11if He is Love, He can suffer; this is 
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the very heart of the mystery of Calvary."(l49) Helton 
further points out that the Cyrilline Christology of an 
impassible and immutable Logos arises from an unethical 
conception o1' God. Thi3 9 he comments 9 is based too 
exclusively on a "Platonic rather than a Christian philosophy.u(l: 
We have heard such a comment repeatedly from Berdyaev 
throughout the course of this investigation. We may, then 
point to the following conclusion of Dr. Relton on the place 
of this idea in modern theology. In the late symposium of 
his contributions to the study of Christian Doctrine in 
Britain, Dr. Rel ton comments that "fortunately the doctrine 
of the impassibility is not one by which we are bound today •.• 
•• On the contrary, modern theology can find a large place for 
the teaching of its exact opposite, in the exposition of the 
great central facts of the Incarnation and Atonement viewed 
'sub specie aeternitatis. "' (l5l) 
Two books which give a review of the debate about the 
passibility of Uod were published in Britain in the 1920's; 
the first in 1926, by J. K. Mozley, (l52 )the second in 1928, 
.!,.~ ... 
by B. R. Brasnett. (l53) Brasnett offers a discussion of 
Relton's article on Patripassianism from which we have just 
quoted. He suggests two criticisms of the article, both of 
which we shall consider since they relate to similar ideas 
in Berdyaev's thought. The first criticism is concerned 
with Relton's view of time and eternity. Brasnett comments 
that: 
we cannot follow him in his hasty flights from time 
to eternity and from eternity to time. He does not 
seem to have sufficiently considered the nature of 
eternity, nor decided whether he wi 11 regard it 
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simply as endless time or as something qualitatively 
distinct from Ume .... he seems to suggest that liod 's 
suffering foD man's sin is as great a reality outside 
of time or space, and he speaks of the inward 
significance of the Calvary sacrifice as a spiritual, 
timeless truth, though apparently he regards it as 
possible for that sacrifice to be brought into 
relationship with us today as an eternal reality. 
But how we who are in time are to have relations with 
a reality which is eternal, which in the context 
presumably means timeless, Dr. Relton does not explain.(l 54; 
It may be instructive to apply this criticism to the way in 
wnich Berdyaev speaks of the Cross in relation to time and 
to eternity which, we have suggested, is similar to the 
approach adopted by Relton. Berdyaev 's understanding 
follows from his vision of a cosmogony, derived from the 
mystical writing of Boehme. Although this vision is 
expressed in terms of m~th and symbol and thus quite 
different in form from the exposition given by Helton, thw 
central features are very similar. The boundary between 
time and eternity Berdyaev speaks of as a "frontier line 
idea"~l55) It is here that the creation, envisaged as 
God's other, from which He looks~ a response, is seen 
to emerge from a sub-conscious state, thereby asserting 
its freedom in its relation to God. So, it enters into 
time and space, the realm of good and evil, becoming the 
objectified world as we know it with all its pain and 
suffering. I ~ Now at this 1 frontier line the life of the 
G-odhead is revealed, becomes knowable as the personal 
life of the Trinity. But we must at this point 
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introduce the distinction between the economic Trinity 
and the immanent life of the Godhead. 
Berdyaev points out that, although the Word W8S prFsent in 
pre-temporal, pre-existent eternity 9 he was "not yet 
incarnate as man and had not made the sacrifice of love.u(l56 ) 
This ''incamationlt is not the incarnation of Jesus Christ in 
the form of the child at Bethlehem; that is rather the 
revelation of the God-man in time and space who exists in 
eternity as the second person of the Trinity. This 
11 incarnation 19 would seem to be the revealing of the humanity 
of the God-man in eternity in the iliife of the Trinity. It 
is thus that the crucifixion is spoken of as 11 the primal 
drama and mystery of the world and •.• of the relations 
between God and His other self," that "other self" being 
perfect thumanity, the true image of God, the full and 
freely-given response from,God 's other. (l57) It is because 
of the freedom which, in the created order- is ir-rat-ional, 
that God shares in its suffering. That is the mystery ani 
the tragedy o1· the love of uod in the act of Great ion. 
Berdyaev makes it quite clear that this is a symbolic way 
of thinking, a myth aoout primordial his tory. 
It might, therefore, be of some help to bear this in mind 
when considering the view put :t'orwa rd by Rel ton and 
Hrasnett's criticism of it. There is a fine tension in 
our kn~ledge of liod which is divine-human, which may speak 
of God in His essence, and yet in so doing must distort the 
intuitive, spiritual knowledge of that essence. Thus, we 
may employ symbolic language to express our knowledge of 
God as He reveals Himself to us. But we can11ot take these 
symbols for the realities themselves. ~o, to say that God 
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suffers is a symbol of our knowledge of Hif love for us. 
It is a symbol which, in the drama of the relation played 
out between God and man, most appropriately expresses our 
ex.I:Jer"ience uf Lhe Lotally self-giving, vulnerable and 
intense yearning that God has for the response of love from 
His creation. It is precisely through the understanding 
that this language is symbolic that we, in time, are able to 
know and speak of a reality that is eternal. It should 
perhaps be said in conclusion to every work of theology 
that "mystery, 'docta ignorantia' have a profound 
significance •.•• mystical negative theology alone brings us 
closer to the depths." ( l58) 
I On the second of Brasnett s criticisms we may comment 
briefly .. He suggests that kelton "makes no real effort to 
find any abiding truth in the dogma of the divine 
impassibility, thatifcr. so long held the field.u(l59) On the 
one hand it should be noted that we have seen, in the writing 
of Berdyaev and a number of other theologians, that there is 
a strong rejection of the concepts of God as Pure Act, self-
sufficient etc. as the legacy of Greek philosophy, rather than 
the testimony of biblical revelation. Among these concepts 
we should number the idea of impassibili~. If, then, we a 
are to reject these concepts as the basis for our doctine of 
God the fact that "for so long they held the field" is of no 
direct relevance to their usefulness. On the other hand, 
while rejecting the doctrine of the impassibility of God in 
its traditional form, one m~t well find that it attests to 
an aspect of the Christian revelation which we should wish 
to preser·ve. Now it is obvious that in speaking of the 
suffering of God we are speaking about the inner ~ife of 
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the Trj_ni ty, a mystery known to us only through the economy 
of revelation. Berdynev is very carrful to poj_nt ouL that 
here we rr ach a boundary which is at the very brink of mystery; 
II ~ 
R ra?.or edge . 
signi1'icance in applying to our idea of the suffering of G-od 
the concept of the "coincidentia opposi torum" which Berdyaev 
seems to locate, as a feature of the experience of the mystics, 
at this point of the boundary between mystery and revelation. 
We should emphasize that Berdyaev insists that the coincidence 
of opposites is a mystical concept, not a rational or 
philosophical one. The example Berdyaev gives is that of the 
concept of ~od as immobile - an idea quite clearly rejected by 
him as a rational concept. .tiowever, when this is seen as one 
aspect of the two-fold '' coincidentia opposi torum ", we can then 
see how it fits into the vision of the mystic as the meeting 
e. 
of rest and motioning God. So ~erdyaev quotes from St. bi~n 
the New Theologian: "Come, Thou, who remainest unmoved yet 
who ever dost direct Thyself towar·ds us". This also would be 
the way in which we could speak of the impassibility of G-od. 
It is the meeting of the mystery of the Godhead which goes 
beyond our experience, with the revelation of the movement of 
God's self-sacrificing love towards us. We have already 
noted that Herdyaev speaks of a "frontier line idea'' at 
which, once again, the meeting of the unknown, unfathomable 
mystery of the Godhead, and the revel& tion of the Trinity 
takes place. 
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CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSION. 
Considering the complexity and range of Berdyaev's thought, 
i t. i q hu nr. 
- .... --- ..... " ...... ._. to offer an assesomt::nt of his 
inf'l uence. Reference is still made to his work by present-
day theologians(l)although the enthusiasm and possibly 
extravagant claims made for his work when it first appeared 
here have diminished~ 2 ) Thus it seems that Berdyaev is 
acknowledged as having made some contribution to the 
development of theological thinking this century, even 
though that contribution cannot be directly identified in 
any particular area. A term often used to describe 
Berdyaev 's work is "prophetic". So Eugene Porret comments 
in La Philosophie Chr~tienne en Russie that Berdyaev had 
communicated the prophetic character of Russia's religious 
thought~3) The reason for Berdyaev's success in England must 
have been tha;t against the background of social unease (e.g. 
the economic difficulties of the Depression, the National 
Government, the rise of totalitarian governments on the 
Continent - in Germany, Italy, Spain, Russia) Berdyaev had 
a message which seemed to read the signs of the times. 
Europe was indeed passing through a period of social and 
economic upheaval. And although ~erdyaev's prediction of 
what would emerge from this might now seem over-optimistic 
and unrealistic, he was essentially correct in his assess-
ment of the areas to which modern European man must turn 
his attention. Berdyaev directs us to man considered in two 
ways; as an individual person, and as a social being. He 
pointed to the crisis in Western society as a crisis in the 
life of the individual. Man exploiting and expld~ed 
cannot be the basis of a stable community. But more 
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importantly, man who knows himself' only in terms of 
material existence and relationships has lost sight 
of the destiny of his life and the source of his being 
human: God. 
In an introduction to Mysterium Magnum Berdyaev wrote that 
"with Boehme there begins a new era in the history of 
Christian thought. His influence is considerable; it is 
not immediately apparent to you, but works like a serum. 11 ( 4 ) 
We would suggest that precisely this assessment could be 
made of Berdyaev•s own work. One ca1mot point to one 
particular theologian or trend of thought and say that it 
has been directly influenced by Herdyaev. However, he 
opened up areas for discussion which are still of interest 
to theologians today. We could suggest two such areas in 
particular. One is the way in which we speak about God, 
or, to borrow a phrase from a modern theologiant 
"metaphorical theology". The other is man considered both 
individually and in relation to society. We shall 1 ook 
briefly at the latter of these first. 
The elaboration of a theology of man has been one of the 
most important developments of this century, and in the 
life of the Church has been given its most systematic 
expression in the Second Vatican Council. Be rdya ev' s work 
is too idiosyncratic for wholesale assimilation as catholic 
doctrine. J. L. Segundo, best known from his development 
of liberation theology,offers an interesting comment. He 
observes that a philosophy which in its entirety can be 
adapted by Christianity is rare or unique. (He is 
Lh' k' ~ ~~u;n~-'~ l.,,&._ln ... ll1g OI .. y_ ..... a. a a 
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use of Aristotle.) Thus, no rule o1' 
'all or nothing' can be applied: "This is a condition of 
the progress of dogrna. 11 (5) This applies, in Segundo's 
opinion, to the work of Berdyaev: "Catholic theology in 
particular is able to profit from berdyaev's thought on 
the condition, however, that she undertakes to rectify her 
own thought. We hope to have shown that it cannot be 
incorporated without more of a coherent Christian dogmatic 
and leaving aside the :formulas used." ( 6 ) 
The context in which it is most likely that Berdyaev-made 
some contribution to the development of modern Catholic 
theology is his association with the Personalists in France. 
It should also be noted that personalism did not remain 
within the confines of isprit and its readers. In 
Catholicism and Crisis in Modern France William Bosworth 
notes that "the term has been taken :from its original 
context and used to describe a much more general concept, 
accepted by virtually all Catholics. In this wide sense, 
personalism is the philosophy of individual self-
development which prevents organizations, including those 
set up along corporatist lines, from impairing individual 
lnitiative."(7) It should also be remembered that not only 
was Mgr. Roncali the Apostolic ~uncio in Paris from 
December 1944 to 1953, but also that such influential 
French theologians as Yves Congar and Jean Dani~lou were 
members of Berdyaev's circle of 1'riends. ( 8 ) The situation 
which faced the Council was the de-christianization of 
whole classes, powerful rival ideologies, the erosion of 
the Church's influence in society, and the passing away of 
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traditional social and moral structures. Michael Kelly 
suggests that the personalists prepared the ground for 
the Council by defining the terms which it used as a basis 
for its discussions 9 and leading to changes in the Church's 
outlook: "the efforts of Mounier and his associates can 
be clearly seen, in retrospect, to have been an important 
contribution towards making such a change possible on an 
ideological level. 11 (9) 
The development of the social teaching of the Roman Gathhlic 
Church reflects the interests of Mounier and the personalists. 
Pius XII gave what R. L. Cramp calls a unique emphasis to a 
cencern shared by his predecessors: "His conviction that one 
of the greatest problems of the social order in modern ttmes 
was the threat to the dignity of the individual within his 
social community.''(lO) Thus, in his Christmas Message of 1941, 
he proclaimed that the contact and relationship between men in 
thei~ social life was 'taking on a purely physical and 
mechanical character; "the rule of external compulsion, mere 
possession of power, over-ruled the norms of right and order, 
human associations and community life, which emanating from 
God, determine the natural and supernatural relationship 
that should prevail in the co-existence of law and love as 
applied to the individual and to society."(ll) 
It was during this period surrounding the Second World War 
that much of the groundwork on which the Second Vatican 
Council was founded was done. Parallel to Maritain's 
revision of Thomism, von Aretin comments that Guardini 
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was prep1:1 ring "a complete new Catholic intellectual approach 
to the problem of man in the technological world of the 
twentieth sentury. u(l 2 ) The French contribution is described 
as that not of a school but "the loosely connected efforts of 
like-minded friends." An example of this is the Unam Sanctam 
series of books produced by Congar, Dani~lou, and de Lubac. (l3) 
The implications of the new emphasis in the theology of these 
people pointed to various areas of the Church's life which 
would require greater consideration. Congar pointed to the 
ecumenical implications which were quite clearly taken up by 
the Council. The Dogmatic Constitution on The Church 
emphasizes the unity of all mankind as the context within 
which the Church operates: "Christ is the light of humanity" 
and it is from Him that unity flows. Each individual human 
being achieves that unity, therefore, within the Church, and 
so "all men are called to belong to the new People of God."(l4) 
The question of ecumenism could not be ignored in the context 
os this emphasis on unity. Rauch maintains that Congar 
develops his ecumenical views as a result of his encounter 
with personalist circles of friends such as Mounier, Berdyaev, 
Mari tain, &c. Mouni er 'a 
was a philosophy of openness and dialogue which 
was at once the consequence and the means of a 
profound ecumenism, an ecumenism witnessed in 
Meunier's association with the fuvid~es, Nicolas 
Berdyaev's meetings of Orthodox and Roman 
Catholics and fr·.:.t-: .. St(\nt~ at Clamart, Mari tain' s 
b'le-
gatherings at Meudon, and within(fosprit movement 
itself. At the Rencontres lnternationales de 
Gen~vres in 1963, Meunier's friend P~re Yves 
Congar discussed the aim of' th8t dialogu.e which 
is the underl.vtng principle of ecumenism in 
essentially personalist terms. Men are so rrone 
to possessiveness, GongD r declared, that they tend 
to regard themselves as subjects and to treat others 
as objects. But other people are also subjects and 
1 they do not wish to be mere objects,not even objects 
of solicitude.' (l5) 
The clearest definition of personalist thinking in the 
documents of the Second Vai tcan Council is probably to be 
found in Gaudium et Spes, the Pastoral Constitution on the 
Church in the Modern World. (l6) Part 1 Chapter 1 is 
entitled uThe Dignity of the Human Person" and on many 
points is similar to the thinking of the Personalists. 
In article 12 the tension between the greatness and baseness 
of the human being is noted, in answer to the fuhdamental 
question, "What is man?" This section 1 s entitled "Man as 
the Image of God". In the Commentar.y on this document, 
Fr. Joseph Ra tzinger notes that this theme 11 only receives 
the full meaning from the fact that in the New Testament 
the Adam-figure and the doctrine of man as the image of God 
are transferred to Christ as the definitive Adam. 
Consequently, this idea not only has its origin in the 
theology of creation, it becomes an eschatological theme, 
connected less with the origin than with the future of man.u(l7) 
This statement ver,y clearly reflects the way in which 
Berdyaev had interpreted Solovyev's Lec¢uves on Godmanhood. 
Solovyev had also seen the Incarnation of the divine Logos 
as the revelation through the second Adam of a new spiritual 
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humanity. Ra tzinger also points out w18 L U1e development 
of the theme of man as God's image selects from the 
patristic writing Augustine's view of the image of God as 
a "capacity for God, quaJification to know and love God. "(lB) 
We have already noted that Marcel deals with this aspect of 
Augustine's thought, showing its close relation to 
personalist thinking. Marcel is in fact mentioned by 
Ratzinger in connection with Augustine's reflections on man's 
spiritual depths. 
~ In this general area the Pensees of Pascal are also mentioned. 
They were a considerable influence on Meunier, as Kelly has 
pointed out. (l9) Here, Berdyaev's insistence on man as a 
spiritual being and not just a bodily one should be borne in 
mind. The concept of man as microcosm, a concept which 
Berdyaev developed from Dostoevsky, underlies the thir~ing 
of this document. Ratzinger makes an interesting 
observation on the Council's consider8tion of Teilhard's 
interiorit~; he writes that "when it is said that by his 
interiority man transcends the whole universe of things, 
it is impossible not to notice the close resemblance to 
Pascal's words: All bodies, the r.irmament, the stars, the 
earth and its kingdoms do not equal the least of the 
spirits; for the latter know all those things, whereas 
bodies know nothing."( 2o) This echoes, t)o, Dostoevsky's 
mystical vision of man's relation to the cosmot3.( 2l) 
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Although it is not possible to develop here the point t"J.lly, 
it should be noted that Fr. Karl Rahner deals vd th the idea 
of man as spirit in the world in several of his essays. He 
deals With it under the heading of "Nature and Grace" and in 
some aspects his conclusions are not dissimilar to Berdyaev's. 
We noted that Berdayev envisaged grace as something which was 
not external to man but which had been revealed through 
Christ as the divine in man, although Berdyaev also speaks of 
it as proceeding from the human and from man's heavenly 
humanity. ( 22 ) Rahner similarly is critical of the average 
textbook concept ot the relationship between nature and grace; 
"Ultimately," he writes, "This amounts to the reproach of 
'extrinsecism': grace appears there as a mere superstructure, 
very fine in itself certainly, which is imposed upon nature 
by God's free decree. 11 ( 23) Rahner speaks of this grace as a 
'potency or congeniality for the eternal miracle of infinite 
Love which is freely given and received as an unexpected, 
unexacted gift; "For, as he now in fact is, he (man) is 
created for it; he is thought and called into being so that 
Love might bestow itself. To this extent this 'potency' is 
what is inmost and most authentic in him, the centre and 
root of what he is absolutely. 11 ( 24) 
Gaudium et Spes also takes up and develops the question of 
man's :freedom. It states that "that whiqh is truly freedom 
is an exceptional sign of the image of God in man."( 25) 
But Ratzinger points out that this freedom is intended to 
relate to the psychological plane rather than the social or 
political; it is not intended as a programme for anarchy. 
However, defining man in these terms, it follows that 
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neither society nor any other power may violute this status; 
the Fathers of the Council intended 11 to affirm man as the 
free being who must himself decide to be himself and who may 
not be subjected either to external coercion or to the 
compulsion of instinct. 11 ( 26 ) But Article 25 of this document, 
entitled "Person and Society: Interdependence" points to 
man's need of life in society; through it "man develops all 
his talents and becomes able to rise to his destiny. u( 27) 
The idea of man's destiny lying within the realm of his 
communal life, which is here put 1'orward by the Council, 1s 
in many ways similar to the Russian concept of sobornost. 
For the community her·e envisaged is a spiritual one which is 
not determined by abstract or ''objectified factors"such as 
class, nation, cluture, &c. As Otto Semmelroth points out 
in his article in the Commentary, ttconsequen tly no other 
difference, racial, national, or individual can destroy 
this fundamental community of likeness to God. 11 ( 2B) It is 
also pointed out by the Council that man's destiny within 
the community of all humanity has not only a horizontal 
dimension but also a vertical one; human solidarity stems 
rrom the fact that all mankind is made in the image or God. 
From this the horizontal dimension is derived, i.e. that 
ever,y human person shares a common status and destiny. 
But the vertical dimension itself has a communal character; 
for the Uod in whose image man is made is the Trinity, one 
God in three persons.< 29) We have already noted that 
Berdyaev uses the doctrine of the Trinity in exactly this 
way, to imply personal and inter-personal existence, the 
surmounting of duality and division. (30) The balance 
between maintaining the rights of each human person and 
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personal striving to pass beyond egocentricity is to be 
derived from the image of the life of the Trinity 9 as 
Semmelroth points out: "Just as if the impenetrabiJj_ ty 
of the mystery of the triune God were to be made 
perceptible to man, he discovers again and again how much 
the individual's own independence can endanger the 
community of all, and to what extent devotion to the 
community can endanger personal independence. 11 ( 3l) 
Two other aspects of the way in which the Council deals 
with the nature of man will lead on to the second area for 
discussion opened up by Berdyaev's work, namely, the way in 
which we talk about God. One consequence noted by the 
Council of speaking about man as made in the image of God 
is that man is given dominion over the world. This theme 
emerges ver,y strongly in Gaudium et Spes and is in many ways 
very similar to Berdyaev's notion of the divine creativity 
which in man exists as the mark of God's image.(32 ) 
Ratzinger points out quite emphatically that to speak of 
man's vocation to creative dominion over the world is a 
consequence and not the content of being made in the image 
of God. ( 33 ) While a similar line is taken by Alfons Auer who 
writes on Article 34 of the Pastoral Constitution ( 11 The Value 
of Human Activity"), he is more specific about the double 
vocation which God's plan assigns to man, to bring all things 
under his dominion, and to refer them to the Creator: 
uClearly the Council was not afraid to describe man as 
collaborating with God or as completing the work of the 
Creator might attribute too much independence and creative 
1 u(34) activity to man to the detriment of God s transcendence. 
The second aspect of the Council's delibePation concel'ns 
the idea of man and woman as the image of God. In 
Article 12 Gaudium et Spes notes that the "partnership of 
man and woman constitutes the first form of communion 
between person."( 35) Ratzinger states in his commentary 
that while the idea that it is man and woman in relation 
which is the image of God" it is rejected as analogia 
en tis. Gaudium et Spes does, however, bring the existence 
of humanity as man and woman into undefined connection with 
human likeness to God."( 36 )In connection with this, 
reference can be made not only to Berdyaev but also to Barth. 
In the Church Dogmatics III/4 Barth points to man's creation 
and vocation to existence in encounter with his fellow man. 
Just as both Semmelroth and Berdyaev had based this on God's 
trinitarian nature, so Barth observes that "nor can God who 
is no Deus Solitarius but Deus Triunus be mirrored in a homo 
solitarius."(37) But Barth develops this further, 
considering man's being as either male or female, for man 
never exists as such, but always as the human male or female, 
and so "by the divine likeness of man in Gen 1.27f there is 
understood the fact that God created them male and female, 
corresponding to the fact that God Himself exists in 
relationship anci not in isolation • .,( 3B) Berdyaev offers a 
different view of the same idea. In the Meaning of the 
Creative Act he maintains that human differentiation into 
male and female cannot wipe out the androgynous character 
in man: "In truth neither man nor woman is the image and 
likeness of God but only the androgyne •.•• The differentation 
into male and female is a result of the cosmic fall of' Adam. 
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Created in the image and li!mess of God, the androgyne man 
f"·r(·,:'"' 
falls apart, separates himself~he natural female element, 
is alienated from tJ1e cosmos and falls slave to the power 
f-zro\ 
of feminine nature."'_,~ 7 ' It must be admitted that this 
mystical doctrine of man seems strangely out of place in 
modern thinking. Berdyaev himself acknowledges that it 
is derived from Boehme. Bar:tJI .. Is :to!bally disrni ssive of 
the idea. He suggests that Liod is either completely 
absent or He is its materially insignificant framework. 
But in tither case "it is impossible to criticise a myth. 
It is enough to see through it as such. 11 (40) 
These considerations of man, both in the male/female 
relation as the image of God, and also as creator in 
relation to the environment, seem to be very similar to 
the issues being raised by Feminist Theologians. It is 
not possible here to develop this fully, but we can point 
to some of the similarities. The first fundamental point 
is that the way in which mankind understands ;- ij)_rts elf to be 
made in the image of God will affect the way in which we 
speak: about God. Thus, if God's image is both male and 
female, our language about God ought to contain both male 
and female elements in the symbols, myths and meaphors 
which we employ. In Sexism and God-talk Rosemary Radford 
Reuther comments on the significance of the identification 
of Christ as an androgynous figure. Her reading of this 
is that the femaleness represents the instinctual and 
bodily side of man; "the separation of the female out of 
the side of Adam represents the disintegration of the 
original whole, the revolt of the lower against the higher 
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,l( I I 1 \ 
side of man:'~~, But this is not the way Berdyaev reads 
Boehme's vi, w of androgyne. Berdyaev made the 
distinction in the feminine principle betweem woman and 
the Virgin; "'l'he fall of the androgyne meant the loss 
of the Virgin Sophia and the appearance of the woman, Eve. 11 (42 ) 
Thus, some significance must be attached to the fact that 
Christ is born of a virgin and represents the restored 
androgynous Adam: 10Escha tologi cal feminism affirmed the 
restored equality of man and woman in Christ by referring 
to an original transcendent anthropology that existed before 
the fall into the finite condition characterized by sexual 
dimorphism. 11 (43 ) If the destiny of mankind is to be seen in 
this way, it may affect our language about God. Reuther 
notes that some feminist theologians believe that an 
androgynous view of God resolves the problem of an 
exclusively male image. (44) The principle of the relation 
between the language we use to express self-knowledge and 
our knowledge of God is maintained by ~rofessor Sally 
McFague: "Feminist theologians are saying that religious 
language is not only religious but also human, not only 
about God but also about us. u(45) 
Here we must move to the question of symbol and its 
relation to reali~. From a feminist point of view, 
Professor McFague raises the question of whether or hot 
human language does still convey a symbolic relation 
between this world and a metaphysical reality beyond it, 
or whether "many of us no longer believe in a symbolic, 
sacramental universe in which the part stands for the 
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whole~ the thin; s of this world 'figure' snother world, and 
11 ( 46 I 
all that is connected by a web of being. '· 1 This view may 
seem to rule out Berdyaev's religious world-view which 
tl.eptlnds lHr·gely on this kind. o1:· symbolic relc:1tionship. But 
there is another point made by Professor McFague which 
suggests a closer~··similari ty to Berdyaev. Suggesting that 
the future of religious language might be metaphorical, she 
writes, "one critical difference between symbol and 
metaphorical statements is that the latter always contains 
thf!whisper, '1i t is and it is not'."(47)Berdyaev also points 
\ 
to the danger of a realist way of' thinking. The 
consequence of the disappearance of an earlier symbolic 
outlook is, in Professor McFague's opinion, what forms the 
basis of feminist theologians' rejection of traditional 
religious language which speaks, for example, of God as 
"Father". But like Professor McFague 's "and it is not", 
Berdyaev's appreciation of an apophatic knowledge of God 
offers this balance in his use of symbolism. For "symbolism 
is justified by the fact that God is both knowable and 
unknowable."(4B) 
The second point is that feminist theology has a pronounced 
emphasis on the human care of and relation to the earth. 
We noted above(49)the similarity between the development of 
the idea of interiorit~ and the notion of man as a microcosm, 
a similarity between aspects of Dostoevsky and Russian 
Orthodoxy, and de Chardi.rt and modern Catholic spirituality. 
In a survey of the work of Christian feminists, Sara 
Maitland notes that de Chardin comes nea~est _to pantheistic 
nature mysticism and that "he was listed as the second most 
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influential theological writer in Fran Ferder's study of 
Roman Catholic women who believe that they have vocations 
.. (r:,o) 
to the priesthood. J A strong spiritual affinity with 
the earth, which Berdyaev noted RR a trAit of Dostoevsky's 
work, emerges in feminist theology. ·women are here 
revealing a forgotten dimension of mankind's creativity in 
relation to his natura 1 surroundings. In an interesting 
article entitled "Parables and Women's Experience" Nicola 
Slee points to the contribution which feminist analysis can 
make to a restructuring of ideas about human reality and 
experience in both its male and female dimensions. Under-
lying the gospel parables of growth she sees a "secret yet 
strong rhythm of the natural world" which strikes "resonant 
chords in women hearers, whose lives and bodies share 
unif:}uely in creation s rJayj;hm, the cycle of labour and birth 
and growth, the mysterious, hidden action of generation and 
reganera ti on." ( 51 ) In The Meaning of the Creative Act, 
Berdyaev illustrates this human intuition of the spiritual 
e, 
forces within the material world with a story from S.Si~n 
the New Theologian. In the story, after Adam was driven out 
of Paradise, the moon and stars refused to give light, the 
waters did not flow, the animals began to despise man, who 
would have perished had not God ordained that all created 
things should become mortal, looking forward to the time 
when man would become renewed, and the whole creation be 
liberated, which was the work of nature and of the cosmos 
and set in motion by the incarnate logos. The story evokes 
Romans, 8.18-25. Berdyaev himself comments: "man's fate 
depends upon the fate of nature and of the cosmos, and he 
cannot separate himself from this. u(52 ) 
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It is this sort o:f understanding of the relationship between 
us,between the spiritiual and the materiaJ...,which is being 
developed by :feminist Christians. An enclosed contemplative, 
Sr.Mainrad Craighead OSB, who writes on our union with 
creation, observes that "prayer is the direction and renewal 
o:f the whole person •.. and this involves our bodies. Our 
bodies are channels to receive and t:i ve out this divine 
energy."(53) 1'o same. this may seem a novel and startling 
way of looking at things. But we would suggest that it is 
an aspect of Christian spirituality which has a long tradition. 
From the pantheistic mysticism of Boehme to the Naturphilosophie 
of Schelling, to the Romantics, Dostoevsky and the Slavophils, 
and to Berdyaev, there flows a stream of ideas. As early as 
1936 the personalists of Esprit were advocating a programme of 
inquiry similar to that followed by modern feminist theologians. 
, 
With reference to a special edition (June 1936) of Esprit 
which was entitled "La Femme aussi est une personne", Mounier 
writes: "How these resources (of feminine being) are to be 
drawn upon without imprisoning woman in her functions; how 
to unite her with the world and the world with her; what new 
values and what new conditions this project calls for -
these are questions and taks inescapble for everyone who gives 
its full meaning to the affirmation that woman, also, is a 
person." (54 ) 
What conclusions would one make in a final assessment of 
Berdyaev' s work? To begin with, one would point to his 
contribution to the religious consciousness of the period 
in which he lived. Initially this means Russia in the 
years le~ding up to the Revolution. But later it also 
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covers the rise of Nazi Germany and the outbreak of the 
Second World War as the background to lt fe in the West. 
U,.,;.>_."L':J -h,L,r 
During the years of Berdyaev' s life in France, 
European society experienced perhaps the most dramatic 
changes it has ever known. His commentary on this, from 
the position of an outsider who had lived through similarly 
j 
apoca~tic upheavals, was at the time seen as prophetic and 
inspired. Now, thirty or forty years later, his writing 
looks clearly dated, a symptom of his age rather than 
determinative of its future. But the times through which 
Berdyaev lived were the raw material of his thoughts and 
reflections. Here an important principle emerges. 
Berdyaev's philosophy and theology are grounded in his own 
experience. He seems to conform to the requirement of 
Orthodox spiritual writers that the mind must enter the 
heart as the faithful Christian comes within the presence of 
God. So, for Berdyaev 7 theology is not simply 
intellectual discipline; it is also the matter of a 
Christian's life of prayer. This is a principle we should 
do well not to forget, and it is one of which we have 
recently been reminded by Andrew Louth in his essay on the 
nature of theology, Discerning the MYstery. He writes of a 
division in theology between thought about God and the 
movement of the heart towards God, 11 a division which is 
particularly damaging in theology, for it threatens in a 
fundamental way the whole fabric of theology in both its 
spiritual and intellectual aspects."(SS) There is also in 
this principle an aspect which Berdyaev develops and is 
another useful contribution; the holding together of 
opposites in tension. We should not lose sight of the 
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theme of coincidentia opposi torum It may be this which 
leads to a feature of Berdyaev 1 s style which should be 
taken into account; a certain amount of his work over-
states the position he is outlining. In addi ti onp there 
is a tendency in Berdyaev's thought to interpret 
revelation solely in terms of his own philosophy. This 
is a point interestingly made by Begundo by means of a 
comparison between Berdyaev and Bu1tmann. (56) This need 
not, however, be a reason for dismissing his work. It 
does mean that Berdyaev's work requires careful 
consideration. An example of such consideration is to 
be found in Professor Macquarrie's assessment of Berdyaev's 
assertion that man contains the solution to the whole 
riddle of the universe: "that may be over-confident", 
Macquarrie writes, "and carries the idea of man as microcosm 
to an extreme length •••• There may well be mysteries to 
which humanity offers no clue. 11 Macquarrie's own verdict 
is that "man does bring to light something of the creative 
forces at work in the world, and to that extent man is 
indeed a microcosm, a becoming that bears a stamp of being. 11 (57) 
We would return again to the idea of Berdyaev's thought 
act[ng like a serum within the general corpus of European 
thought. He pointed to broad truths amout man in relation 
to the world, about the whole of humanity, and about God 
which remain topics for theological, philosophical and 
scientific investigation today. Berdyaev's was a spirit 
which animated others, even though they might subsequently 
have followed other paths. 
As a conclusion and assessment of this consideration of 
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Berdyaev 1 s work and influence, we offer the following 
quotstion: 
I realise that to some people the religious 
nature of his (Berdyaev's) philosophy may 
seem to belong to a past age, but I believe 
that as a philosopher, prophet and visionary 
Berdyaev speaks to all who are turned towards 
the light, hoping to respond to their tragic 
destiny and through their creative freedom 
to play their part in the transfiguration 
of the cosmos ••.. In his autobiography he 
had written that the contents of his books 
implied a new consciousness of the Eighth Day 
which prepares for the corning of a New Heaven 
and a New Earth •.•.• Berdyaev symbolizes the 
Man of the Eighth Day.(5B) 
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